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policy REVIEW

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Once more, through the looking glass

Suppose an American company—one that operates all over the world—wants to open a new factory, store, warehouse, or office building in the United States. Such a facility, of course, would create new jobs for Americans, along with all the other good things that happen when people are put to work.

But when the company's top executives take a final look at the economics, they hesitate. So a foreign company steps in, the project gets built, and everybody lives happily ever after—except the American company, and maybe some American workers, who find themselves penalized by American tax law, and thereby beaten out by a foreign competitor.

The above-mentioned script seems highly illogical, like something out of Alice in Wonderland, if not Franz Kafka. But it's eminently possible, and even probable, thanks to the vagaries of the 1986 tax law passed in the name of reform.

The culprit in our example is the section of the rewritten tax law dealing with the allocation of interest expense.

What those words mean is that for a U.S. multinational company, with affiliates operating in many parts of the world, the interest paid on money borrowed to finance a U.S. business is treated as if it were paid in part to finance foreign operations. And this, of course, results in a partial loss of the tax deduction. Foreign companies have no such requirement. That's the technical definition. As a practical matter, the words mean that it's often cheaper for a foreign company to create American jobs than for a U.S. company to do so. And the foreign companies, because their after-tax interest costs are lower, are more competitive in the U.S. than many U.S. companies.

Here's why:

An American affiliate of the U.S. multinational, Global Widgets, Inc., wants to build a widget plant in Anytown, Iowa, and borrows money to do so. Under the tax law, part of the interest on the loan is allocated to Global Widgets' operations in Kiribati, an island country in the Pacific, even though Global Widgets Kiribati borrowed no money and has no relationship with the Iowa operation. As a result, Global Widgets' U.S. affiliate cannot deduct the full amount of its interest expense in the U.S. Moreover, it cannot deduct anything in Kiribati, either, where the government would surely frown on any tax return claiming Iowa expenses as a deduction. But any foreign-owned widget maker who wanted to build a plant in the U.S. could deduct all of its interest expense against revenues earned in the U.S. Global would therefore be the high-cost producer, compared to the foreign-owned company operating here.

Here's another example. Suppose a U.S.-based multinational manufacturing company buys a major U.S. retailer, with borrowed money. Parts of that borrowing are treated as if they were made by affiliates in far-flung places, well-removed from the U.S. So part of the tax deduction is lost. But that isn't the end of it. Suppose the retailing arm then borrows money to finance its inventories of lawn mowers in southern California. A portion of that debt is treated as if it were accrued by the parent company's operations in Zimbabwe. So the retailer would have a smaller tax deduction—and higher operating expenses—than a U.S. retailer with no overseas ties, or any of the major retailers, household names all, who have recently been bought by foreign companies.

Our tax law, in other words, needs some intensive rethinking, well beyond the technical fixes currently being made in Congress. We should be thinking about why multinational U.S. companies are treated like second-class citizens, compared to strictly domestic companies. And we should be thinking about why even foreign firms operating here get better tax treatment.

Congress is understandably reluctant to go deeply into reforming tax reform. But sooner or later the bullet will have to be bitten. American tax law needs to be pulled back through the looking glass into the real world, where, one hopes, logic and fairness prevail.

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PLAYING TO WIN

William J. Bennett On Conservative Government

AN INTERVIEW BY ADAM MEYERSON

In July 1988, then Secretary of Education William J. Bennett spoke about conservative principles in government with Adam Meyerson, editor of *Policy Review.*

Policy Review: **You've often criticized conservatives whose vision of domestic policy is limited to budget cuts. Instead you've suggested that conservatives need to *govern*—to forge winning political coalitions and to shape policies that advance conservative values. What kind of government should conservatives stand for?**

Bennett: Well, it is prudent for conservatives to remain worried, suspicious, and instinctively wary of government when it comes to domestic matters, but they shouldn't let this become an inflexible article of faith. Government need not always be an unqualified evil. It can be made to serve conservative ends.

As a general starting point, the proper conservative position is that the federal government should not get involved with an issue if it is unlikely to play a helpful role. But some amount of government is going to be with us in the modern state whether we like it or not. If you couldn't get rid of substantial portions of government with the conservative revolution led by Ronald Reagan, you are probably not going to do it with anybody. This is not an argument for expanding the size of government; it is an argument for recognizing that government is there and has to be dealt with.

So, how do you deal with government? In some cases, simply by damage control, by trying to limit the harm that government does. We must insist that government do no harm to those institutions that really make a difference in the lives of individuals—institutions like the family, good schools, and community organizations. But in many cases, I would urge conservatives to view the existence of government programs as an opportunity to make things better. Harness government programs to serve conservative ends. Harness government programs to ends that work, ends that reflect the basic views and values of the American people.

P.R.: And what are some of those principles?

Bennett: Consider the family, which conservatives care a great deal about. I have noticed, in listening to the Democrats lately, that they talk most often as if there were two major entities. One is the individual, usually beleaguered and unhappy and miserable. The second is government, which delivers help to this beleaguered, unhappy individual. Democrats don't talk much about intermediate institutions like the family. Mario Cuomo used family as a metaphor in his famous 1984 convention speech. He talked about the American family. But he didn't really talk about the family as conservatives understand it, namely, as consisting of husbands and wives and children.

Can conservatives advance an agenda—even through government programs—that can strengthen the family? Yes, they can and they should. Because the choice here, as with so many other things, is not whether you will do something or nothing. Something will be done. Action will be taken. Programs will be put in place. The question is whether they will be good or bad. I think there is much we can do to see that they are good.

Now, what does this mean concretely and specifically? It means taking up the issue of child-care, for example. The Dodd-Kildee child-care bill pending in Congress is a bad bill that discriminates against parents who care for their children at home. It includes many other worrisome provisions. Those of us who testified on Capitol Hill in favor of child-care tax credits, and against the Dodd-Kildee bill, probably had some success in altering the terms of debate. But you could only do this if you were of a mind to think about ways the federal government could help families, rather than just raging against the Christopher Dodds of this world.

Another conservative principle is accountability in government, the idea that federal monies ought to be spent in ways that reach the object they are intended to reach. I have found in my dealings with the Democrats in Congress that they are much better at writing checks than they are at checking the merchandise. If we are going to spend money, we have an obligation to spend it well, spend it wisely, to be good and faithful stewards of the public's purse.

For example, the Department of Education during my tenure did not launch an ideological assault on Chapter 1, the $4 billion compensatory education program, or even

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on the $140 million program for bilingual education. We took a different strategy. We said that if those programs are there—and there is enormous consensus in the Congress on both sides that they be retained—then they ought to reach their objectives. Bilingual education should teach children how to speak English; if it doesn't, the program should disappear or the money should go elsewhere. The $4 billion in Chapter 1 should go to actual, demonstrable gains in achievement by poor children, or we should do something else with the money. This is, I think, not only right and sound and responsible government. It is also politically appealing, as it should be, to the American people who are shelling out the money.

A third conservative principle: government should never relieve individuals of their own sense of responsibility. Welfare programs as they exist and will exist should be structured in a way that invites and encourages people to a greater sense of individual responsibility, rather than to a greater sense of dependence.

P.R.: It's often said that you've used your office mostly as a "bully pulpit"—focusing less on Department of Education programs, more on shaping the public debate about teaching, curricula, and accountability in education. How should a conservative Secretary of Health and Human Services or Housing and Urban Development use his or her bully pulpit?

Bennett: Essentially the same way. The new appointee coming into a cabinet post is typically confronted with the "narrow playing field" argument, as Mark Blitz calls it. He is immediately met by predecessors, holdovers, bureaucrats, and well-wishers who say, "Now be careful. Here is the playing field and it is defined within these lines. You have to meet with the interest groups, you have to meet with those who are powerful on Capitol Hill, and you have to make some measure of compromise to deal with them." We did very little of this at Education. We met with the interest groups but we did very little dealing. Instead we talked about issues directly with the American people. And we got results.

Lincoln said that public opinion is everything in politics. In a number of cases, our recommendations fell on deaf ears on Capitol Hill until we aroused support around the country. Then, six or seven months later, people were writing their congressmen and suddenly we were getting a response on the Hill. When we first raised a stink about the price of higher education and the default rate of student loans, many people in Congress didn't want to do anything. But once we aroused public opinion, lo and behold, they held hearings and they now have to do something. Will they do the right thing? Maybe not. But they at least have got to face the issue. We did this on several major issues: AIDS, drugs, bilingual education, accountability, the teaching of religion.

P.R.: What would Madison and Jefferson think of the Education Department and the modern welfare state?

Bennett: I think Madison's main worry would be whether the whole array of government programs and services would deprive individuals, over the long run, of a clear sense of their own responsibility for their lives. Everything Madison says about the structure of government—from separation of powers to individual rights, from the tyranny of the majority to all the details about representation—is intended as an auxiliary safeguard. The most important thing is a sense of justice in the people and what Madison unembarrassedly calls virtue. By this he means individual virtue, individual responsibility.

I don't think that Madison would be upset by the idea that government should try, if it can, to help the lot of individuals. After all, he was very concerned that the rights of the wealthy be extended to the poor; he was concerned with the abolition of slavery; he was concerned that this noble American experiment include more and more in its purview. But I think he would be very worried that a government as large as ours might be seen by too many people as the complete solution to all social ills and not simply as an auxiliary.

Chicago Tribune/Paul F. Gero

Politics is like a football game. You are either on offense or you are on defense, never in between.

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P.R.: Is it practical to get back to that Madisonian view?

Bennett: I think so. The American people have not lost their basic moral views. Look at education. Two hundred years ago, we find Americans were saying with Thomas Jefferson that schools should develop the intellectual and moral faculties of the young—equip them with solid academic skills and instill in them a sense of right and wrong. I don't think the American people have changed their basic views. We are still, in that sense, the same people we were then.

Government need not always be an unqualified evil. It can be made to serve conservative ends.

P.R.: You talked a little bit about child-care. I want to get a sense of your views on proper and improper conservative approaches to issues such as child-care, civil-rights laws, and social security and health care for the elderly.

Bennett: The American people are extremely pragmatic. They want to know what works. The argument can be made in many areas—housing vouchers, education vouchers, perhaps health care—that some means other than federal government would be more effective in meeting goals that people want.

P.R.: What about civil-rights laws? What is the proper conservative approach here?

Bennett: We still have to face up to the question of the burden of American history: What do we think about race? What do we think about the Fourteenth Amendment? Neither party is addressing this. I thought that we had settled this question. I thought that with the 1965 Civil Rights Act and other legislation, we had finally put it to rest. I thought that we now were firmly of the view that it is the individual we protect—that race, gender, ethnicity, and religious origin are matters that give you neither a plus nor a minus in admission to schools or jobs. Our dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal meant that each should be judged on individual merit. I thought we had an assist from Martin Luther King, Jr., when he said he had a dream that one day his children would be judged on the content of their character and not on the color of their skin. Even in the '60s and '70s, liberals arguing in favor of affirmative action said that this was a temporary remedy. Well, I would ask: how long must this "temporary remedy" last?

Again, from the context of what I know best, the problem of race on American campuses is by no means solved. We have *de facto* segregation on many campuses because black students have decided, for whatever reason, that they should not associate with white students. You read about Berkeley where black students sit separately at football games and libraries and dormitories; this is not what we intended in 1965. I recently read about a newly appointed university president who said, "No white student can understand a black student." That is a terrible thing to say. And it is wrong. Are we now facing an unbridgeable chasm, a gulf between the races? Are we back to where we were before the Civil Rights Act? This is an issue we must come to terms with.

P.R.: What are the Reagan administration's biggest domestic and foreign policy achievements?

Bennett: Let me start with what President Reagan talks about, the economy, which is obviously in good shape. We have seen a tremendous economic recovery, now in its 68th month. Overall, this is one of the most important accomplishments of the Reagan administration, and the changes in the tax laws were very significant here.

At the same time, the president taught people that leadership was possible, that a president could lead. There was talk among academics and journalists in the late 1970s that the job of the president had become too big, that nobody could do it, nobody could really command the attention and allegiance of the American people, and nobody could really change things. The idea of the president as leader has been restored, and Americans now feel much better about the country, its future, and themselves.

Internationally, the Reagan Doctrine will be an honorable standard for years to come. But it is still unclear what has been achieved with the Soviet Union. Their interest and willingness to meet has certainly proved the fundamental Reagan view that we will gain advantage by being strong. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is perhaps the most significant international event in the past eight years. It is a tribute to Ronald Reagan's policies.

The Democratic Party platform is also a tribute to Ronald Reagan. The American people and the Republican Party have taught the Democrats at least one thing: If you want to be elected president in this country, you had better not stand up and talk about cutting defense and raising taxes, because the American people will beat your brains out on election day. I don't believe the Democratic leadership means what it says in the Democratic party platform. But, that the Democrats believe they have to say what they have said to get elected shows how much the political landscape has changed.

P.R.: What should the administration have done differently?

Bennett: The biggest disappointment has been the failure to support the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. The blame rests primarily with Congress. But, somewhere in the White House, this issue was fumbled. We didn't push it as aggressively or as eloquently as we should have. My guess is that some people in the White House weren't very clear-minded about the importance of winning this issue. The day Congress voted to abandon the Contras will be marked in history as a dark day for the cause of freedom.

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We also should have been more aggressive on other fronts. When you win an election, you have an obligation to follow through on what you believe and to follow through on what you said you would do, and that means following through aggressively. If the American people don't like that, they will later throw you out and put in the other guys. But while you are there, do what you came to do. Do it without apology and do it without hesitation, go to it.

I would like to have seen greater efforts to strengthen institutions such as the CIA, including a more thoughtful explanation to the American people and the Congress of why we need an organization like the CIA, what it does and how necessary it is in a dangerous world. I wish we had done more in the area of drugs. We have done a lot more than some people will give us credit for, but our policies on drugs could have been more coherent, more direct. We could have taken not only the moral lead, which I think President Reagan did, but more of the legislative lead.

Outright legislative victory is not always possible, however. We took such a vigorous posture here at Education that, whether or not we won the debates, frequently we pretty much defined the terms of debate. People had to react to what we were saying because we kept throwing out the challenge. The one thing that I have learned in government is that politics is like a football game in which two things count, time and possession. The game always adds up to 60 minutes, and in this politically charged town, with a Republican president and a Democratic Congress, you are either on offense or you are on defense. You are never in between, there is never a time-out. You either have the ball and are moving it against them, or they are moving it against you.

The Bork nomination was the domestic equivalent of the Contra failure. For some reason, we didn't make the case, we didn't get our team together, we didn't push hard enough. And, again, I would guess as with the Contras, it was because some people in the administration didn't have their hearts in it. It was disgraceful what the Senate did to Judge Robert Bork. It was a terrible thing to happen to one of the most distinguished legal minds in America. It was a real job of sabotage and smear. There is a lesson here: in politics, sometimes you have to think low and act high. You can't underestimate the degree of self-interest and politicization in the Senate and House. As Justice Brandeis told his daughter: As soon as you believe that life is difficult and hard, things will be all the smoother for you. Assume there is going to be trouble with everything, that nothing is going to go through unchallenged. Assume that the nomination of a very distinguished legal mind is going to be controversial. And be ready. Prepare more of the case than you think you are going to need, because you are probably going to need it.

P.R.: How would you assess the conservative movement during the Reagan years? Should it have been doing things differently?

Bennett: I don't fault the conservative movement for the mistakes of the last two years. The responsibility of the governor is to govern. At the Education Department we called on conservatives many times and we often received their support. There were, of course, times that we did things that angered conservatives; and we didn't satisfy the agenda of every conservative out there. Some will never forgive me for having spent three years at the Department of Education without devoting myself to dismantling the place. But conservatives can be fairly forgiving if they know you are fighting the good fight, doing things that are consonant with the basic values of the American people. If you try to be everything to everybody, you end up being nothing to anyone. So, you go about your business, ask for help when needed. It was encouraging to me how many times we received help from conservatives. When we asked for help, they responded, "Sure." A lot of times in this administration people who were willing to help just weren't asked.

Conservatives can win more black support by talking about issues blacks care about: better schools and an all-out war on drugs.

P.R.: When should a cabinet official or high public official resign or be asked to resign?

Bennett: Well, it should be easier to get rid of high public officials and cabinet members than it is to get rid of a university professor, which is almost impossible to do. I think the president should ask for the resignation of an official in his administration anytime he is unhappy with that person's performance. I take seriously the phrase, "You serve at the pleasure of the president," and if your actions are not pleasing to the president, he should not be reluctant to ask you to leave. I spent a lot of time during my first year here firing people. That is not an easy thing to do, even with people you don't particularly care for, or whose politics you don't agree with. But you have to do it. This administration probably should have been a little tougher in this area.

I think a person should resign when, in the totality of their actions, they are doing more harm than good. It has been shocking how many people who worked for this administration sabotaged administration policy by winking at it during congressional hearings. The people who work for Ronald Reagan should be loyal to Ronald Reagan and to his agenda. Otherwise they should resign.

I don't think I have anything original to say about the importance of high ethical standards. Let me add a practical point about politics. Sometimes people in an administration will get into trouble that is of their own making, either because of bad judgment, slipshod standards, or inattention. They can become dead weight, and they should go. An administration should not be distracted by

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controversies that will force it to deviate from its agenda. Remember the football analogy: you can't hold ground in politics, you have to gain ground. That is the reality of governing.

P.R.: What would your cabinet look like if you were president?

Bennett: In general, I think political leaders should pay more attention to the character as well as the ability of the people they hire. There are lots of smart, experienced people available, but when your administration is involved in disagreements and controversies with Congress, when your political opponents are out to get you, you need people of character as well as skill. You want people whom "Nothing can daunt, nothing can bribe," people who won't "grow in office" by becoming more sympathetic to your opponents. Obviously, the people working close to you should be loyal, both while you are in office and afterwards. Some things are fundamental and that is one of them.

Some conservatives will never forgive me for having spent three years at the Department of Education without dismantling the place.

Pericles said the secret of democracy is courage and I think he is still right. I was appalled, when the Iran/Contra crisis broke out, how silent many people in the administration were about the president, heading for the tall grass and waiting events out. The first thing to do in such a situation is rally to the defense of our president.

As for the kind of training that is useful for the cabinet, I am much more impressed with governors than I expected to be. The job of governor is much more interesting than the job of senator, because governors actually do very practical things for which they are held directly accountable. They have to run schools, build highways, and balance the budget. These tasks give a certain practicality to their deliberations. A lot of governors would make good cabinet members, and we should use them more often if they have governed well and effectively.

It also helps in some situations to look for agency heads and cabinet heads with a little more political sophistication. One should be concerned about people who come from a cocoon where they have been surrounded entirely by like-minded people who rarely challenged their views. For example, some good Republican businessmen run a good company and then move to Washington to accept important government positions. When they are savaged by the press or a hostile congressional committee for the first time, you can see that for all their practical experience they have never had to handle a situation like that.

Ironically, you can make an argument that some of us former academics have an advantage here, because in these ideologically charged times conservatives who come from universities have learned to cope with ideological hostility. It isn't such a big shock to meet a group of hostile reporters or hostile members of Congress after you have been dealing with faculty colleagues.

P.R.: What are the major mistakes politicians make in dealing with the American people?

Bennett: I've found that politicians greatly underestimate the intelligence of the American people. A lot of politicians I know think they and their colleagues are smart, that the press is smart, and that some people back home are smart. But they think you have to talk down to the American people, to make political issues simple for them, to put everything in terms of slogans. They are wrong, wrong, wrong! I haven't been to one place in this country where I haven't met many smart people who are smart about many things. This is a much more sophisticated citizenry than many politicians give them credit for. You can speak directly to the American people. And you don't have to put it all in one-syllable words. The American people can handle complexity just fine.

Americans are also a better people than a lot of politicians give them credit for. Too many people in Washington accede too early to the politics of bribery. They believe that they have to cave in to constituents and interest groups on just about every issue, or they will not be elected. They shouldn't do that in any event, even if they are not going to be elected. They should follow the politics of principle rather than the politics of bribery. But, in fact, if they were more principled, they would find they would be elected with pretty much the same regularity. You do not gain people's affection, you certainly don't gain their respect, by caving in to them.

Back to what I was saying earlier: we said "no" a hell of a lot in the Education Department. We certainly said "no" to the education establishment, and we have said "no" from time to time to conservative friends on issues and on appointments. We tried to be honest and straightforward. I don't think that has hurt us.

P.R.: How can conservatives win the black vote?

Bennett: Conservatives can win more black support by talking about the things that blacks care about. Blacks in inner cities care about drugs, schools, and ineffective government programs. The *Washingtonian* magazine did a poll not too long ago and asked what is the worst problem in Washington. Whites in D.C. said the worst problem was parking, black citizens said it was drugs, drugs, and drugs. An all-out war on drugs—with more resources for police, more prosecutors, more convictions, more jail sentences—would be popular with the American people. It would be extremely popular with those in our inner cities who are suffering most as a result of this plague. And, it would be the right thing to do.

The second way to win black votes is to work for better

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David C. Snyder

We all know what works in schools. Now the issue is whether we have the political courage and will to do the job.

schools. Providing good schools in the inner city, and getting rid of the rotten schools that we have in so many of those places, would be enormously popular. I have been spending a lot of time in Chicago. I've been very tough on the Chicago schools, and the support I've received from the black community there has been very encouraging.

P.R.: Can Republicans win control of the Congress?

Bennett: Probably not yet. If we run races in the Senate and House like we did in '84 and '86, not for a long time. I don't know why so many Republicans feel they need to run away from Ronald Reagan, the most popular president in recent history. I don't know why more Republicans aren't just saying, "I have a few differences with Ronald Reagan, but basically he's shown us the right way to go." If conservatives lose confidence in their convictions, forget it. And if Republicans become just cheaper versions of the Democrats, forget it. Why go with half a loaf when you can get a full loaf? If you start sounding the Democrat rhetoric but only want to spend half as much, the game is over before it starts.

I think conservatives can win a political majority because mainstream conservatism is basically mainstream American thinking. Ours is not some small, isolated fringe group. Polls on education show that the American people are basically with Ronald Reagan and Bill Bennett. Polls on other subjects show similar support for the administration. The American people don't have doubts about where they stand on subjects like children, schools, drugs, and family. The American people are basically conservative. They like a strong leader, they want to be sure the country is being defended, they want things to work, and they believe in individual responsibility. We may not have a political majority, but conservatives have a cultural majority. I've tested that thesis.

P.R.: What should be the Republican response to calls for a tax increase?

Bennett: We should say that we are against tax increases, and we should promise to veto any tax hike that Congress passes.

P.R.: What is happening in the Soviet Union, and what should the United States do about it?

Bennett: Conservatives can't ignore what's going on in the Soviet Union; we need to be open to evidence of change. On the other hand, we need to remain vigilant and strong. My guess is that in 10 years, when we look at the world, we're not going to see a radical difference from what we see now. There will be countries of freedom pitted against countries of no or little freedom. The struggle will still be about the same thing, about whether we believe that man is a spiritual being with a potential for individual nobility and moral responsibility, or whether we believe his ultimate fate is to be a cog in the machine of state.

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We need to be cautious before we embrace the idea of a "new" Soviet Union. If the changes we hope for are to come to pass, it will require nothing less than an overturning of the totalitarian apparatus, overturning the totalitarian idea. Otherwise, we're simply talking about changes at the margin; perhaps even a more efficient totalitarian state.

Is it possible that we are seeing the end of totalitarianism? I suppose it's possible; I certainly hope it's occurring. I'm skeptical, though, because the changes required are enormous.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is perhaps the most significant international event in the past eight years. It is a tribute to Ronald Reagan's policies.

Let me say one last thing on this subject. The rhetoric coming out of the Soviet Union doesn't much interest me because it's not a reliable standard by which to judge real change. We need to look closely at what they do in the areas of defense policy, regional conflicts, civil liberties, and human rights. These are the criteria by which we should judge.

P.R.: What role should the United States play in the United Nations?

Bennett: I think we need to take a fresh, hard look at it. I frequently call for more accountability in education. But if you want to see real waste and abuse and lack of accountability—well, the U.N. can give the National Education Association a pretty good run for its money. There are lots of examples you can point to: UNESCO, programs supporting the PLO and SWAPO, the General Assembly voting for $75 million for a conference center in Addis Ababa during the Ethiopian famine, and many others.

The real problem with the U.N., however, is more fundamental than questionable financial dealings. For all the stupid things that go on at the U.N.—and there are a lot of them—it is not an institution without influence. Right now the U.N. is hostile to American interests and Western ideals. It's hypocritical; its treatment of Israel is appalling. On balance, it has been a political and moral failure.

Can the U.N. be reformed? I'm skeptical. But we should try. Charles Krauthammer once said that, in effect, we pay for the megaphone and our enemies speak through it. That certainly needs to change.

P.R.: Are you in favor of a rapid deployment of SDI?

Bennett: Yes, I am. Even if one grants that a "perfect" population defense is years away, I understand that we may have the technology to begin protecting our strategic military forces. Some form of defense—even an imperfect missile defense—makes deterrence more credible. The incentive for a first strike would be sharply, perhaps decisively, reduced if an aggressor knew that, say, half of the opponent's ICBMs would survive an attack. What we hope to do is to complicate vastly an attacker's calculations and thus reduce the risk of a first strike. In addition, a strategic defense could provide some protection against terrorist or accidental nuclear attacks.

It's not clear that the Soviets even accept the Western notion that mutual vulnerability is a sound strategic doctrine—which is, after all, the premise underlying Mutual Assured Destruction. The Soviets have done considerably more in the area of strategic defense than we have. So, yes, we should move ahead. We'd be foolish not to.

P.R.: Let me ask about education. What are the most important achievements? What mistakes have you made and what did you learn from them? What is the unfinished agenda?

Bennett: Probably the best thing we did was to to keep the debate on educational improvement going. We broadened it, got more people involved, and we made sure the reform movement rested in the hands of the public and not with those I've called the educrats. We also got the Republican Party to be players in this debate. It is a good issue politically, and the Democrats don't have a monopoly on it any more. We helped bring attention to the right issues: standards and basics, competency for teachers, educational choice, strong curricular content, sound moral education, and accountability. Those issues are being discussed, and in some places needed reforms are being implemented. Some positions that were unpopular when we first argued them are now much more mainstream. No idea was more vilified in liberal opinion than the idea of education vouchers. Now, after an extensive series of investigative reports by the *Chicago Tribune,* the newspaper's editorial page recently called for vouchers for the Chicago public schools. The debate is now joined on the right issues.

The unfinished business: American schools are not where they should be. It is still a battle over who will control the schools—the people who gave us the educational disasters of the '60s and '70s or the people who are going to fix those mistakes, that is, parents and other concerned adults. Now the debate in education need not be as much about what we should do. We largely know what to do, we know what works, we know what we should expect. Now the issue is whether we have the political courage and the will to do the job. Do we have the will to fire incompetent teachers, to fire incompetent principals, to reward excellent teachers and principals, to get all the litter out of the curricula and put the basic subjects back in there? Are we going to give parents more say in what goes on? Are we going to hold people accountable for what kids learn? And are we going to stop accepting lame excuses for low performance?

The answers to these questions will determine the future of American education. I am confident in the good sense of the American people and hopeful of their success in improving education.

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THE DIPLOMACY OF DEFEAT

Are We Losing Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan Again?

CONSTANTINE MENGES

Negotiated agreements to end conflict can lead to genuine peace, as occurred between Israel and Egypt after the Camp David accord of 1978. Or, as with the Munich agreement of 1938, they can help an aggressor state enforce its will and thereby provoke a wider conflict. Defective international settlements have often been used in modern times by totalitarian powers—whether fascist or Communist—to play on the peaceful inclinations of the democracies and achieve conquests through diplomacy at less cost than through military means alone.

For all the optimism over peace "breaking out" throughout the world, the recent agreements on the conflicts in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Angola fall in the defective category. The Arias plan for Central America has led to the cutoff of military aid to the Contras without the establishment of democracy in Nicaragua or the termination of the Sandinistas' armed subversion—begun in 1979—against their neighbors, therefore making wider conflict in the region more likely.

The Afghan agreement requires the end of military aid to the mujahideen without any obligation that an independent non-Communist government will succeed the present regime in Kabul. The assassination of Pakistan's President Zia likely foreshadows additional coercion from Moscow and Kabul to force the total cutoff of military aid through Pakistan as well as a campaign to neutralize and destabilize that important U.S. ally.

Similarly, if the southwest African agreement follows the principles and plan agreed upon in July and August 1988, it will probably lead to the creation of a Communist state in Namibia. There will be no guarantee of a full Soviet and Cuban withdrawal from Angola or of the end of the Communist regime in Luanda.

In each case, effective international agreements could have been achieved if the U.S. State Department had used diplomacy to help America's friends succeed against its adversaries. Instead, the State Department pursued the incompetent diplomacy it has often succumbed to in previous negotiations with Communist belligerents.

A 1986 Defense Department report cited widespread Communist violations of four earlier negotiated settlements: the 1953 Korean armistice, the 1954 Geneva accords on Indochina, the 1962 Declaration of Neutrality on Laos, and the 1973 Paris Agreements on Vietnam. The record showed that "significant violations, including military ones, began immediately after the agreements went into effect, suggesting the Communists were planning the infringements even as they were negotiating." The report found that in all four cases the Communist side circumvented the international control and monitoring mechanisms with "relative ease and at little political cost."

For example, in violation of the Laos agreement, North Vietnam withdrew only 40 instead of all of its estimated 10,000 troops. After the 1973 Vietnam accord, the Communist side totally ignored the commitment to withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. Within three months of the treaty, North Vietnam illegally infiltrated into South Vietnam 30,000 additional troops and tens of thousands of tons of military supplies. These violations continued and culminated in the 1975 invasion and defeat of South Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the State Department does not seem to have learned from these experiences. Since late 1986, the State Department has come to determine U.S. policy on Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Angola. (The departure of CIA Director William Casey and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the staffing of senior regional National Security Council positions mainly with foreign service officers, and the weakening of the National Security Council as a result of the Iran/Contra controversy have all contributed to State Department dominance.) In taking the lead on these issues, the State Department has both defined foreign policy as diplomacy and repeated its earlier diplomatic mistakes.

Defective Arias Plan

In Nicaragua, President Reagan has for years defined his objectives and policy clearly. A genuine settlement to the conflict there would mean that the Communist government would finally permit the democratic elections prom-

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Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

Arias aftermath: Nandaime, July 1988. Sandinista policemen break up opposition march.

ised to the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1979, end its armed subversion against its neighbors, remove the thousands of Cuban, Soviet bloc, Libyan, and PLO personnel, and reduce its military to parity with its neighbors. The Nicaraguan armed resistance, Reagan declared, had to be supported until all these conditions were in fact implemented—and not just promised yet again.

A defective settlement on Nicaragua has also been proposed over these last seven years: first, military aid to the armed resistance would be cut off, then the Sandinistas would *promise* to end the armed subversion they initiated in 1979, and would pledge some kind of democratization in the future. Mexico's foreign ministry—a political ally of the Sandinistas since 1979—proposed this approach in 1982, again in five defective (and rejected) draft Contadora treaties, and then backed it when it was repackaged in 1987 as the Arias plan. Many congressional Democrats also favored this type of "peace settlement," as did a dominant faction at the State Department.

In August 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz made a grave mistake in persuading Reagan to go along with the "Reagan-Wright" plan. Secretary of Defense Weinberger found out about this proposal only at the last minute, since it had not been presented for discussion at an NSC meeting in which Reagan could have weighed the full implications—including the likely impact on the impending Central American summit meeting. Both Weinberger and Congressman Jack Kemp sought to warn the president that Central American democratic leaders would view his signing the Reagan-Wright plan as an indication that the Contras were being abandoned. El Salvador and Honduras then saw the Arias plan as their only means to buy time against the Sandinista threat, and to obtain more support from western democracies and the Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress.

The Arias plan, signed August 7, 1987, two days after the Reagan-Wright plan, gave congressional Democrats a reason or a further pretext—"give the Arias peace process a chance"—to deny further military aid to the Contras. In January 1988, the four Central American democracies met and concluded that Nicaragua had failed to comply with the Arias plan within the six months agreed upon. Nevertheless, in February 1988, congressional Democrats continued to use this defective, lapsed, and violated agreement as a major reason for voting against Reagan's request for military aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

By August 1988 it was clear to all objective observers that the Arias plan had totally failed: the Communist regime in Nicaragua not only had received more than $500 million in additional Soviet bloc military supplies, it also had become more repressive. Meanwhile, the Contras had been reduced from an effective combat force of more than 20,000 inside Nicaragua to about 10,000 mostly outside the country. The Sandinistas now confidently boast of the impending defeat of the resistance. Should their prediction come true, Communist victories will be much more likely in all of Central America, Panama, and then Mexico.

Disarming the Mujahideen

In Afghanistan a decade of Communist tyranny has cost more than a million lives and has caused five million persons to flee. The Afghan Communist government established by military coup in 1978 was held illegitimate by most governments, and annual U.N. resolutions have condemned the 1979 Soviet invasion. The Afghan resistance had been growing stronger every year with significant political and military help from outside countries. A genuine political settlement would have meant that the illegitimate Communist government would be replaced by an independent non-Communist government including the Afghan resistance, and that all Soviet bloc troops and other personnel would withdraw. In return, the resistance would permit both Soviet and Afghan Communist personnel to leave without their being attacked, and it might grant amnesty to former members of the Afghan government.

President Reagan has proclaimed the restoration of an independent non-Communist Afghanistan as his objective year after year. This was an attainable objective, given the Afghan people's rejection of Communism and the increasing military effectiveness of the mujahideen since they were equipped with antiaircraft weapons.

Unfortunately, that is not the type of settlement the Department of State sought. According to Senator Gordon Humphrey, the State Department in 1985, without any authorization from Reagan, indicated the United States could accept a settlement that terminated all outside military aid to the resistance at the beginning of a withdrawal of all Soviet troops—which might take about a year. After various people informed Reagan about this, and after the Senate in February 1988 passed a resolution by a vote of 77-0 objecting to this type of deal, the State Department came up with a slight improvement. It called its arrangement "positive symmetry": as long as Moscow continued providing military supplies to Kabul, the U.S. would reserve the right to continue military aid to the Afghan resistance. The Soviet and Kabul governments rejected this proposal and they repeated their objection during the signing of the Afghan accord on April 14, 1988.

The Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed to serve as "co-

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guarantors" of the agreement signed that same date between Pakistan and the Communist government in Afghanistan, which required both governments to cease all "intervention," meaning for Pakistan an end to its support of the Afghan resistance. Earlier, Reagan had pledged never to endorse an agreement unless the resistance also judged it positively. In fact, the resistance was not included in the talks and unanimously rejected the Geneva agreement.

While the international agreement prohibits Pakistan from aiding the Afghan resistance, it says only that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will agree between themselves on a timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal. That schedule—indeed the withdrawal itself—is not explicitly mandated by the Geneva accords. Moreover, the agreement contains no procedures for enforcing or verifying their departure. The Soviet pull-out can be reversed if those governments decide to do so—and both have threatened this repeatedly since May 15, 1988.

Contrary to State Department forecasts, Kabul has remained in control of nearly all major cities and towns.

Nor does the Afghan accord provide for the establishment of a non-Communist government in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has stated its intention to help the Afghan Communist regime retain power. The Afghan accord, like the Arias plan, has had the effect of leaving the Communist regime in place while severely restricting outside military aid to the resistance.

Misplaced Optimism

In the spring of 1988, the few critics of the Afghanistan settlement predicted that Soviet political and covert pressure on Pakistan would likely lead to a severe cutback in its military aid to the resistance, with the Communist government remaining in control of Afghanistan. When I had the opportunity to state this personally to President Reagan two days before the Afghan accord was to be signed, a member of his cabinet also present said Pakistan could and would resist Soviet pressures. His optimism proved to be misplaced.

Contrary to the assurances the State Department gave Reagan, Pakistan has been coerced by Soviet pressure into cutting off most of the military aid to the Afghan resistance. The Afghan accord entered into force on May 15, 1988. Within the first two months the Soviet Union and the Kabul government had issued more than 30 formal protests and statements claiming more than 400 violations by Pakistan. In June 1988, Gorbachev and the Afghan Communist ruler Najibullah issued a joint declaration in Moscow threatening that it would be "necessary to undertake the most resolute retaliatory steps" if Pakistan continued aiding the Afghan resistance. In early August the Soviet foreign minister reiterated a sharp warning that Moscow intends "to take all necessary measures so that strict observance of the Geneva accords by some sides and crude violations . . . by the others should not create problems for the Republic of Afghanistan."

On August 17, 1988, an explosion destroyed a Pakistani military aircraft, killing Pakistan President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, a number of top Pakistani generals, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, and the chief of the U.S. military aid mission there. Given the intensity of their repeated threats against Zia, both Moscow and Kabul have to be considered prime suspects in these deaths.

Also contrary to State Department forecasts, the Afghan Communist regime has remained in control of nearly all major cities and towns. On July 13, the *New York Times* quoted Western diplomats as saying that Soviet and Afghan "attacks on positions captured by Afghan insurgents have recently stalled, and in some cases reversed the guerrilla campaign to topple Kabul." On August 12, the *Washington Post* reported that the mujahideen "have had difficulty taking and holding any key provisional stronghold."

No Verification of Withdrawal

It is difficult to assess whether the Soviets moved 50 percent of their forces out of Afghanistan by August 15, as they promised. The United Nations monitoring force of 25 individuals, who can travel only with the cooperation of the Soviet and Afghan military, cannot possibly verify the facts given the Soviet Union's 1,000-mile border with Afghanistan. Nor was a firm, independent count of the Soviet military presence ever taken. Meanwhile, columnist Cord Meyer has reported that, in violation of a promise by General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan that Soviets would not engage in offensive operations, Soviet planes, some operating from Soviet territory, have repeatedly bombed Afghan towns after Soviet ground troops have withdrawn. The U.S. has protested these bombings and violations of the accords.

If the resistance in Afghanistan is neutralized, the Soviets' confidence in their control of their own Muslim population and their southern border will rise. We would then likely see a step-up in Soviet indirect aggression aimed at destabilizing Pakistan and bringing pro-Soviet groups to power in the oil-producing sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf.

Betrayal of Alvor

As with the two previous cases, the conflict in Angola also began as a result of aggression by the Communist side. In 1975, the three indigenous anticolonial insurgencies in Angola—two of them non-Communist (UNITA and FNLA) and one Communist (MPLA)—negotiated with Portugal and then signed the Alvor agreement. Portugal agreed to grant independence in November 1975, and in return each signatory would contribute 8,000 troops and join in an interim government that would then hold genuinely democratic elections. The Alvor agreement would have permitted the eight million people of Angola to choose among the three anticolonial movements.

Starting in late 1974, Cuban military personnel began

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arriving in Angola to help the Communist group seize power. Then, in the spring of 1975, the Soviet Union—seeing the unwillingness of the U.S. to enforce the Vietnam "peace agreement"—illegally transported thousands of tons of military supplies and, eventually, 15,000 Cuban troops into Angola to help the Communist MPLA overturn the Alvor agreement and take control of Angola. In response, the U.S. began providing covert aid and, beginning in October 1975, South Africa sent about 2,000 troops to help the non-Communist independence movements. But, in January 1976, after the U.S. Congress passed the Clark amendment prohibiting covert U.S. aid to the anti-Communist forces, South Africa withdrew and Angola fell to the Communists.

Since then the Soviet bloc has provided more than $2 billion in military support to the Communist government, as well as logistic backup for a continuously present Cuban combat force, which has now grown to between 45,000 and 57,000 troops. Meanwhile, the anti-Communist resistance movement, UNITA, has grown to number about 50,000 combatants. UNITA controls approximately 40 percent of Angola and provides education, medical, and economic services in its zones. In 1985, despite objections from the State Department, Congress repealed the prohibition on U.S. military aid for UNITA. Since then, the Reagan administration has reportedly provided approximately $30 million in military aid, including highly effective antiaircraft missiles.

A Genuine Angola Settlement

A genuine political settlement in Angola would involve a return to the principles of the 1975 Alvor agreement. This would include a cease-fire between the Communist government and UNITA, followed by fair, open national elections, which would be monitored by representatives of genuinely democratic countries. All of the estimated 57,000 Cuban troops would leave Angola during the cease-fire to be replaced by a neutral buffer force from the monitoring countries while MPLA and UNITA troops would remain on their respective bases. There would also be amnesty for both sides under the newly elected government.

South Africa would then permit free elections in Namibia for a new government. But these elections should not be monitored by the U.N., because the General Assembly has taken the biased position that the pro-Soviet armed movement, the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), is the "authentic representative of the Namibian people." This assertion could only be tested by genuinely free elections, which cannot occur unless an effective monitoring and buffer force protects the Namibian people from intimidation and coercion by the estimated 8,000 SWAPO guerrillas.

Excluding UNITA

The 1988 Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow produced a communiqué suggesting that an agreement on Angola and Namibia could be signed by September 29, 1988. Since then the State Department has mediated four rounds of talks between South Africa and the Communist regimes of Angola and Cuba, with a Soviet observer present and the Angolan UNITA resistance excluded.

Fourteen principles governing the settlement were agreed upon at talks held in New York in mid-July. On August 8, the negotiators announced that a cease-fire between the Angolan government and South Africa would go into effect immediately, and that South Africa would remove its 3,000 troops from Angola by September 1, at which time Cuba and Angola would present their timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. (Cuba has proposed a four-year withdrawal.) On November 1, the United Nations would begin supervising a process leading to Namibian independence. By February 1, 1989, South Africa will have withdrawn all but 1,500 troops, the remainder to be removed by June 1, when U.N.-monitored elections would be held in Namibia.

Given the intensity of their repeated threats against Zia, both Moscow and Kabul have to be considered prime suspects in his death.

The agreed principles included the "redeployment toward the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops" from Angola "on the basis of an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both states to solicit the on-site verification of the withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations." This repeats a major defect of the Afghan accord—the most important obligation of the Communist side is *not* part of the internationally binding agreement but is part of a bilateral (and reversible) agreement between two Soviet-allied Communist regimes.

A Loss for Democracy

A South African departure from Angola and U.N.-supervised elections in Namibia will likely result in SWAPO's taking power in Namibia. SWAPO was established in 1960 and most of its members are from the Ovambo tribe, which comprises about half of Namibia's one million people. However, it is not clear how much genuine support SWAPO has even among the Ovambos. SWAPO refused to test its popular support when it boycotted Namibian elections held in 1975, 1978, and 1980. SWAPO has been dominated by Marxist-Leninists since the mid-1970s when it expelled moderate leaders and forged close ties with the Soviet bloc and Cuba.

U.N.-supervised elections would most likely produce a pro-Soviet dictatorship presided over by SWAPO. UNITA would then be caught between two Soviet allies, the MPLA and Namibia. Cuban troops and perhaps other pressures would likely be used against bases in Zaire or elsewhere from which UNITA receives support.

The result would be a UNITA that is politically and militarily isolated, and far more vulnerable in every way. As

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for the further stages of any settlement: although some thousands of Cuban troops might leave Angola in the glow of media attention, the Luanda and Havana governments are likely to ignore or sidestep whatever commitments are made about Cuban withdrawal and elections in Angola.

Both the Cuban and Angolan Communist regimes have stated that the current Angolan MPLA government must continue to rule (just as Moscow said about its Kabul ally). Therefore, it is unlikely that the final agreement will require elections in Angola. Even if it did, the likely result would be Angolan elections with unknown numbers of Cuban and Angolan regime troops intimidating the population and an undermanned, biased, or incompetent U.N. monitoring group unable to prevent the Communist government from rigging the counting of votes.

U.N.-supervised elections in Namibia would most likely produce a pro-Soviet dictatorship presided over by SWAPO.

Or, under the rubric of "national reconciliation," UNITA might be given the choice between total defeat or joining the MPLA as a junior partner in a "unity" government. Whatever method is used, there is a high probability that once world attention had passed, the Communist Angolan regime would render ineffective UNITA and its leadership.

If UNITA were defeated, there would almost certainly be a resurgence of Soviet bloc, Cuban, Libyan, Angolan, and now SWAPO-Namibian military support for the pro-Soviet ANC and a dramatic expansion of its war for control of South Africa. With the major democracies isolating South Africa because of apartheid, the ANC could ultimately take power.

A Failure to Learn

Why does the State Department repeatedly make mistakes in negotiating with Communist regimes? First, there is a lack of competent understanding of international politics and of the Soviet Union and its allies. It also seems that the historical record of its past unsuccessful negotiations with Communists has not been studied. In contrast, there is abundant evidence that Communist negotiators systematically use the lessons of the past. For example, a defecting Sandinista official revealed that the Nicaraguans were advised by Vietnamese Communists on how best to use negotiations with the United States to gain their objectives.

Second, the State Department does not set the defeat of Communist regimes as its objective, in direct conflict with President Reagan's policy. Therefore, State has entered into these negotiations with the illusion that the resistance movements should and could be incorporated into the existing Communist governments, using some "national reconciliation" formula.

Third, there is an inclination in the Department of State to view paper agreements as the end of the "peace process" rather than to ask what comes next. State Department negotiators are perceived as successful if they can reach an agreement. But, in their desire to do so, they at times deceive themselves about whether the agreement is in the national interest.

Fourth, despite decades of negative experiences—and four annual reports by President Reagan documenting Soviet violations of most of its international arms control agreements—the State Department does not carefully consider the consequences of possible Communist violations of the newest agreement or plan how to respond to them beyond issuing ineffectual protests.

Finally, the Communist side has learned to take advantage of the Free World political and media culture when negotiating these complex and seemingly arcane issues. Most political leaders in democracies like to have "peace agreements" to solve situations of conflict—and this is especially helpful on the eve of major national elections. It was no accident that the Vietnamese Communists—with astute advice from their Soviet allies—always sped up the pace of negotiation on the eves of the U.S. presidential elections in 1968 and again in 1972. Nor is it coincidental that U.S.-Soviet summits and agreements so often occur close to national elections.

For senior State Department officials, diplomacy with Communist governments and movements usually brings enormous media attention. There is an almost irresistible momentum toward the dramatic media and political event of a "successful" negotiation.

Furthermore, the career prospects of State Department officials are almost never hurt by defective agreements—even when subsequent events prove they made egregious mistakes. There is generally little congressional or media interest in holding previous State Department officials accountable for their judgments. No congressional oversight hearings were held on the failure of Carter administration officials to follow through after playing a main role in shaping the 1979 OAS political settlement in Nicaragua, which required the Sandinista-led coalition to establish genuine democracy and remain non-aligned. Will there be such congressional hearings if the Afghan accord leads to the defeat of the Afghan resistance, or the Angola/Namibia arrangement helps to defeat UNITA and results in one more pro-Soviet dictatorship?

The defective agreements in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Angola can still be reversed. The administration should put its full political weight behind a call for full military aid to the Contras—and there would likely be enough congressional Democrats who would vote with the president. The Afghan accord should be renegotiated to obtain agreement on an independent non-Communist government to replace the illegitimate Communist regime. And the State Department's proposals for Angola should first seek a free Angola without any Cuban troops, and fair elections for Namibia thereafter. What is needed, in short, is a diplomacy of victory, not a diplomacy of defeat. ☎

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

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REAGAN JUSTICE

Combating Excess, Strengthening the Rule of Law

TERRY EASTLAND

Recent controversies involving Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, have distracted public attention from the substantial achievements of President Reagan's Justice Department under Meese as well as his predecessor William French Smith and now his successor Richard Thornburgh. From civil rights enforcement to narcotics prosecution to coordination of our criminal justice system to the appointment of new judges, the Justice Department has probably made more of a difference in the lives of ordinary Americans than any other domestic agency of the Reagan administration.

By 1981, when President Reagan took office, the cultural laxity of the '60s and '70s had taken its toll, as communities were experiencing more and more crime and criminal justice systems at all levels were straining to deal with the massive breakdown of law and order. Illegal drug use had become a greater and greater social problem, obscenity and child pornography were infecting communities across the nation, and terrorists increasingly threatened Americans both at home and abroad. Meanwhile, antitrust and civil-rights law had become encrusted with legal excess, much of it encouraged by previous Justice Departments, but none of it required by relevant law and much conflicting with the law. For years, courts had too often exceeded their proper constitutional bounds, deciding cases they had no authority to decide, and interpreting the Constitution and other legal instruments in ways that could not be reconciled with their original terms. Congress had also crossed the constitutional line of separation between itself and the executive branch, exceeding its power.

Against this legacy, the trademark of Reagan justice can be summarized in one phrase: combating legal, political, and cultural excess, and strengthening the rule of law by recovering its original understanding and seeking new law as social conditions require.

That was what Reagan justice was all about, or at least what it was all about when at its best. And the effort—a continuous effort involving scores of key appointees—has yielded remarkable results. Antitrust enforcement has found its way back to the real world, to the benefit of consumers. The era of forced busing is fading away and neighborhood schools are returning. Racial quotas are open to serious question and the idea of color-blind law has been reasserted. Traditional organized crime has lost ground in many of our major cities. Drug trafficking and drug consumption are no longer matters of societal or governmental indifference. Those who trade in child pornography and other obscene materials have been forced deeper underground. Terrorism is no longer the threat to Americans at home or abroad that it was just a few years ago. The criminal justice system is stronger and better coordinated. Courts are getting out of the business of judicial policy-making and starting to become what Alexander Hamilton once described as "the least dangerous branch" of our government.

Let us examine more closely the efforts that produced these results.

Antitrust: Focus on the Consumer

Government enforcement of antitrust law began in 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Act. The essential purpose of the law was to benefit consumers by prohibiting monopolies and activities that constrained trade. But, especially in recent decades, enforcement of this and other antitrust law had become preoccupied with the size of companies. Bigness was equated with badness and constituted a sufficient reason for government intervention. On the basis of populist ideas that generated exotic enforcement theories, the government under both Republican and Democratic presidents went after large companies that supposedly monopolized their industries. For example, the department brought a major monopolization case against IBM—mainly because of its size. And the Federal Trade Commission brought cases against groups of large firms in the oil and cereal industries simply because, when viewed collectively, they were thought to have monopoly power. In 1977, in an effort to move the law into yet another new frontier, the Federal Trade Commission's Michael Pertschuk even suggested that antitrust must address "the social and environmental harms produced as unwelcome by-products of the marketplace."

By the time the Reagan administration took office, a

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major intellectual shift had occurred. Thanks to the work of such scholars as Aaron Director, Yale Brozen, Robert H. Bork, Richard Posner, and William Baxter, size ceased to be the dominating concern of antitrust law. Rather, economic efficiency, and, more particularly, the consumer welfare it produced became the touchstone. In 1981 the department began adapting antitrust enforcement to the new learning. Smith selected Baxter to do the job. He was the perfect choice to head the antitrust division: A Stanford law professor, he had devoted his career to recovering the original understanding of antitrust law; he had firm ideas about how that understanding should influence enforcement; and he could state in no uncertain terms—sometimes to the discomfiture of subordinates and senators alike—how he planned to do it. Under Baxter, the division experienced a major law enforcement shift that his three successors—Paul McGrath (1983-1985), Douglas Ginsburg (1985-1986), and Charles F. Rule (1987-1988)—maintained and strengthened.

The "Merger Guidelines" first issued in 1982 (and later updated) recognized the essential economic truth that most mergers do not threaten competition and many can benefit consumers. The division dismissed the huge case against IBM, thus enabling it to compete more freely and efficiently in domestic and international markets. Further, the division recognized that some joint efforts among competitors may enhance productive activity, again to the benefit of consumers. The division also established a competition-advocacy program in which it made its views known to federal regulatory agencies (and sometimes state and local bodies); here the division emphasized that the purpose of economic regulation is consumer welfare, not the market position of current incumbents, and that government regulation is often responsible for erecting the most enduring barriers to competition. Specific policies like these sent the general message that Americans could undertake initiatives of enormous economic benefit that not too many years ago might well have been subject to government intervention. For example, in Austin, Texas, Bobby Inman heads a joint research venture, involving a number of major firms, that hopes to strengthen America's competitiveness in microelectronics. It's doubtful that such an enterprise would have been permitted in the '70s.

In recovering the original thrust of antitrust law, the division also made criminal prosecution of price fixing and bid rigging a top priority. This kind of enforcement lies at the heart of antitrust, for economic practices that have no justification and that plainly have the intent and effect of harming consumers should be vigorously prosecuted. During the Reagan years, the division obtained record numbers of price-fixing and bid-rigging convictions, pursuing cases in the road building and electrical contracting industries, and beginning in 1986 under Meese and Rule, in federal government procurements.

Civil Rights: The Color-Blind Ideal

By the end of the 1970s there was a growing concern, shared by many who had participated in the original civil-rights movement, that the founding purpose of our nation's civil-rights laws had been forgotten or distorted as the "color-blindness" ideal had yielded to "color-consciousness" in the forms of busing and quotas. Under William Bradford Reynolds, whom Smith selected as assistant attorney general in 1981, the civil rights division emphasized anew the core concerns of the anti-discrimination laws: making whole the identified, victims of intentional discrimination. Overall, there were more investigations, more successful prosecutions, and more relief obtained on behalf of minorities and women during the Reagan years than during any other comparable period. And, in the area where the law enforcement stakes are the highest—criminal civil rights—the division set a record in 1987 for number of cases filed. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith credits the Reagan civil rights division with breaking the back of the Ku Klux Klan.

Norfolk, Virginia, now brings together schoolchildren of different races without forced busing.

Previous Justice Departments had sought busing as a remedy for school segregation, a remedy required by neither federal statute nor the Constitution. For Reynolds, however, there were compelling practical arguments against busing: It had failed to achieve its promise of integrating the schools, and it had distracted school officials from their primary purpose of education, which had deteriorated in many schools with busing programs. Under Reynolds, assisted by his deputy J. Harvie Wilkinson, who in 1983 took a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the division redirected policy, avoiding busing and instead seeking alternative remedies, such as magnet schools. The change sparked angry reaction from conventional civil-rights leaders, but by the end of the '80s magnet schools had proved their worth and become the preferred means of school integration, primarily because they consistently offered quality education.

The division also embarked on another, related change by attempting to return decision-making authority to local school districts once they had successfully dismantled their "dual" or segregated systems. Here the division played an important role in the most important school decision of the '80s, which was handed down by the Fourth Circuit in 1985 in a case from Norfolk, Virginia. In the late 1960s Norfolk had been judged guilty of school segregation; it was ordered to bus. In 1975 the federal courts declared the school system "unitary"—meaning that it had fully eliminated its segregated system. In 1982, acting on the assump-

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Arrest of Sicilian Mafia boss, 1985. U.S.-Italian cooperation has led to crackdown on organized crime.

tion that because the system was unitary it could run its own affairs, and concerned about the flight of white and black students from its schools, the Norfolk school board decided to "debus" at the elementary school level and return to a neighborhood attendance plan, concentrating resources on strengthening the education offered in each school. Predictably, the city encountered opposition and a lawsuit was entered, charging in effect that Norfolk still could not run its own affairs and had to continue busing. The division entered the case as a friend of the court, arguing that a system deemed unitary was free to manage its schools as it saw best, so long as it did not reinstate by law a segregated regime. In *Riddick* v. *School Board of Norfolk* the Fourth Circuit adopted this position. The decision encouraged other school systems in similar legal situations that wished to end forced busing and its negative consequences.

Without question, the division's most controversial and important effort lay in its persistent attack on racial quotas and goals. The division is responsible for enforcing anti-discrimination laws governing public employment, and previous Justice Departments had sought hiring and promotion goals as a remedy for discrimination. But Reynolds, drawing in large part on the arguments of a key aide, Charles J. Cooper, who later became assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel, concluded that such numerical devices violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. For Reynolds, the Constitution was, as Justice John Marshall Harlan put it in his famous, solitary dissent in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* (1896), "color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." The division ended the practice of asking for quotas in litigation against public employers, and in *amicus curiae* briefs before lower federal courts, it advocated the color-blind standard in employment discrimination cases. The division also worked in the first term with Solicitor General Rex Lee, and then in the second with his successor, Charles Fried, in pressing for color-blindness in the Supreme Court. Ultimately, the results were mixed, in the lower courts as well as the Supreme Court. The Court adopted positions compatible with a color-blind standard in 1984 in *Stotts* v. *Firefighters* and in 1986 in *Wygant* v. *Jackson Board of Education;* but the Court also upheld racial employment goals in key cases in 1986 and 1987. Resolution of this thorny problem awaits a later day, but the signal contribution of the Reagan Justice Department was to recover and advocate the great tradition of color-blind law.

Targeting Mob Chiefs

Upon taking office, Smith picked up the department's pace against traditional organized crime. Smith secured more resources for the enhanced effort, but more importantly, under Smith and Rudolph Giuliani, Smith's first associate attorney general, the department redirected its efforts against the very highest ranks of the organized crime families. Meese continued the emphasis, and by the mid-1980s, the strategy began paying off. In New York, where Giuliani became U.S. Attorney for the Southern District in 1983, key members of the five families thought to constitute the city's La Cosa Nostra were convicted on racketeering charges. The bosses and chief aides of three families were each sentenced to 100 years in prison, and the boss of the fourth was given 12 years. (The boss of the remaining family was killed in a gangland-style slaying.)

In Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Kansas City, and elsewhere, federal prosecutors enjoyed dramatic success against the chieftains of traditional organized crime. Smith and Meese also directed the department's attention to the new, emerging organized crime entities, many of which rely on ethnic ties. In 1987, the department's Operation Bamboo Dragon successfully prosecuted key members of three emerging Chinese criminal families.

Moving Against Drugs

By 1981, not only was traditional organized crime deeply involved in the drug trade, but new crime groups had emerged whose sole reason for being was the distribution and sale of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other illicit substances. Drug trafficking had become associated with other forms of crime, including murder and public corruption. Furthermore, the drug trade had grown to include

By 1981, when President Reagan took office, criminal justice systems at all levels were straining to deal with the massive breakdown of law and order.

cartels around the world and become more financially sophisticated. When Smith became attorney general he stressed the urgency of developing a response commensurate with the growing problem. Under Smith, the FBI for the first time joined the fight against drugs and the DEA added 500 additional agents to a force that had shrunk

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during the previous administration. The department concentrated resources in 13 anti-drug task forces established in geographical regions throughout the nation. The department sought and won in the Congress new criminal laws to fight the battle. All of this paid off; under Smith and Meese, and Associate Attorneys General Giuliani, Lowell Jensen, and Stephen Trott, the department chalked up record numbers of indictments and convictions, seized ever higher amounts of drugs at the borders, and stripped drug criminals of more and more assets associated with their illegal trade (such as boats, planes, and cars, even golf courses and country clubs).

Smith began as a "supply-side" attorney general; he concentrated on reducing the supply of drugs by seizing them or eradicating source plants or trying to discourage the drug trade by investigating, convicting, and imprisoning traffickers, both those in the United States and abroad, and taking away their assets. Toward the end of his tenure, he began focusing as well on reducing the demand for drugs through drug prevention and education.

In 1985, Meese inherited the strengthened supply-side effort and a fledgling demand-side effort. As chairman of the government-wide National Drug Policy Board, he refined the supply-side effort and beefed up the demand-side, meshing the two into an overall strategy. The department's key contribution to the government's evolving demand-side effort lay in its use of legal tools to discourage drug consumption. William Weld, who headed the criminal division from 1986 to 1988, urged prosecution of not only drug traffickers but also drug consumers. His "user prosecution" initiative, inspired by the Zero Tolerance program developed by U.S. Attorney Peter Nunez in San Diego, also called for the seizure and forfeiture of "any conveyance carrying drugs, even in trace amounts," and the prosecution of middle- and upper-class users. Richard Willard, who ran the civil division from 1985 to early 1988, supervised an active litigation effort supporting drug testing administered by both public and private employers. Under the direction of Willard and Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns, the civil division also developed the department's drug-testing program.

Battling Obscenity

The number of individuals indicted on obscenity charges were 2, 7, 0, 6, 19, and 10 for the years 1981 through 1986, respectively. In 1987, the number skyrocketed to 80. Also in 1987, the number of child pornography indictments rose from 147 to 244. These numbers suggest what was emphatically the case: that 1986 was a year of policy change. In the summer of 1986, the much-maligned attorney general's Commission on Pornography filed its report with Meese, urging (among many other things) that the Justice Department simply enforce existing laws. Meese agreed, and established a unit within the criminal division to coordinate and spearhead a nationwide effort. Under the leadership of H. Robert Showers, a former prosecutor from the U.S. Attorney's office in Raleigh, North Carolina, the unit worked closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Customs Service, Postal Service, Organized Crime Strike Forces, and the United States Attorneys, as well as state and local prosecutors, sparking the upsurge in enforcement activity. The focus of the new effort was not such magazines as *Playboy* but the material that fell plainly within the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity, which is not constitutionally protected, such as videotapes showing group sex, bestiality, sadomasochism, and violence. The Obscenity Unit encouraged the use of new methods to obtain results previously unthinkable. For the first time ever, for example, the powerful RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statute was used in an obscenity case, as the department eliminated a multimillion dollar pornography ring by obtaining forfeiture of its assets and imprisoning a principal violator.

The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith credits the Reagan civil rights division with breaking the back of the Ku Klux Klan.

Protection Against Terrorism

The '70s marked a decade of rising terrorism; in response, Smith and Meese both insisted on the importance of fighting terrorism through law and indeed on understanding terrorism as an attack on the very idea of the rule of law. Under Smith, the FBI made terrorism one of its four national priorities. More funds were allocated and more agents were assigned to terrorism investigations, the number of agents increasing by 25 percent from 1981 to 1985. In 1983, the FBI assembled a specially trained 50-man hostage rescue team capable of responding to an incident of terrorism anywhere within the United States; it was at the ready in Los Angeles during the 1984 Olympic Games. More agents conducted undercover investigations; there was more electronic surveillance as wiretap authorizations, rarely sought in the past, were used more frequently. In 1983, Smith issued new domestic security guidelines designed to prevent abuses by the government while better enabling it to investigate terrorism.

Terrorism incidents within the United States steadily declined during the Reagan years, from 51 in 1982 to 7 in 1985, blipping up to 17 in 1986 but falling back to 7 in 1987. Abroad, however, the picture was different. From 1981 to 1985 the annual number of international incidents grew from around 500 to roughly 800. The legal tools available to the department for fighting terrorism abroad were inadequate. Accordingly, the department sought and obtained from the Congress in 1984 a law making it a U.S. crime to take an American hostage. Only through means of this law was the United States able to obtain jurisdiction in 1985 over the *Achille Lauro* attack and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer. The airport attacks in Rome and Vienna during the Christmas season of 1985 exposed another hole in American law: It wasn't a U.S. crime to kill an American abroad in a terrorist incident. Again, the department was

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able to achieve important legal change, as the Congress enacted relevant law.

Attorney General Meese made international terrorism a personal concern, as he became the first U.S. attorney general to participate in the Trevi Group, which brings high European officials together on a regular basis to discuss terrorism and share strategies for combating it. Meese also broadened the work of the Italian-American Working Group on Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking, established under Smith, to include international terrorism. With the United States armed with new legal weapons, and with enhanced cooperation among participating nations, the number of international incidents declined by 6 percent in 1986 and 10 percent in 1987. The FBI's arrest in 1987 of Fawaz Younis, who is alleged to have participated in the 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian airliner that included American citizens among its passengers, well illustrated the department's enhanced ability to fight international terrorism. The warrant for Younis' arrest, accomplished in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea, was based upon the 1984 hostage-taking law.

Strengthening Criminal Justice

The Reagan Justice Department's actions against organized crime, illegal drugs, obscenity, and terrorism were all part of a comprehensive initiative to strengthen the criminal justice system. This effort included the allocation of more resources, legislative change, successful litigation, and better coordination with law enforcement agencies outside the department.

Budgets tell a story. From 1981 through 1989 the department budget, more than 90 percent of which is allocated to criminal justice, grew from $2.3 billion to $6.3 billion (the only non-defense agency to enjoy such robust growth during the Reagan years). Adjusted for inflation, the department's budget rose by almost 100 percent from 1981 to 1989. By contrast, the department's budget under Jimmy Carter declined by a third from 1977 to 1981. Obviously, the Justice Department and criminal justice were high priorities for President Reagan.

During these years, the additional funds were carefully added to the various parts of the justice system so that the entire system, from investigation through incarceration, could function smoothly, without the congestion that would occur, for example, from having too many investigators but not enough prosecutors. Of particular importance was the prison expansion program begun in 1982 under Smith and maintained and strengthened under Meese, a program designed to accommodate the dramatic growth in the number of inmates that resulted, in large part, from the enhanced anti-drug effort.

The department's criminal justice effort was reflected in not only additional resources but also criminal law reform. The department strongly supported the Victims of Crime Act of 1982, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act was the most important criminal reform bill in two decades, legislating more than 50 badly needed changes and becoming a worthy model for states engaged in their own reform efforts. Among other things, it established a commission to provide sentencing



Operation Bamboo Dragon: the Reagan Justice Department chalked up record numbers of indictments and convictions in the war against drugs.

guidelines, the goal being a nationwide system of uniform punishments. And the new act changed bail law to enable courts to consider danger to the community posed by a suspect free on bail. (The department successfully defended the law against constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court.) The department also won criminal law reforms in the courts, the most important being the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in *United States* v. *Leon* (1984). This case was part of a larger concern, as articulated by Meese, for recovering one of the original purposes of the criminal justice system—finding out the truth about a crime. In 1985, Meese denounced the Supreme Court's 1966 ruling in *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, making it the centerpiece of a campaign to reform criminal law, both statutory and decisional, to improve the ability of investigators to discover what actually happened at the scene of a crime. The Office of Legal Policy, under Stephen Markman's direction, produced several important studies of *Miranda* and other criminal law issues.

Finally, the criminal justice effort stressed assistance to states and localities. Under Smith, the department established law enforcement coordinating committees in judicial districts around the nation; these groups, made up of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, identified regional priorities and worked together to attack common problems. Meese broadened their work to include obscenity cases. He also reduced the amount of time needed to process applications by states and localities for their share of proceeds from joint asset forfeitures. Meese worked hard to inspire the men and women, federal, state, and local, who were actually doing the work in the field. He understood their labor, met frequently with them, and gave voice to their concerns.

Judges Who Judge

Advising presidents on judicial appointments has been a responsibility of attorneys general since the 1850s. No duty

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is more important, because none promises such an enduring legacy. Under Smith, and on the advice of his deputy Edward Schmults, the Office of Legal Policy was established in 1981 and assigned the task of screening and evaluating prospects for the federal bench. First under Jonathan Rose, then Tex Lezar, later James M. Spears, and finally Markman, this office carefully reviewed the qualifications of each candidate, making recommendations to the attorney general. The central consideration, assuming competence, integrity, and judicial temperament, was the candidate's understanding of the role of the courts in our society: the department sought judges who believed in judicial restraint. Interviews by Legal Policy lawyers and others assisting in the process were designed to yield the candidate's views in this crucial respect. Irrelevant to this enterprise and therefore *not* asked were questions about an individual's partisan involvements, political philosophy, or personal views about such contentious issues as abortion or school prayer. What was asked, because relevant, were questions about federalism, separation of powers, and approaches to constitutional and legal interpretation.

President Nixon had earlier criticized judicial activism, mainly in the context of criminal law cases, and he sought, with very limited success, "strict constructionists" for the Supreme Court. The Reagan administration addressed judicial activism much more systematically, choosing judges committed to a proper understanding of the courts and the Constitution for all levels of the federal judiciary. In this, the department clearly was disagreeing with those, among them some Republicans on Capitol Hill, who think that age, experience, a law degree, bar involvement, and some party connection are adequate qualifications for the bench. Those factors dominated judicial selection under Presidents Nixon and Ford.

President Reagan appointed 167 judges during Smith's tenure, 206 during Meese's, 373 in all—almost half of the sitting federal judiciary. This breaks down to 288 District Court judges, 81 Circuit Court judges, and 4 (including the appointment of Associate Justice William Rehnquist as Chief Justice) to the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, one appointment that failed was that of Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court; the Senate's rejection of his nomination was a major symbolic defeat for the president's effort to rein in judicial activism. Still, Reagan-appointed majorities now exist on the Second, Third, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals (and there is a chance that a majority may emerge on the Fifth Circuit before the administration ends). Those on the courts of appeals are like Triple-A ballplayers, inasmuch as they may be graduated by some future president to the Supreme Court. Among the stars at that level—the most notable champions of judicial restraint—are Douglas Ginsburg, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Frank Easterbrook, Pasco Bowman, Edith Jones, Stephen Williams, Daniel Mahoney, Jere Smith, Patrick Higganbotham, and Kenneth Starr (who served in the department as counselor to Smith from 1981 through 1983).

Constitutional Litigation

Judicial selection was an important means for attacking judicial activism, but not the only one. Previous Justice Departments had not made threshold challenges to opposing litigants—regarding, for instance, the litigants' standing to bring a case or the ripeness of their claim; indeed, during the Carter administration, senior department lawyers instructed staff attorneys not to make such "non-merits" arguments. In a major effort to effect change, the Reagan Justice Department sought to confine courts to their proper constitutional role, winning major standing cases in *Valley Forge* v. *Americans United For Separation of Church and State* and *Allen* v. *Wright*. In a broad range of cases where constitutional issues were properly reached, the department advanced interpretations of the Constitution more consistent with its original understanding, with varying results. The department participated in First Amendment religion-clause cases, Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure cases, Fifth Amendment post-*Miranda* cases and takings cases, and Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection cases. Perhaps most dramatically, in 1985 then acting Solicitor General Charles Fried asked the Supreme Court to overrule *Roe* v. *Wade*, which had declared a woman's constitutional right to abortion. His position did not prevail in the Court, but it emphatically demonstrated the department's commitment to principled constitutional interpretation.



The Long Arm of the FBI. Fawaz Younis, suspected hijacker, arrested in the Mediterranean in 1987.

The department argued three major separation of powers cases; in each the issue raised involved an attempt by Congress to exceed its powers at the expense of the executive branch. After Smith and Theodore Olson, assistant

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AP/Wide World Photos

Scalias of Justice. President Reagan appointed almost half of the sitting federal judiciary.

attorney general in charge of Legal Counsel, succeeded in persuading the president that the "legislative veto" violated the Constitution, the department successfully asked the Court in 1982 to strike it down (*Chadha* v. *INS*). And in 1986 the department persuaded the Court to invalidate certain provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation (*Bowers* v. *Synar*). The department lost the third separation of powers case. Perhaps the most important constitutional case of the decade, *Olson* v. *Morrison* concerned the constitutionality of the independent counsel law. Deputy Attorney General Burns courageously decided to file an *amicus curiae* brief opposing the law when the case reached the Court of Appeals in Washington. That court struck down the law, but it was then upheld by the Supreme Court.

The department also took on judicial activism through a tort reform project initiated by Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard. Activist judges have levied huge punitive damages against manufacturers without a demonstrated causal link between the injury suffered and the manufacturer's product. Willard's Tort Policy Working Group recommended, among other things, a restoration of the concept of fault as the basis for liability and the use of credible scientific and medical evidence to establish causation. While tort reform legislation failed in the Congress, an overwhelming majority of the states have adopted tort reform measures.

Missed Opportunities

Arguably, more could have been tried and more done. The department was unable to end racial quotas administered elsewhere in the government, particularly at the Labor Department; a more forceful effort might have borne fruit. *Miranda* was verbally bashed and studied to death, but that was about it; courses of action proposed in frequent memorandums never went anywhere and raising *Miranda* might have been a tactical error because other proposals for criminal law reform languished. Department officials gave speeches calling for constitutional interpretation more faithful to the original understanding of the Constitution, but the department often failed to advance more principled views in court. This happened, for example, in 1984 in the *Jaffree* case, which involved school prayer. One constant problem in the constitutional area was insufficient strategic planning that would have helped the department more consistently push originalist views in the federal courts.

Also, the department might have tried to think more creatively about the drug problem; as it was, the supply-side and demand-side solutions represented the best of contemporary bureaucratic thought, a middle-of-the-road approach whose results, so far, do not inspire confidence that the war on drugs will be won anytime soon. The options—legalization on the one hand and a more serious, all-out anti-drug war, on the other—could have been explored within the department. The department also did not take on the Congress by advocating legislation that would have put it on the defensive and stirred the public debate on important issues; for example, legislation that would apply to the Congress, laws that it exempts itself from, such as those involving civil rights, occupational safety and health, and freedom-of-information, could usefully have been advanced.

Still, much was tried and much was done to effect policy change. In fact, much *more* was tried by this Justice Department than any dating back at least to FDR's. One reason for that is the simple fact of duration in office: Ronald Reagan is the first president to have served eight years since Dwight Eisenhower. Another reason is the great variety of justice issues that clamored for attention—more than at any other period in modern times. Given the problems of crime, including drugs, of increasingly misguided antitrust and civil-rights enforcement, and of judicial activism, much had to be tried. And in its work, the Reagan Justice Department benefited from a large cadre of bright conservatives, many of them in their 20s and 30s. At the assistant attorney general level they included John Bolton and Henry Habicht. Below that level, they included James M. Spears, Carolyn Kuhl, Michael McConnell, Roger Clegg, Michael Carvin, Mark Disler, John Harrison, Gregory Walden, Steve Matthews, Gary McDowell, Steven Calebresi, Robert Syncar, Patricia Bryan, Fred Nelson, and Lee Liberman. No department in the administration had such a large number of able, committed young people, and none was as important in the administration-wide effort to implement the president's social and political philosophy.

The criminal justice effort most likely to be jettisoned by a liberal administration is the anti-obscenity initiative.

A Permanent Revolution?

How much of what was accomplished will endure? Much of the criminal justice effort probably will be main-

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tained, primarily because the new laws passed in the '80s enjoy bipartisan support. Drug-law enforcement will continue, perhaps even with more resources, simply because drug-law enforcement is now popular. The overall drug effort probably will undergo revision, maybe even an entire overhaul, particularly if the problem is perceived to be worsening. The one criminal justice effort most likely to be jettisoned by a liberal administration is the anti-obscenity initiative. The revolution in antitrust enforcement may seem tenuous but I predict that it will endure, because as Judge Ginsburg has said, it is "so obviously . . . reasonable . . . in the light of our common experience as witnesses to the follies of the recent past." Also, it enjoys strong backing in the academic community. The changes wrought in the civil rights division are very fragile; magnet schools will probably continue to be preferred over busing, which remains unpopular, but goals may well return as the remedy of choice. And, probably not even a Republican Justice Department will be as interested in making justiciability ("case or controversy") arguments as the Reagan Justice Department was—or as committed, even at a purely rhetorical level to originalism. Even so, the atmosphere in which the entire legal culture operates will be different as a result of the Reagan Justice Department. The law professors Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover, who are not Reagan supporters by any means, have observed that constitutional discourse was "redefined" by this Justice Department in a way "that put liberals on the defensive," forcing them to take "public stands against the legitimacy of the constitutional text and the intent of the Framers—this, while publicly deprecating the need to abide by the legislative will of democratic majorities."

Primarily as a result of speeches by Meese in 1985 and 1986, the Reagan Justice Department generated, in the words of Collins and Skover, "a new momentum in the world of American law, a conservatism that could no longer be ignored." More than 50 law reviews have published articles on "original intention" since Meese brought the concept to public attention in a 1985 address to the American Bar Association.

Freewheeling constitutional interpretation is on the defensive, as evidenced during the hearings on Richard Thornburgh to succeed Meese. Thornburgh indicated that he thought *Roe* v. *Wade* was wrong as a matter of constitutional law and that if the opportunity arose he would argue against *Roe* in the Supreme Court. (Smith refused ever to say publicly that *Roe* was wrongly decided. Meese was not so shy.) Obviously, Thornburgh's position on *Roe* was no impediment to his confirmation.

Terrorism incidents within the U.S. steadily declined during the Reagan years, from 51 in 1982 to 7 in 1987.

The fate of *Roe*, and the fate of judicial activism generally, may well turn on the performance of the Reagan judges. As the verdicts are returned through the years, case by case, we all will learn the full nature and extent of the change wrought by judicial selections.

The next Justice Department will find plenty of challenges. Protecting the power of the presidency looms as one of the most important in the wake of *Olson* v. *Morrison* and at the end of a decade in which Congress has continued to invade executive-branch turf. But the next Justice Department will also inherit an impressive legacy of accomplishment. Whichever candidate is elected president will be fortunate indeed to have a department achieve as much as did Reagan Justice.

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Stocks Populi

Privatization Can Win Bipartisan Support

Robert W. Poole, Jr.

Ronald Reagan came to Washington determined to shrink big government. Unfortunately, whatever his successes, shrinking the size of the federal government has not been among them. Consider the following statistics:

- From 1981 to 1987 federal spending increased from $678 billion to $1.05 trillion.
- Federal spending today, at 22.4 percent of GNP, is a larger fraction of gross national product than in any year under Jimmy Carter.
- There were 3.1 million federal civilian employees on the payroll in 1987, compared with 2.9 million in Carter's last year—an increase of 4.8 percent.
- And the stream of record annual budget deficits has ballooned the national debt from $914.3 billion in 1980 to $2.3 trillion in 1987.

Shrinking the federal government would have meant shifting major functions to private enterprise, that is, privatization. Yet despite a lot of rhetoric about the magic of the marketplace, there has been little real privatization during the Reagan years. The Grace Commission identified billions of dollars worth of essentially commercial functions performed by federal civil servants. But aside from Conrail, privatized last year, practically nothing has been spun off to the private sector.

Lessons from Abroad

Overseas, the picture is dramatically different. Governments of all ideological hues—from Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives to Australia's and New Zealand's Laborites to Spain's Socialists—have been selling state-owned enterprises at an amazing clip. In 1987 alone, over $90 billion worth of assets and enterprises were privatized overseas.

Many of the privatized enterprises are former commercial companies that had been nationalized under previous regimes: Britain's Jaguar, Rolls-Royce, and British Airways; the French banks Société Générale and Banque Paribas; and Spain's automaker SEAT; as well as the numerous privatizations proposed and under way in Latin America. But many of the entities being sold have always been in state hands. Examples include utilities such as Nippon Telegraph & Telephone and British Telecom, infrastructure like British Airports Authority (Heathrow and Gatwick, among others) and Air New Zealand (air traffic control), and even the national forests in New Zealand!

From inside the Beltway, the privatization of such enterprises looks politically impossible. Sell the historically governmental and heavily unionized British telephone system? You might as well try selling the U.S. Postal Service! Sell inherently governmental utilities like electricity and water? That's about as plausible as selling the Tennessee Valley Authority—ask Barry Goldwater how feasible that is. Yet these sales and more are taking place with increasing regularity overseas.

Were Thatcher's Britain the only locale of large-scale privatization, we might attribute the difference between her success and Reagan's to greater ideological commitment or more skillful leadership. But that hardly accounts for the fact that similar privatizations are occurring in at least 64 other countries, from Austria and Japan to Bangladesh and Togo.

The Global Money Sink

Privatization is a global phenomenon because governments everywhere have become overextended. Shrinking big government is far less a matter of ideology than it is a fiscal necessity. State-owned enterprises are money sinks. Insulated from marketplace discipline, they operate inefficiently (often requiring taxpayer subsidy). Moreover, they pay neither corporate income taxes nor local property taxes, thus draining the economy and the national treasury. Selling such enterprises produces both one-shot revenues and ongoing annual operating savings, as well as new tax revenues.

Just as in this country, however, those who benefit from government enterprises have political clout that can block action. Government employees, with civil service protection and strong unions, fear being subjected to the rigors of the marketplace. Customers who pay below-market prices for telephone service or electricity or air traffic control services resist being thrust into the unknown future.

The practitioners of privatization abroad have developed several techniques for dealing with such fears and

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resistance. The most important principle is to identify potential opponents and cut them in on the deal, generally by means of stock ownership. Two specific applications of the principle are employee stock ownership and popular capitalism.

Worker Ownership

The Thatcher government pioneered the use of worker/management stock ownership, which has figured in privatizations of such companies as Associated British Ports, British Aerospace, British Telecom, British Gas, Cable & Wireless, National Freight Consortium, and many others. The opportunity to become shareholders can dramatically change the incentives of unionized civil servants, as illustrated by the case of British Telecom. Union officials denounced the planned privatization of Telecom, telling their members not to purchase the shares that were being offered to them at a discount. Yet in the end, sensing the chance to make money, some 96 percent of the work force bought shares.

A major reason for their enthusiasm was the obvious success of a previous privatization, that of National Freight Consortium. When the plan to sell that company was first announced in 1979, it was assumed that the money-losing trucking firm would be sold to a competitor (which would probably sack much of the incumbent management). Working with their bankers, the managers came up with a plan for a worker/management buyout instead. Because stock ownership was so uncommon among British workers in those days, only a third of the work force purchased shares. But those who did saw their holdings increase tenfold in value in just three years. National Freight has become highly profitable, with employee productivity up 30 percent, now that the workers have a direct stake in the outcome.

What Margaret Thatcher pioneered has now become routine in privatizations around the world. Employee stock ownership has been an integral part of the divestiture of hundreds of state-owned firms in Chile during the past 15 years. Workers typically own 20 to 30 percent of the shares, and in some cases (for example, the EMELTA electric utility and ECOM data processing company) as much as 100 percent.

In Canada, the Saskatchewan government announced in June the sale of the $6 million Meadow Lake and Green Lake sawmills. The new company, NorSask Forest Products Inc., is a joint venture of an employee/management company (Tech-For Services Ltd.) and a company owned by 10 Indian tribes (MLDC Investment Co.). Ninety percent of the 157 sawmill employees bought shares in the company, and the provincial government put up part of the Indians' share of the purchase price. Thus, key constituents of the forest products company now have a stake in the success of its privatization.

Popular Capitalism

Hand in hand with employee stock ownership, widespread public stock offerings provide another successful privatization strategy. Although many state-owned enterprises could simply be sold to large commercial firms, there are sound political and public policy reasons for spreading the ownership widely. First, widespread share ownership gives ordinary citizens a chance to participate in the capitalist system. Second, it gives customers of the privatized firms a stake in their success as business enterprises. Third, widespread ownership insures against the possibility of future renationalization (which once plagued British industries as government alternated between Labor and Conservative).

British Telecom was the first large-scale British privatization in which shares were aimed at ordinary people. The initial public offering was designed specifically to get the shares into as many hands as possible. The government ran an upbeat, six-month advertising campaign, promoting the offering and explaining how to buy shares. To encourage telephone customers to buy shares, they were offered vouchers granting them a discount on their phone bills if they held their shares for at least six months. And to prevent institutions and large firms from buying up the lion's share, initial purchases were limited to 800 shares per buyer.

Foreign governments of all ideological hues—from Thatcher's Conservatives to New Zealand's Laborites to Spain's Socialists—have been selling state-owned enterprises at an amazing clip.

The result was that the initial offering was oversubscribed by five times; the shares opened at 50 cents and rose to 97 cents within hours. In one day more than two million people had become stockholders, doubling the number of Britons who owned stock. And that was only the beginning. By the end of 1987, after eight years of privatization, the number of shareholders in Britain had grown from two million to nine million, some 21 percent of the population.

Similar social transformations are taking place elsewhere, as popular capitalism spreads around the globe. In just one year, 1987, the privatization program of France's Chirac government increased that country's shareholders from one million to seven million, representing 13 percent of the population. In Chile, where capitalism traditionally meant ownership by a handful of the elite, the number of shareholders in the nation's 50 largest firms had increased from a few hundred in the 1970s to some 200,000 by the end of 1987, thanks to privatization. That government, too, has taken care to limit the number of shares available to each purchaser. For example, no individual may own more than 2.5 percent of the shares in a Chilean bank.

Popular capitalism is popping up in some surprising places. Conventional wisdom says that individual shareownership is impractical in small, poor countries because

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of the absence of large-scale stock markets. Yet the Jamaican government has been disproving this adage. In 1986 the government privatized the country's largest bank via a public stock offering. London's N. M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd. designed the offering campaign, using the mass media to advertise the shares and distributing prospectuses and application forms in bank branches and post offices across the country. Once again, the offering emphasized individual purchases: no buyer could obtain more than 7 percent of the total. The offering was 170 percent oversubscribed; some 30,000 Jamaicans purchased shares, increasing the country's shareholders fivefold. And this was done in a country whose official stock market was only open four hours per week!

Employee stock ownership and popular capitalism can overcome political resistance to privatization.

The Conrail Model

The one significant privatization accomplished by the Reagan administration was the sale of Conrail in early 1987. Yet the administration's efforts exhibited little knowledge of the extensive experience of other countries. Then Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole rejected the idea of a public stock offering, insisting that Conrail be sold to an existing railroad. Both Conrail's experienced management (which had produced a remarkable turnaround, given the freedoms offered by the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981) and its work force opposed a sale to another railroad and argued strongly for a public offering. Conrail's work force already owned 15 percent of the railroad by means of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) set up in 1980 in exchange for pay cuts.

The battle over the method of sale continued more than two years, pitting Republicans (on the side of big business) against Democrats (favoring widespread stock ownership). In the end, with the House refusing to agree to the Senate-passed bill to sell Conrail to Norfolk Southern, the latter withdrew its $1.2 billion offer in August 1986. That move cleared the way for a highly successful $1.6 billion public stock offering in early 1987—the largest initial public offering in U.S. history.

The eventual success of the Conrail sale suggests that both worker ownership and popular capitalism can be used to promote privatization in this country, as they are overseas. A number of successful private-enterprise providers of public services are partly or entirely owned by their workers and management, generally by means of an ESOP. And there are a few cases of the conversion of a public agency into a private, worker-owned company.

The Entrepreneurs on the Bus

One such case occurred in 1985 in South Lake Tahoe, California. The city-owned South Tahoe Area Ground Express (STAGE) was costing the city more than a half billion dollars per year in operating subsidy, and covering only 33 percent of its costs from the farebox. As the city considered shutting the system down and contracting with private providers for limited service, several STAGE employees proposed turning the agency into a for-profit firm, which would contract with the city. The result was the creation of a worker-owned firm, Area Transit Management.

Besides the two principal employee-owners who created ATM, seven of the 17 other employees bought stock from the 49 percent set aside for employee ownership. The city retained ownership of the buses, but no longer provides any operating subsidy, saving some $500,000 per year. Basic service has been maintained, though total ridership has dropped by one-third, due to the elimination of low-ridership routes. Farebox revenues now cover 62 percent of operating costs, with the balance (as before) coming from the state. During its first year of operation, ATM reported a $40,000 profit, of which 25 percent was distributed to employees under a profit-sharing plan.

The South Lake Tahoe bus service privatization resembles in concept a proposal from the Office of Personnel Management called Fed Co-Op. Under this plan, when a federal service is put out to bid under the federal contracting-out policy, the winning bidder would be required to create a subsidiary to run the operation and to hire all the former federal employees. It would set up an ESOP that buys stock in the parent company, with stock accounts for all the employees based on their salary levels. The idea is to give federal workers a stake in privatization.

ESOPs have been around since the early 1970s, when Congress, at the behest of Senator Russell Long, passed several pieces of legislation providing various tax breaks to encourage their creation. ESOPs borrow funds from a lending institution to buy stock from the employer corporation, with the company guaranteeing the loan. The company can make tax-deductible contributions to the ESOP to pay off the loan. And banks can deduct 50 percent of the interest income they receive from ESOP debt.

According to the Oakland-based National Center for Employee Ownership, the number of ESOP companies has grown from 1,600 in 1974 to 8,100 today, and the number of employees owning stock in this manner grew from 250,000 to more than eight million. A study published in the September/October 1987 issue of *Harvard Business Review* found that companies that set up ESOPs grew faster than before doing so, and also grew faster than similar companies without ESOPs. If stock ownership can change employee incentives in the private sector, it seems plausible that stock ownership would motivate employees in newly privatized firms as well.

Out of the Ideological Ghetto

Employee ownership and popular capitalism have been key elements in the widespread acceptance of privatization by governments around the globe. The United States has highly developed stock markets and a well-organized movement favoring employee stock ownership. It would appear that the preconditions exist to use these tools to redraw the line between public and private sectors.

But to begin this process, it is essential that privatization

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no longer be seen as the province of ideological conservatives and libertarians. No consensus in favor of divesting commercial entities from government can come without the participation of liberals and Democrats. And here is where employee ownership and popular capitalism come in.

Recall that in the Conrail battle it was primarily Democrats, such as Representative John Dingell, who favored the public stock offering, with its benefits to millions of individual investors. And the ESOP movement, while nominally bipartisan, has been championed more consistently by Democrats than by Republicans.

The greatest perceived barrier to privatization is employee opposition to trading the security of being civil servants for the risks of employment in the competitive private sector. It's hardly unreasonable, then, when we ask these people to take such risks, to offer them a compensating benefit—namely, the opportunity to benefit personally by making their enterprise efficient and productive. This might sound like idle theorizing, were it not for the enthusiastic embrace of share-ownership by the heavily unionized employees of British Telecom and the dozens of other privatized firms in Britain and elsewhere overseas.

The other principal political barrier to privatization is the fear that prices will go up after privatization. While that is likely to be the case (indeed, it's often the key to making the service operate efficiently), it is unreasonable to expect people to give up an accustomed benefit without some compensating benefit. The opportunity to share in the ownership and profits of the service offers just such a benefit—and once again, has been proven effective in privatizations overseas.

If privatization is to have a future in this country, it must become a bipartisan issue, transcending liberal/ conservative pigeon-holing. By embracing the principles of popular capitalism and worker ownership, privatization advocates can present proposals that stand a realistic chance of enactment.

Of what, then, might such an agenda consist? Here are four possible candidates from the numerous commercial activities of the federal government.

U.S. Postal Service

Though much derided for its poor service and antiquated methods, the Postal Service has the potential of being a viable commercial enterprise—if it can gain the freedom to draw on the capital markets for new equipment, the freedom to enter new lines of business (for example, electronic mail), and the freedom to manage like a business (without constant "oversight" by Congress and the Postal Rate Commission). Largely because of its extensive real estate holdings, the Postal Service has a net worth of approximately $13 billion, according to a Reason Foundation study by the economist Douglas Adie.

The British Telecom model of privatization is directly relevant to the Postal Service. The USPS should be sold in one or more public stock offerings, with a significant block of shares offered to employees and management at a hefty discount. At the same time, its monopoly on first- and third-class mail should be ended, permitting other firms to enter those fields—but also allowing USPS to enter any other field it chooses. It could buy its own fleet of jetliners and set up central sorting hubs as do Federal Express and UPS; it could go into electronic mail.

Rural areas could be protected by means of an "essential postal service" subsidy program, analogous to the program for rural airline service enacted with airline deregulation. Office of Management and Budget Director James Miller estimates that such a program would cost only $25 million a year—a pittance compared with the economic benefits of a competitive postal market. Advertising and application forms in every post office could encourage postal customers to buy shares. Millions of citizens (not just stamp collectors) would welcome the opportunity to purchase shares in one of America's largest ($30 billion in sales a year) companies.

Such a program would bring immense economic benefits to this country, opening to competitive innovation the last of the major arteries of commerce (after airlines, trucking, telecommunications, and financial services, all of which have been at least partially deregulated).

In the Conrail battle it was primarily liberals and Democrats, such as Representative John Dingell, who favored the public stock offering, with its benefits to millions of individual investors.

Air Traffic Control

Like postal service, air traffic control (ATC) is a vital function. But because ATC is apparently a natural monopoly, it cannot simply be sold to a for-profit company (due to the danger of monopoly pricing). The alternatives are to sell it either to a regulated public utility or to a nonprofit user co-op. Because of the well-documented problems with utility regulation, a growing number of observers (including Transportation Secretary James Burnley) now favor divestiture of ATC to a nonprofit user co-op.

An ATC user co-op would include airlines, private pilots, business aircraft owners, airline pilots, and the federal government (whose aircraft account for about 15 percent of the traffic handled by the civilian ATC system). "Users" should also include the controllers themselves. A federal corporate charter could spell out the maximum percentage of shares that could be owned by each user group, all of which would be represented on the co-op's board. Conflicts among user groups—for example, between "general aviation" and airlines—would be negotiated at the board level, rather than being endlessly lobbied in Congress. The result would be a system that is far more responsive than today's bureaucratic, politically managed ATC system.

Air traffic controller unions have often spoken in favor

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of ATC privatization. The airline trade group (Air Transport Association) has called for divesting ATC from the Federal Aviation Administration to an independent corporate structure. And the major airport group (Airport Operators Council International) has endorsed a similar proposition. As with postal service, it may be necessary to guarantee funding for small-town airport development to ensure passage of privatization legislation. But that, too, would be a small price to pay for the benefits of a high-tech, state-of-the-art, user-friendly ATC system.

Widespread share ownership gives customers of the privatized firms a stake in their success as business enterprises.

Tennessee Valley Dinosaur

Once considered a model of regional development, today's TVA is viewed as a model of mismanagement and environmental depredation. Its costly nuclear units are either incomplete or out of service, and present potentially huge future rate increases to TVA customers. Its coal-fired plants are among the country's worst polluters.

Privatization should separate TVA's operations into a number of companies. The nonnuclear power plants could be spun off into three or four generating companies (GENCOs) and sold in a public stock offering, with discounts for TVA customers and employees (as in the case of British Telecom). A large separate transmission company (TRANSCO) could be created from TVA's existing grid and sold to the users—with the requirement that the grid be open to all potential power suppliers, not just the GENCOs. This would foster a competitive market—and lower long-run costs—in electricity supply in the region. The nuclear units should be held in a separate company for eventual sale, and their liabilities written off, so as not to drag down the rest of the companies.

As was the case with the British utilities, customers would have to be offered some compensation for giving up historically below-market electricity rates. While the proposed privatization plan would free TVA customers from having to pay for white-elephant nuclear plants, their support for privatization would be enhanced if they were given attractive opportunities to become stockholders. Shares could be made available through a monthly purchase plan, as an adjunct to the utility bill. Discounts off the initial offering price could be offered, as was done in Britain. Customers who agreed not to sell the stock for a period of several years could be given discounts on their monthly bills.

This proposal would turn a floundering dinosaur into a set of viable commercial enterprises. Their workers and customers would stand to gain, as shareholders, from the firms' improved efficiency and performance. Customers would be relieved of the huge impending cost burden of the nuclear units, and the federal government would realize an estimated $12 billion from the various sales (which would nearly offset its TVA liabilities).

Commodity-Producing Lands

The U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management own nearly 375 million acres of commodity-producing lands—commercial timberland and grazing land. Despite the fact that these lands are ostensibly operated to produce salable commodities (timber and cattle, for the most part), the government manages to lose more than $1 billion per year on these operations. Much of this loss arises from economically and environmentally unsound activities, such as building roads to harvest timber in practically inaccessible areas.

There is no inherent conflict between multiple uses (hiking, hunting, fishing) and commodity production. Many privately owned forests in the East encourage (and profit from) such multiple use. And private ownership provides powerful economic incentives to preserve the long-term value of the land—short-sighted "rape-the-land" practices immediately decrease asset value on the balance sheet.

These lands could be privatized in various ways. An individual forest could be converted to a corporation and sold through a public stock offering, with incentives for purchase by local residents and individuals. Or a forest could be auctioned acre by acre, which would facilitate the purchase of those portions valued by environmental organizations and the more-commercial tracts by timber companies. In any case, deed restrictions that require future owners to continue to make the lands accessible for multiple uses could be imposed.

A recent Reason Foundation study estimated that the sale of federal commodity-producing lands over a 10-year period could yield $160 billion. That is a sum large enough not to be dismissed by those who immediately assume that environmental objections would doom such a plan.

The $300 Billion Question

Can privatization become a bipartisan issue in this country? Certainly the same broad motivation is present here as it is in the welfare states of Europe and Australia/New Zealand and the republics of South America: government is overextended, with ongoing deficits and soaring debt.

New Zealand's Labor government is committed to selling sufficient government assets and enterprises to pay off 25 percent of its entire national debt. Japan is selling both the highly profitable Nippon Telegraph & Telephone (proceeds thus far: over $50 billion) and the grossly inefficient Japan National Railway (which loses $1.3 billion per year). Britain has already sold some $37 billion in assets and enterprises, and has a lot more in the pipeline.

The June 1988 report of the Privatization Task Force, a joint effort of 10 free-market think tanks, identified over $300 billion in federal assets and enterprises that could be sold (including the $160 billion in commodity-producing lands discussed above). So it's clear that a privatization agenda on the scale of that being carried out in Britain and New Zealand is conceivable in this country.

But is it politically feasible? A February 1988 article in

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the *New York Times* noted a growing interest in privatization among Democrats in Congress. It cited Representatives Dennis Eckart and William Gray as being willing to look at such alternatives, not for ideological reasons but as a matter of weighing all the alternatives. The article quoted a House budget committee staff member: "I'm bothered by the notion that we need more privatization per se. But I do think asking about what kinds of activities should be in the private sector makes a lot of sense." And it quoted Senate Budget Committee staff director Richard Brandon as saying, "Where Congress could be convinced that the issue is efficiency and not ideology, I think it is willing to listen."

Also worthy of note is that the chairman of the President's Commission on Privatization was Professor David Linowes, a lifelong (and well-connected) Democrat. During the life of the commission, as he became exposed to privatization, including the British experience, Linowes seemed to become especially interested in the ideas of employee ownership and popular capitalism. Another key member of the commission was Walter Bish, head of the union at employee-owned Weirton Steel (which has been rescued from bankruptcy by a successful ESOP). The experience of these people produced a report that has much to say to Democrats and liberals. Even the liberal columnist Robert Kuttner conceded that the President's Commission on Privatization report made some excellent points.

Whoever is inaugurated president next January will face a $150 billion deficit and an unconscionable national debt. To restore fiscal sanity, he'll be forced to make hard choices. Conventional wisdom puts the choices at two: either raise taxes by hundreds of billions or cut spending by a like amount. Yet the lesson from abroad is that there's a third choice: Spin off from government those hundreds of billions worth of assets and enterprises that are basically commercial and put them into the hands of workers and individuals.

Conventional wisdom can give dozens of reasons why those things can't be sold. Yet all over the world they *are* being sold. Making owners out of workers and taxpayers appeals to both Britain's conservative Margaret Thatcher and New Zealand's liberal David Lange. It should appeal equally well to Republican Senator Phil Gramm and Democratic Representative William Gray, both of whose parties must cope with the reality of the deficit.

Privatization can play a major role in the post-Reagan era. But only if it comes to be appreciated as a tool for solving economic problems and broadening the base of ownership. It would be ironic if the country that is the bastion of free enterprise lagged behind the rest of the world in bringing capitalism to the people. ☎

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How Great Was Ronald Reagan?

Our 40th President's Place in History

A Symposium

How will President Reagan be most remembered? How, if at all, has he changed American politics and government? Has he been one of America's great presidents? Has he been a conservative president? To what other presidencies might the Reagan administration be compared?

These questions were put to seven leading political historians and presidential biographers.

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

A funny thing happened to Ronald Reagan on the way to his place in history. At the three-quarter point, he made a sharp left turn, then another, and ended his journey going in the opposite direction from his start. Initially, he was headed towards the title of the toughest Cold War president of all. His rhetoric was bellicose in the extreme, as "evil empire" replaced detente. When martial law descended on Poland, Reagan tried to organize an economic blockade of the Soviet Union. On the military front, he launched the greatest arms race in history, topped by the single most expensive weapons system ever undertaken.

But history will remember Reagan as the first Cold War president to preside over eight years of unbroken peace, the first to reach an arms reduction accord with the Soviets, and the American president who helped make it possible for Mikhail Gorbachev to begin the process of restructuring Soviet society.

Historians will also stress the gap between Reagan's domestic goals and his accomplishments. Most obvious is the deficit; what he promised to eliminate he has allowed to swell beyond comprehension. On the social agenda, abortion remains legal, prayer in the schools illegal. Reagan's failure in the war against drugs and related crime activities is so great that drugs are the number one issue in the 1988 presidential campaign.

Nevertheless, Reagan will be remembered as the president who reversed the decades-old flow of power to Washington. By dismantling some federal programs, and reducing others, he forced the states and the cities to assume more responsibility for running their own shows. If he failed to break the Democratic hold on Congress, he did force the Democratic Party to move to the right. When Reagan entered politics 22 years ago virtually every Democrat outside Dixie identified himself, proudly, as a liberal; today, in large part because of Reagan, almost every Democrat in the nation tries to call himself a conservative.

Bid for Greatness: Tax Reform

These are important changes, but not of such a magnitude to earn Reagan a title of "great." The great presidents are the ones who bring permanent changes in society. Teddy Roosevelt and conservation and trust-busting, as one example, or Woodrow Wilson and the Federal Reserve System, Franklin Roosevelt and Social Security, Harry Truman and the integration of the armed forces, Dwight Eisenhower and the interstate highway system, Lyndon Johnson and Medicare and civil rights.

Reagan's bid for greatness is tax reform, and on this one it is just too early to tell. If the doomsayers are right and we are dragged into a depression by the deficit and the trade imbalance, Reagan's tax policy will be reversed and forgotten. If the optimists are right and the economy continues to grow, the new tax rates will become permanent and Reagan will be blessed for his wisdom and courage.

Like Ike and JFK

Comparing Reagan to other presidents produces mixed results. He has been very like Jack Kennedy in a number of ways: cutting taxes to stimulate the economy, accepting large deficits in order to step up the pace of the arms race, indulging in Cold War rhetoric. He has been like Dwight Eisenhower in a number of ways: talking tough while maintaining the peace, using the CIA's covert capabilities rather than the Armed Forces' overt firepower to support his policies in the Third World, using a show of force rather than force itself in the Middle East while attempting to maintain an even-handed policy toward the antagonists. Reagan has also been very like Eisenhower in his tremendous personal popularity, as well as in his inability to use that popularity to promote the Republican Party.

Therein lies the biggest difference between Reagan and Nixon. Many people admired Nixon, almost no one ever liked him. Almost everyone likes Reagan, although not so many admire him. Every scandal in the Nixon administration came home to stick to the president; the Reagan administration's scandals have been more numerous, and in the case of Iran/Contra, more serious, but none of them have stuck to the president.

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

Drawing by Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*

Whether that was just plain dumb luck or brilliant politics Reagan's biographers will argue for a long time to come.

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE *is a biographer of Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon.*

M. E. BRADFORD

One political era most differs from another in the language used by those in power. We know that a watershed is coming when that language starts to change. We are now hearing a new idiom in the speech of public figures, one in sharp contrast to the language that originally defined the Reagan Revolution. That speech was a universe of discourse, a network of rhetorical questions, assumptions, normative terms, and modifiers that has given the last 10 years an identifiable momentum. Whoever is chosen to be president in November, this now-familiar political idiom will not long survive the changing of the guard. About the promise of individual liberty and responsibility, we will hear less and less; about the benevolence of government, more. The thought of such subtraction makes us self-conscious about what we will lose. Thus, these remarks are openly valedictory of the rhetoric of the Reagan presidency, the eloquence by which we were so securely environed. And very soon this will be the attitude of most conservatives, however frequently we have lost patience with President Reagan while he has been in office.

For all things change when the expectations generated by political discourse shift. In recent months, conservatives have argued that tax reform and tax cuts have made it difficult for politicians coming after Reagan to postulate the necessity for creative spending; to insist that government, if properly concerned for the unfortunate, should throw money at social problems. For a time I shared that opinion. Now I doubt its validity. Leftism is a virus in the bloodstream of our body politic, present in authoritative appeals to tolerance and peace, fairness, charity, and a natural right to the property of others. It will not go away. It has a ground in envy and resentment, which are the fashionable modern responses to eminence and distinction of every kind.

The Left in Disguise

Yet the political success of Ronald Reagan has forced the contemporary Left to disguise the intransigent emotional core of its worldview behind talk of heart-rending circumstances and imminent disasters, which by reason of their severity cancel every consideration of means or ends. Assuredly, the task that President Reagan set for himself has not been completed. The practical consequences of his triumphs have been adumbrated by continuing Democratic power on Capitol Hill, by a press overwhelmingly on the left, and by the timidity of too many of his servants. We must remember that he was allowed to govern for only one term. The rest has been a holding action, undercut by concern for respectability and by a preoccupation with the "judgment of history." Nevertheless, because of Reagan, no serious national politician now wishes to be identified simply as a "liberal." Facing President Reagan, leftists prefer to be described as "competent" and "compassionate." Beyond such partial characterizations, they deal only in personalities, in the dark arts of vilification, or in the outrageous allegation that Democratic omnibus continuing appropriations prove Republican fiscal irresponsibility.

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This president has taught those who share his politics how to conduct a national campaign—how to give limited government, strong national defense, and a check on inflation mass appeal. He has shown us how to do this with a high heart and good humor, making conservatism an optimistic creed. Moreover, he has put to rest forever the old axiom that no candidate for the presidency can run as a conservative and be elected. Finally, with the counsel of Attorney General Edwin Meese, he has compounded these achievements by choosing judges who will defend the Constitution as it has not been defended in over 50 years. These appointments are this president's greatest accomplishment.

Reagan will be remembered as the president who reversed the decades-old flow of power to Washington.
—Stephen E. Ambrose

I leave aside the effort of the Reagan administration in Central America, its role in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. They involve business that is far from complete. Along with much of the Reagan agenda, their disposition must wait upon his legitimate successors: those who will go forward with implacable determination regardless of the enmity that confronts them. Ronald Reagan will be remembered for the initiatives he set in motion with his anti-statist rhetoric, and for changing through such language the current of our politics almost as dramatically as that current was changed in 1932. The most popular of our modern presidents, he has in his virtues and personal style symbolized our national character, not necessarily as it is, but as we wish it to be.

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ALONZO L. HAMBY

After Ronald Reagan has endured the usual biographical cycle of bunk, debunk, and rebunk he likely will be remembered as an outstanding national cheerleader. If such an assertion sounds disparaging, it should not. In the Media Age, rhetorical leadership has become one of the presidency's most important functions. In part through hard policies but even more through his skills as a communicator, Reagan has successfully lifted the morale of a nation that in 1980 was wallowing in pessimism and uncertainty. Long accustomed to the spotlight and the microphone and understanding the way in which the media magnifies one's personality, Reagan has turned what was a liability for most of his predecessors into an asset of major proportions.

Scholars and others with a large view of the world will remember him also as a participant in a transnational movement against the excesses of the regulatory/welfare state, whether overtly socialist (as in much of the world) or marginally social-democratic (as in the United States). It seems doubtful, however, that they will consider him the outstanding political leader and conceptualizer of the return to free market capitalism. That honor will be reserved for Margaret Thatcher, a political captain of notably greater will and tenacity.

It is in the realm of the substantive rather than the symbolic that future generations will raise the greater number of questions about Reagan. Their ultimate judgment probably will be that like most American presidents he wore his ideology lightly and was more notable for his flexibility than for his dogmatism.

Was he conservative? Sure, but not a "hard" conservative. Clearly, he has done little about the social agenda of the Cultural Right other than make an occasional speech stating an opposition to abortion and/or affirming traditional Christian values.

Reagan has largely had his way on economics but with policies that do not fit well into traditional definitions of economic conservatism. Many observers, not all of them liberal, argue that in the long run we will pay for a prosperity set in motion by massive budget and international trade deficits. Reagan's defenders may confound (or simply infuriate) them by invoking Lord Keynes' dictum that in the long run we are all dead. It remains to be seen whether the American economy is capable of generating the output to cover our internal and international debts with little or no pain.

It is notable, moreover, that even in the realm of economics Reagan has taken the easy path rather than the hard one. For all his rhetoric in favor of a balanced budget, he has consistently refused to fight for one. Instead, he has rather easily acquiesced in one of the worst tendencies of democracy, its cupidity. Despite the incessant rhetorical handwringing about the plight of the poor, the vast bulk of federal "social programs" involve some sort of subsidy to the middling groups in American society. It is, no doubt, a realization of this situation and along with it a basic political survival instinct that has caused the administration to back away from programmatic hit lists.

Pandering to Popular Appetite

Reagan has run up against a popular appetite for federal benefits without parallel in our history. He and the people around him have been able to deal with it only by pandering to it. The Ronald Reagan who announces that the elderly will receive an increase in Social Security benefits whether or not inflation runs high enough to trigger it is hardly the leader of a counterrevolution. One wonders what historians will make of all the talk of a conservative era in a decade when federal social spending actually increased.

It is even harder to determine how they may classify a man whose foreign policy has meandered all over the ideological spectrum and has run in qualitative terms from the steadfast defense of the American nuclear presence in Eu-

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rope and the liberation of Grenada to the muddled Reykjavik summit and the shabby arms-for-hostages dealings in Iran. That said, it is a pretty sure thing that most historians will approve of the recent moves toward detente with the Soviet Union, in part because most historians are liberal but also because if present indicators hold up, Reagan will have done the right thing. (One wishes, however, that he could have found a better way to go about it than tinkering with the nuclear balance.)

Has he been a great president? Let us begin with the acknowledgment that at the very least in the short run, Reagan has left the nation stronger, more prosperous, and more confident than he found it. Unless sometime in the next several years we fall victim to a catastrophe that can be convincingly traced to his policies, it will be hard to rate him a subpar chief executive. Yet it will be difficult even for those in sympathy with him to argue that he has achieved greatness.

Disconnected Administrative Style

It is clear now that his administrative style has been not simply "detached" but virtually disconnected. It is well for presidents to avoid obsession with detail and to keep their eyes on the larger goals, but Reagan exemplifies the opposite extreme to a fault. He too often appears indifferent not simply to detail but to the personnel who manage his presidency, not just ill informed but positively removed from the world of policy execution.

He does not seem to have made much change in the large patterns of American politics. If he has temporarily changed the momentum of American foreign and domestic policy, he has not posed a frontal challenge to the assumptions of the Great Society, nor has he established a new majority. Public opinion surveys that record a widespread pessimism about the future may show that even his achievement as a morale booster has been superficial. He has sustained himself politically by taking the easy way out on the tough issues. Ideologues may call this cowardice; political professionals will characterize it as prudence. In either case, it may have been the price of self-preservation in assuming the leadership of a people who want to avoid difficult choices. What it is not is an indicator of greatness.

As for comparisons: Reagan has been an uplifter and rhetorician comparable to the two Roosevelts and Wilson; a conservative exponent of capitalism in the tradition of Coolidge and Eisenhower; a cold warrior and advocate of U.S. international leadership akin to Truman, Kennedy, and Nixon. These analogies demonstrate the skill and strength of a political leader able to draw on diverse themes and weave them together into a formidable personal coalition. Whether he has left something more durable remains for all of us, especially George Bush, to see.

ALONZO L. HAMBY *is professor of history at Ohio University. His most recent book is* Liberalism and Its Challengers: FDR to Reagan. *He is now at work on a biography of Harry S. Truman.*

FORREST MCDONALD

Forecasting history's judgment of a presidency is a tricky business. In addition to lacking the perspective that time alone can provide, we are impaired by two features that inhere in the office. The first of these is that the presidency is dual in character: the president is head of government, which is an administrative and managerial function, and he is also head of state, which is a ceremonial, ritualistic, and symbolic function. Our tendency is to judge the president, while he is in office, largely in terms of the latter, and therefore personality weighs heavily. Scarcely a generation needs pass, however, before personality is forgotten and other criteria come to bear. Accordingly, such presidents as Lincoln, Wilson, and Truman, whose personalities were far from charismatic and who were regarded as failures by most of their contemporaries, can come to be regarded as great; and the likes of William McKinley and John F. Kennedy, immensely popular when in office (and for a brief time after their martyrdom), can subsequently come to be viewed as ciphers.

Reagan has left the nation stronger, more prosperous, and more confident than he found it. Yet it will be difficult to argue that he has achieved greatness.

—Alonzo L. Hamby

The second feature arises from the lame-duck syndrome. During his first term, the president and the members of his party in Congress, looking forward to the support they can provide one another when seeking reelection, tend to cooperate effectively. After the president is reelected, the bond of reciprocal dependency is dissolved; and besides, the president, who is almost invariably returned to office by a greatly increased majority, tends to regard dealing with Congress as beneath his dignity. The president thus moves toward overseas adventuring, where his hands are relatively free, and congressmen of both parties are progressively estranged from him. At some point during his second term he becomes fair game for the most vicious attacks from politicians and press alike, and scandals (real and bogus) become commonplace. This is not something that began with the presidency of Ronald Reagan, or even with those of Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson. It is the fate suffered by George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and almost every other two-term president. But as time passes, the attacks are forgotten and the achievements (or failures) in foreign policy tend to determine the president's niche in history.

Prophet or Silly Ass?

Bearing these considerations in mind, one can rise above the provincialism of the present in appraising a presidency, but there is yet another difficulty. Whether history will regard Ronald Reagan favorably or otherwise will depend in large measure upon the course of history yet to come.

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Forrest McDonald: Lincoln, Wilson, and Truman, regarded as failures by their contemporaries, came to be regarded as great; McKinley and Kennedy, immensely popular in office (and for a brief time after their martyrdom), came to be viewed as ciphers.

This is not always the case. Presidencies that are devoid of significant achievement, such as those of Franklin Pierce and Jimmy Carter, are unlikely to be reevaluated later, and the same is true of calamitous presidencies such as those of James Buchanan and Warren G. Harding. But with active presidents, Reagan among them, the verdict of history is likely to be many years in the coming.

It seems entirely probable that the judgment on Reagan will turn mainly upon two pivots, his domestic economic policies and his negotiations regarding nuclear disarmament. Conservatives have been greatly disappointed in his economic policies, believing that deregulation and the cutting of income taxes have not gone nearly far enough and fearing that the budget deficits portend disaster. But if the economic systems of the world continue to move toward depoliticization and the primacy of the market, if prosperity continues to attend that trend, if the budget is brought under control without a new round of worldwide inflation, and if the time bomb that is Social Security does not explode, Reagan will be regarded as the man who led America out of the abyss of socialist stagnation. These are admittedly large ifs.

The returns on that aspect of his presidency will be in fairly soon—within a generation or so. Those having to do with nuclear disarmament might take longer, especially if Mikhail Gorbachev manages to stay in power. If the various reactionary elements in the Soviet Communist Party can oust Gorbachev, as they would love to do, Reagan will look a silly ass for having changed his mind about the evil empire. If Gorbachev by some miracle manages to pull off his *perestroika*, Reagan will be made to seem a prophet and a great force for world peace.

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GEORGE H. NASH

It is not difficult to identify the principal initiatives for which Ronald Reagan will be remembered. After a decade of national defeatism and doubt, he strode into office in 1981—confident of America's ideals and promise, and of the ability of his countrymen to conquer their malaise. He instituted startling tax-rate reductions and other measures that have produced (his supporters argue) the longest peacetime economic expansion in the history of the United States. In foreign policy he initiated a massive rearmament program to contain Soviet imperialism and expounded America's democratic faith without shame. In doing so he broke, without fully dispelling, the debilitating grip of the "post-Vietnam syndrome" and the mentality of "blame America first." In the realm of social issues, he set out deliberately to curb the "imperial judiciary" and reorient a left-leaning Supreme Court.

Not all of his accomplishments were so programmatic. Perhaps equally significant is the fact that during the Reagan years principled, articulate conservatives gained unprecedented access to executive power and to the nation's policy-making elite. The Reagan Revolution of 1981 was not a conventional shift in legislative priorities and personnel; it was an *intellectual* challenge that undermined the sanctity of the status quo. It did not overthrow that status quo; Reagan never had the votes—or perhaps the intent—to do so. But his administration for at least a time altered the terms of public debate and tarnished the intellectual pretensions of social democracy. In these subtle but influential ways Reagan altered American politics more than he did public policy.

Contingent Legacy

Contemplating this substantial legacy, I am nonetheless struck by how tentative and contingent it remains. Is the economic boom of the 1980s, for example, a healthy phenomenon for which Reaganomics may take credit, or is it (as critics maintain) a false prosperity built upon the quicksands of debt? Events during the next few years will tell—and will thereby color our judgment of the Reagan record. Similarly, was the revival of American military strength and morale in the early '80s a lasting achievement or only a fleeting spasm in a dreary saga of declension? Here, as well, the *post*-Reagan era will inform us. So, too, for the Supreme Court; all that Reagan has done to reshape it could quickly be undone in the next presidential term. And despite the entry of conservatives into the Washington mainstream, the Reagan Revolution is not yet institutionalized. To a considerable degree, then, Reagan's place in history will depend upon the deeds of his successor.

If all this creates uncertainty about our 40th president's eventual niche in the history books, another factor is likely to embroil him in extended controversy. For Ronald Reagan, like Woodrow Wilson and Abraham Lincoln before

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him, has been guided in office by a compelling moral vision. Because he has been a principled (and not merely managerial) chief executive, Reagan has profoundly antagonized those who espouse competing social visions—notably the New Deal, Great Society, and New Left. He has threatened their intellectual hegemony and sense of superiority, much as FDR threatened those Republicans of his day who considered themselves America's natural aristocracy. As custodians of a regime under powerful ideological assault, Reagan's adversaries have a vested interest in disparaging his presidency. For this reason alone, his standing at the bar of history will long engender passion. Such is the fate of those who delegitimate (but do not overturn) the status quo.

Eisenhower's Augustan Age

How, then, will Ronald Reagan go down in history? As a conservative Roosevelt who redirected America's course for half a century? As a second Coolidge of liberal caricature who fiddled while the economy burned? As a benign, Ike-like grandfather who ruled for an insignificant interlude during America's inexorable march toward socialism? As a rejected prophet like Wilson whose vision triumphed only after his death?

My own hunch is that an Eisenhower analogy may be the closest one—although not the analogy dear to yesterday's liberals. A generation ago, when Eisenhower left office, he was widely disdained by "the best and the brightest" as an aging golfer whose presidency had brought little but stagnation. It was time, his youthful successor asserted, to "get America moving again." The sequel was the hubris and tragedies of the '60s. Only now, a generation later, have historians begun to perceive Eisenhower as an effective, "hidden-hand" executive who governed during what in retrospect appears an Augustan age.

Will historians someday gaze similarly on our own decade and its dominant public figure? No one can say. But I do venture to predict that our 40th president will be adjudged a singular statesman, and for a reason few of his critics understand. As the finest political orator of our era, Ronald Reagan reaffirmed with eloquence the continuing validity and vitality of the American Dream. In this more than in any policies or decisions lie his legacy and enduring claim to greatness.

GEORGE H. NASH, *author of* The Conservative Intellectual Movement Since 1945, *is currently working on the third volume of his biography of Herbert Hoover.*

JAMES NUECHTERLEIN

It has been Ronald Reagan's extraordinary political gift to be at once a unifier and a constructive polarizer. Polls have registered his ability, right up to the present, to make a substantial majority of Americans feel better about both themselves and their country. At the same time, he is no Eisenhower, bringing people together behind a genial moderation. Genial, yes; moderate, not really at all. During the 1930s, conservatives hissed Franklin Roosevelt at the newsreels while liberals looked on him with something akin to worship. Fifty years later, Reagan has reversed those patterns of appraisal.

Those who question Reagan's conservatism or wonder whether he has made a genuine difference lack a sense of historical perspective. He has accomplished nothing less than a fundamental change in the terms of debate of American politics. The Democrats, it is true, presently show signs of revival—no political mood lasts forever—but they have achieved recovery only by carefully distancing themselves from the liberalism that is their presumed reason for being. They have been reduced to responding to the president's agenda rather than setting their own.

Startling Accomplishments

Consider Reagan's accomplishments. He has restored the American economy (a president's single most important domestic responsibility) even as he has frustrated the Left's ambition to transform the welfare state into the redistributive state. More generally, he has revitalized faith in private enterprise, the work ethic, political freedom, and the dignity and responsibility of the individual; he has, in short, reestablished a consensus on the basic principles of democratic capitalism that define the American experiment. On all the major social issues—abortion, quotas, gay rights, feminism, crime and punishment, the family, moral and religious values—the Reagan administration has been conservative and correct, even if reasonable people might quarrel over details of policy and political strategy.

In foreign affairs, the record is mixed, but it should not be forgotten that Reagan has kept the peace, rebuilt America's defenses, and exhibited, at least on occasion, a vigorous understanding of the national interest (no imaginable Democratic administration would have undertaken the Grenada operation). He has labeled the USSR for what it has been, an evil empire, at the same time that he has understood the need to establish sober terms of coexistence with it. His essential skepticism toward the Soviets has not blinded him to the possibility that in Mikhail Gorbachev we *may* be dealing with a genuine departure in Soviet leadership. There have been great blunders (Iran/Contra most notable among them) but many of the administration's perceived failures have had more to do with the intractabilities of international affairs (and the fecklessness of Congress on foreign policy) than with errors in vision or execution.

To those who grumble that he has not reconstituted the political economy of Herbert Spencer, one can only say welcome to politics and welcome to America.

—James Nuechterlein

Triumph of Personality

Reagan's leadership has been, above all, a triumph of personality. His eloquence, charm, courage (recall his behavior after the assassination attempt), and remarkable

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sense of self have revived Americans' pride in the presidential office and, by extension, in the nation itself. No president in memory has displayed so healthy an ego, and Reagan's most adamant political opponents concede his fundamental personal decency.

There has been, it must be said, a considerable falling off since 1986. The loss of the Senate and the Iran/Contra fiasco have weakened the president and led to frustrations in both foreign and domestic policy. The administration has failed in Nicaragua (though that was by no means entirely its own doing) and faltered in Panama. The greatest domestic disappointment came in the defeat of the Bork nomination, where the administration stumbled tactically and failed to communicate adequately the essential principle at issue. (Americans must somehow be made to understand the necessity of judicial restraint to the preservation of our constitutional order.)

One can't help wondering how much more he could have achieved had he been a more forceful, involved chief executive.

—Karl O'Lessker

Still, except for those on the irreconcilable Right who dream of an American equivalent of the Bourbon restoration (dismantlement of the welfare state and reversion of Cold War attitudes to those prevailing *circa* 1953), Reagan's has been a record that conservatives can look to with no small feeling of approval and satisfaction. To those who grumble that he has not been everywhere successful and has not reconstituted the political economy of Herbert Spencer, one can only say welcome to politics and welcome to America.

A great president? Probably not: there has been too much inattentiveness, too little intellectual grasp, some inadequacy of vision. (Reagan's celebrations of individualism too often leave the impression that it is not individualism-in-community to which conservatives should aspire but individualism as an end in itself.) But if not a great president, surely the most significant one since FDR. And perhaps the best-loved of all—which is not, ideologues to the contrary notwithstanding, a thing to be despised.

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KARL O'LESSKER

The achievement for which President Reagan will be most warmly remembered occurred the first year of his administration. It was the putting into place of fiscal policies, collectively known as "Reaganomics," that have produced the longest peacetime period of sustained economic strength in this century. The cornerstone of this policy was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which Reagan championed during his 1980 campaign and fought like a tiger to get through Congress the following year. To whatever extent the credit for any successful major policy can be attributed to one man, the credit for ERTA belongs to Ronald Reagan.

Far more important than its present impact on the economy, Reaganomics may well have caused a fundamental shift in the political community's approach to fiscal policy. During the past seven years (and, one suspects, for some years to come) there has been little if any disposition among congressional Democrats to advocate, still less vote for, big new spending or taxation programs.

Apart from partisan bleats about the poor, elderly, homeless, minorities, handicapped (as if these categories of unfortunates were created by Reaganomics), the one dark shadow that falls across the economic record of this administration is the federal deficit. Among economists there is hardly any consensus as to what the long-term consequences will be of the soaring national debt. My own inexpert view is that all those foreigners who are said to be financing our deficit are doing so not out of the goodness of their hearts but because they see this economy—deficit and all—as a splendid opportunity for productive investment. And that worldwide belief among hard-headed investors is more likely to be accurate than the doomsday prophecies of our own pundits.

Unfortunately, I find little else in the record of this administration that posterity is likely to applaud. What started out as a strong-willed, unillusioned policy toward the Soviet Union has become in President Reagan's second term a rush toward "give-peace-a-chance" accommodationism.

In a related area, this administration has been given too much credit and far too much blame for the defense buildup. Allowing Mr. Reagan full marks for the large increases in his first two defense budgets, we need to bear in mind that the buildup actually began under President Carter and his excellent Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in the final year of the Carter administration and in the budget he left behind for his successor (FY1982). The Reagan bud-

Reagan reaffirmed with eloquence the continuing validity and vitality of the American Dream. In this more than in any policies or decisions lie his legacy and enduring claim to greatness.

—George H. Nash

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gets accelerated the Carter increases but by no means charted a new direction.

The one program of transcendent importance that might stand as a monument to the Reagan presidency is the Strategic Defense Initiative—*if* it survives the next Congress. If it does not, however, some portion of blame will have to be assessed against Mr. Reagan himself because of his insistence on portraying the program as an impenetrable space shield using madly exotic weaponry to protect our cities rather than as a quickly deployable defense of our retaliatory forces. This ill-judged emphasis gave rise to the ugly and dishonest anti-Star Wars campaign, which may well prove to be the undoing of SDI.

All told, in my judgment as a conservative Democrat, President Reagan will be remembered more for the opportunities that slipped from his grasp than for achievements that reshaped the American political landscape. I don't at all mean to discount the enormous difficulties Reagan confronted in the form of a largely hostile Congress and virulent news media. A great deal of what he did accomplish against these odds is attributable to his own extraordinary personality, eloquence, and moral commitment. But one can't help wondering how much more he could have achieved had he been a more forceful, involved chief executive. Reagan has indeed been as conservative a president as we could realistically hope to have but not a great one. Greatness requires more than heartfelt good intentions and an occasional success.

KARL O'LESSKER, *a member of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, has written many articles on political history for* The American Spectator.



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The Great Rejuvenator

The Best of Ronald Reagan's Speeches

To call President Reagan the Great Communicator is to trivialize the message he has communicated, and to misunderstand the profound influence of his speeches on America and the world. Mr. Reagan has, of course, made the most of his Hollywood and his radio training; he has been a star performer on the presidential podium. But his effectiveness as a speaker has depended on much more than his brilliant choice of speechwriters and his masterful delivery. After all, countless other politicians can read a teleprompter as skillfully and inspirationally as he.

Our oldest president has really been the Great Rejuvenator. Ronald Reagan has made America feel young again, with its mission in history uncompleted and its greatest accomplishments yet to come. He has done so mostly through policies that have restored America's economic growth and military strength. But through his rhetoric, he has also reawakened his countrymen's commitment to simple American principles that somehow had been forgotten in the 1960s and 1970s. President Reagan has reestablished what America stands for, and, as important, what it stands against. And he has given Americans renewed confidence that, in a world of evil, their principles of liberty and popular government will prevail.

The following collection of excerpts from some of President Reagan's greatest speeches is divided into three sections.

The first is from his speeches about America, "this blessed land" of faith and freedom and charity and opportunity. Inheriting an economic crisis from Jimmy Carter, President Reagan put the blame on the departure from the American democratic tradition, on a government that had "grown beyond the consent of the governed." The president has never been very precise about what exactly the federal government should not be doing, but with his constant emphasis on "we the people," he has undermined the legitimacy of special-interest programs that do not enjoy widespread public support, and he has identified the conservative principle of limited government with the American mainstream. His themes of American heroism and of a "golden door" for immigrants stood in sharp contrast to the "malaise" speeches of his predecessor, and have been adopted without attribution—the highest compliment—by Governor Dukakis.

The second section is about the titanic conflict of our times, the conflict of freedom against totalitarianism. The sophisticates who ridiculed the "evil empire" speech never criticized the president for calling Nazism evil in Germany or for calling racism evil before an audience of southern white conservatives. But his assessment is nonetheless accurate in all three cases: there is still right and wrong in the modern world, and Communism is currently the most dangerous embodiment of evil.

There is no jingoism or bellicosity in the president's case for a strong military, including strategic defenses. Instead there is the commonsense argument, never expressed more eloquently, that in a world of tyrants the democracies must remain armed if they are to remain free and at peace, and that the best protection against war is the moral courage of free peoples willing to defend themselves.

What is most striking about the president's speeches on Communism is his confidence that freedom will prevail, that it is the Soviet Union "that runs against the tide of history." To help move history along, he has gone on the rhetorical offensive against Communism, taking his message of liberty even to the bosom of the enemy. His speeches to the students of Moscow and Shanghai may read like clichéd civics textbooks to Americans, but his words of liberty and genuine people's republicanism will reverberate for decades in the Communist world. Despite occasional naive comments about Soviet change under Gorbachev, the president's rallying cry for freedom in Moscow alone justified the summit.

The third section is on the great moral issues confronting America at home. Mr. Reagan is the first president to address that terrible "wound in our national conscience," abortion on demand. His speeches on the tragedy of family breakdown and the permanence of dependency on welfare have helped reshape public debate about how government can best help the poor.

Like Jefferson, Lincoln, and the other great framers of the American rhetorical tradition, President Reagan has been guided through all his speeches by a deep faith in Providence. His optimism about the future is grounded in his conviction that God wants man to be free, and that He will deliver good from evil. It is this faith that ultimately has made President Reagan the Great Rejuvenator. "Come," said the president in London this June when he returned from Moscow, "it is not too late to seek a newer world."

—Adam Meyerson

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THIS BLESSED LAND

The Crisis of Overgovernment

These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions.

We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our national history. It distorts our economic decisions, penalizes thrift, and crushes the struggling young and the fixed-income elderly alike. It threatens to shatter the lives of millions of our people.

Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery, and personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps us from maintaining full productivity. . . .

In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981

We are a nation that has a government—not the other way around. And this makes us special among the nations of the earth.

Our government has no power except that granted to it by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of government which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed.

It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the federal government and those reserved to the states or to the people.

All of us—all of us need to be reminded that the federal government did not create the states; the states created the federal government.

Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it's not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work—work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it.

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981

It wasn't long ago that we looked out on a different land—locked factory gates and long gasoline lines, intolerable prices and interest rates turning the greatest country on earth into a land of broken dreams. Government growing beyond our consent had become a lumbering giant, slamming shut the gates of opportunity, threatening to crush the very roots of our freedom.

What brought America back? The American people brought us back—with quiet courage and common sense; with undying faith that in this nation under God the future will be ours, for the future belongs to the free.

State of the Union Address, February 4, 1986

American Heroism

Those who say that we're in a time when there are no heroes—they just don't know where to look. You can see heroes every day going in and out of factory gates. Others, a handful in number, produce enough food to feed all of us and then the world beyond.

You meet heroes across a counter—and they're on both sides of that counter. There are entrepreneurs with faith in themselves and faith in an idea who create new jobs, new wealth and opportunity.

There are individuals and families whose taxes support the government and whose voluntary gifts support church, charity, culture, art, and education. Their patriotism is quiet but deep. Their values sustain our national life.

Now I have used the words "they" and "their" in speaking of these heroes. I could say "you" and "your" because I'm addressing the heroes of whom I speak—you, the citizens of this blessed land.

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981

If we look to the answer as to why for so many years we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on earth, it was because here in this land we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before.

Freedom and the dignity of the individual have been more available and assured here than in any other place on earth. The price for this freedom at times has been high, but we have never been unwilling to pay that price.

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981

We're a compassionate people. When the war ended we helped rebuild our allies—and our enemies as well. We did this because we wanted to help the innocent victims of bad governments and bad policies, and because, if they prospered, peace would be more secure.

We're an optimistic people. Like you, we inherited a vast land of endless skies, tall mountains, rich fields, and open prairies. It made us see the possibilities in everything. It made us hopeful. And we devised an economic system that rewarded individual effort, that gave us good reason for hope.

Fudan University, Shanghai, April 30, 1984

America's Golden Door

America is really many Americas. We call ourselves a nation of immigrants, and that's truly what we are. We have drawn people from every corner of the Earth. We're composed of virtually every race and religion, and not in small numbers, but large. We have a statue in New York Harbor that speaks of this—a statue of a woman holding a torch of welcome to those who enter our country to become Americans. She has greeted millions upon millions of immigrants to our country. She welcomes them still. She represents our open door.

All of the immigrants who came to us brought their own music, literature, customs, and ideas. And the marvelous thing, a thing of which we're proud, is they did not have to relinquish these things in order to fit in. In fact, what they brought to America became American. And this diversity has more than enriched us; it has literally shaped us.

Fudan University, Shanghai, April 30, 1984

Just this past Fourth of July, the torch atop the Statue of Liberty was hoisted down for replacement. We can be forgiven for thinking maybe it was just worn out from lighting the way to freedom for 17 million new Americans.

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White House Photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick

Inaugural, 1981: "In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem."

So now we'll put up a new one.

The poet called Miss Liberty's torch the "lamp beside the golden door." The golden door, that was the entrance to America and it still is. And now you really know why we are here tonight.

The glistening hope of that lamp is still ours. Every promise, every opportunity is still golden in this land. And through that golden door our children can walk tomorrow with the knowledge that no one can be denied the promise that is America.

Her heart is full; her door is still golden, her future bright. She has arms big enough to comfort and strong enough to support. For the strength in her arms is the strength of her people. She will carry on in the '80s unafraid, unashamed, and unsurpassed.

In this springtime of hope, some lights seem eternal, America's is.

Thank you, God bless you, and God bless America.

Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention, August 23, 1984

THE TITANIC CONFLICT

The Evil of Nazism

The lesson of World War II, the one lesson of Nazism, is that freedom must always be stronger than totalitarianism and that good must always be stronger than evil. The moral measure of our two nations will be found in the resolve we show to preserve liberty, to protect life, and to honor and cherish all God's children.

Bitburg Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany, May 5, 1985

Four decades ago we waged a great war to lift the darkness of evil from the world, to let men and women in this country and in every country live in the sunshine of liberty. Our victory was great, and the Federal Republic, Italy, and Japan are now in the community of free nations. But the struggle for freedom is not complete, for today much of the world is still cast in totalitarian darkness.

Twenty-two years ago President John F. Kennedy went to the Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too, was a Berliner. Well, today freedom-loving people around the world must say: I am a Berliner, I am a Jew in a world still threatened by anti-Semitism, I am an Afghan, and I am a prisoner of the Gulag, I am a refugee in a crowded boat foundering off the coast of Vietnam, I am a Laotian, a Cambodian, a Cuban and a Miskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potential victim of totalitarianism.

Bitburg Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany, May 5, 1985

The Evil of Racism

There is sin and evil in the world, and we're enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. Our nation, too, has a legacy of evil with which it must deal. The glory of this land has been its capacity for transcending the moral evils of our past. For example, the long struggle of minority citizens for equal rights, once a source of disunity and civil war, is now a point of pride for all Americans. We must never go back. There is no room for racism, anti-Semitism, or other forms of ethnic and racial hatred in this country.

I know that you've been horrified, as have I, by the resurgence of some hate groups preaching bigotry and prejudice. Use the mighty voice of your pulpits and the powerful standing of your churches to denounce and isolate these hate groups in our midst. The commandment given us is clear and simple: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983

We don't lump people by groups or special interests. And, let me add, in the party of Lincoln, there is no room for intolerance and not even a small corner for anti-Semitism or bigotry of any kind. Many people are welcome in our house, but not the bigots.

Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention, August 23, 1984

The Evil of Communism

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness—pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world. . . .

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the

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church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983

War and Peace

As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it, we will not surrender for it—now or ever.

Our forbearance should never be misunderstood. Our reluctance for conflict should not be misjudged as a failure of will.

When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do we have the best chance of never having to use that strength.

Above all we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981

Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used. For the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets but a test of wills and ideas—a trial of spiritual resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.

British Parliament, June 8, 1982

National security is government's first responsibility. . . . We only have a military industrial complex until a time of danger; then it becomes the arsenal of democracy. Spending for defense is investing in things that are priceless: peace and freedom.

State of the Union Address, February 6, 1985

For the past 20 years we have believed that no war will be launched as long as each side knows it can retaliate with a deadly counterstrike. Well, I believe there is a better way of eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

[The] Strategic Defense Initiative . . . is the most hopeful possibility of the nuclear age. But it is not well understood.

Some say it will bring war to the heavens—but its purpose is to deter war, in the heavens and on earth. Some say the research would be expensive. Perhaps, but it could save millions of lives, indeed humanity itself. Some say if we build such a system, the Soviets will build a defense system of their own. They already have strategic defense that surpasses ours; a civil defense system, where we have almost none; and a research program covering roughly the same areas of technology we're exploring. And finally, some say the research will take a long time. The answer to that is: "Let's get started."

State of the Union Address, February 6, 1985

Respect for human rights is not social work; it is not merely an act of compassion. It is the first obligation of government and the source of its legitimacy.

It is also the foundation stone in any structure of world peace. All through history, it has been the dictatorships and the tyrannies that have surrendered first to the cult of militarism and the pursuit of war. Countries based on the consent of the governed, countries that recognize the unalienable rights of the individual, do not make war on each other. Peace is more than just an absence of war. True peace is justice, true peace is freedom, and true peace dictates the recognition of human rights.

General Assembly of the United Nations, September 22, 1986

Americans seek always to make friends of old antagonists. After a colonial revolution with Britain we have cemented for all ages the ties of kinship between our nations. After a terrible civil war between North and South, we healed our wounds and found true unity as a nation. We fought two world wars in my lifetime against Germany and one with Japan, but now the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan are two of our closest allies and friends.

Some people point to the trade disputes between us as a sign of strain, but they're the frictions of all families, and the family of free nations is a big and vital and sometimes boisterous one. I can tell you that nothing would please my heart more than in my lifetime to see American and Soviet diplomats grappling with the problem of trade disputes between America and a growing, exuberant, exporting Soviet Union that had opened up to economic freedom and growth.

Moscow State University, May 31, 1988

People do not make wars, governments do—and no mother would ever willingly sacrifice her sons for territorial gain, for economic advantage, for ideology. A people free to choose will always choose peace.

Moscow State University, May 31, 1988

Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They are armed because they distrust each other.

appears in many of Reagan's speeches

Communism in Crisis

Quite possibly, we are entering an era in history, a time of lasting change in the Soviet Union. We will have to see. But if so, it's because of the steadfastness of the allies, the democracies, for more than 40 years, and especially in this decade. . . . Let us embrace honest change when it occurs, but let us also be wary. Let us stay strong.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, June 3, 1988

In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis—a crisis where the demands of the economic order are colliding directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union.

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It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying freedom and human dignity to its citizens. . . .

What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.

British Parliament, June 8, 1982

In the 1950s Khrushchev predicted: "We will bury you." But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind—too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor.

Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin, June 12, 1987

Shots Heard Round the Communist World

General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin, June 12, 1987

We Americans make no secret of our belief in freedom. In fact, it's something of a national pastime. Every four years the American people choose a new president, and 1988 is one of those years. At one point there were 13 major candidates running in the two major parties, not to mention all the others, including the Socialist and Libertarian candidates—all trying to get my job.

About 1,000 local television stations, 8,500 radio stations, and about 1,700 daily newspapers, each one an independent, private enterprise, fiercely independent of the government, report on the candidates, grill them in interviews, and bring them together for debates. In the end, the people vote—they decide who will be the next president.

But freedom doesn't begin or end with elections. Go to any American town, to take just an example, and you'll see dozens of churches, representing many different beliefs—in many places synagogues and mosques—and you'll see families of every conceivable nationality, worshipping together.

Go into any schoolroom, and there you will see children being taught the Declaration of Independence, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights—among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—that no government can justly deny—the guarantees in their Constitution for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.

Go into any courtroom and there will preside an independent judge, beholden to no government power. There, every defendant has the right to a trial by a jury of his peers, usually 12 men and women—common citizens, they are the ones, the only ones, who weigh the evidence and decide on guilt or innocence. In that court, the accused is innocent until proven guilty, and the word of a policeman, or any official, has no greater legal standing than the word of the accused.

Go to any university campus, and there you'll find an open, sometimes heated discussion of the problems in American society and what can be done to correct them. Turn on the television, and you'll see the legislature conducting the business of government right there before the camera, debating and voting on the legislation that will become the law of the land. March in any demonstration, and there are many of them—the people's right of assembly is guaranteed in the Constitution and protected by the police.

Go into any union hall, where the members know their right to strike is protected by law. As a matter of fact, one of the many jobs I had before this one was being president of a union, the Screen Actors Guild. I led my union out on strike—and I'm proud to say, we won.

But freedom is more even than this: Freedom is the right to question and change the established way of doing things. It is the continuing revolution of the marketplace. It is the understanding that allows us to recognize shortcomings and seek solutions. It is the right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts, and watch it catch fire among the people. It is the right to follow your dream, or stick to your conscience even if you're the only one in a sea of doubters.

Moscow State University, May 31, 1988

Sometimes in America, some of our people may disagree with each other. We are often a highly disputatious nation. We rather like to argue. We are free to disagree among ourselves, and we do. But we always hold together as a society. We've held together for more than 200 years, because we're united by certain things in which we all believe, things to which we've quietly pledged our deepest loyalties. . . .

We believe in the dignity of each man, woman, and child. Our entire system is founded on an appreciation of the special genius of each individual, and of his special right to make his own decisions and lead his own life.

We believe—and we believe it so deeply that Americans know these words by heart—we believe "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among those are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Fudan University, Shanghai, April 30, 1984

Nicaragua

I am against sending troops to Central America. They are simply not needed. Given a chance and the resources, the people of the area can fight their own fight. They have the men and women. They're capable of doing it. They have the people of their country behind them. All they need is our support. All they need is proof that we care as much about the fight for freedom 700 miles from our shores as the Soviets care about the fight against freedom 5,000 miles from theirs.

Conservative Political Action Conference, March 1, 1985

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Forty years ago Republicans and Democrats joined together behind the Truman Doctrine. It must be our policy, Harry Truman declared, to support peoples struggling to preserve their freedom. Under that doctrine, Congress sent aid to Greece just in time to save that country from the closing grip of Communist tyranny. We saved freedom in Greece then—and with that same bipartisan spirit we can save freedom in Nicaragua today. . . .

My fellow Americans, you know where I stand. The Soviets and the Sandinistas must not be permitted to crush freedom in Central America and threaten our own security on our own doorstep.

Now the Congress must decide where it stands. [As Clare Boothe Luce has said,] "the 99th Congress of the United States, will be remembered as that body of men and women that either stopped the Communists before it was too late—or did not."

National Address, March 16, 1986

AMERICA'S MORAL CHALLENGE

The Wound in Our National Conscience

More than a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of 50 states statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on demand now takes the lives of up to one and a half million unborn children a year. Human life legislation ending this tragedy will some day pass the Congress, and you and I must never rest until it does. Unless and until it can be proven that the unborn child is not a living entity, then its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness must be protected.

You may remember that when abortion on demand began, many, and, indeed, I'm sure many of you, warned that the practice would lead to a decline in respect for human life, that the philosophical premises used to justify abortion on demand would ultimately be used to justify other attacks on the sacredness of human life—infanticide or mercy killing. Tragically enough, those warnings proved all too true. Only last year a court permitted the death by starvation of a handicapped infant.

National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983

Today there is a wound in our national conscience; America will never be whole as long as the right to life granted by our Creator is denied to the unborn.

State of the Union Address, February 4, 1986

Welfare and Family

In the welfare culture, the breakdown of the family, the most basic support system, has reached crisis proportions—in female and child poverty, child abandonment, horrible crimes, and deteriorating schools. After hundreds of billions of dollars in poverty programs, the plight of the poor grows more painful. But the waste in dollars and cents pales before the most tragic loss—the sinful waste of human spirit and potential.

We can ignore this terrible truth no longer. As Franklin Roosevelt warned 51 years ago before this chamber: Welfare is "a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit." And now we must escape the spider's web of dependency.



Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

Brandenburg Gate, 1987: "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"

. . . I am talking about real and lasting emancipation, because the success of welfare should be judged by how many of its recipients become independent of welfare.

State of the Union Address, February 4, 1986

In God We Trust

When our Founding Fathers passed the First Amendment, they sought to protect churches from government interference. They never intended to construct a wall of hostility between government and the concept of religious belief itself.

The evidence of this permeates our history and our government. The Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. "In God We Trust" is engraved on our coinage. The Supreme Court opens its proceedings with a religious invocation. And the Members of Congress open their sessions with a prayer. I just happen to believe the schoolchildren of the United States are entitled to the same privileges as Supreme Court justices and congressmen.

National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983

I've always cherished the belief that all of history is such a pilgrimage and that our Maker, while never denying us free will, does over time guide us with a wise and provident hand, giving direction to history and slowly bringing good from evil, leading us ever so slowly, but ever so relentlessly and lovingly, to a moment when the will of man and God are as one again. . . .

Here, then, is our formula for completing our crusade for freedom. Here, the strength of our civilization and our belief in the rights of humanity. Our faith is in a higher law. Yes, we believe in prayer and its power. And like the founding fathers of both our lands, we hold that humanity was meant not to be dishonored by the all-powerful state, but to live in image and likeness of Him who made us.

More than five decades ago when an American president told his generation that they had a rendezvous with destiny, at almost the same moment, a prime minister asked the British people for their finest hour. This rendezvous, this finest hour, is still upon us. Let us seek to do His will in all things, to stand for freedom, to speak for humanity. Come my friends, as it was said of old by Tennyson, it is not too late to seek a newer world.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, June 3, 1988

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THE WALL THAT PROTESTANTISM BUILT

The Religious Reasons for the Separation of Church and State

BENJAMIN HART

Upon my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there the more did I perceive the great political consequences resulting from the state of things, to which I was unaccustomed. In France I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom pursuing courses diametrically opposed to each other; but in America I found that they were intimately united, and that they reigned in common over the same country. My desire to discover the cause of this phenomenon increased from day to day. In order to satisfy it I questioned the members of all the different sects. . . . I found that they differed upon matters of detail alone; and that they mainly attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in their country to the separation of church and state.

—Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America (1835)

Americans are more confused about the separation of church and state than they were in Tocqueville's day. Many civil libertarians view separation as a constitutional principle, grounded in the secular thought of the Enlightenment, that must be jealously protected from the onslaughts of religious fundamentalism. Meanwhile, many evangelical Christians argue that separation is an alien interpretation grafted onto the Constitution by secular humanists whose intention is to undermine religion. Both of these positions are misreadings of history. The separation of church and state was one of the most cherished principles of our Founding Fathers, but its origins were more theological than secular. Its roots can be traced to the religious beliefs of the dissenting Protestants who formed the overwhelming majority of the American population at the time of the Revolution, and whose form of Christianity is carried on by evangelicals today.

The separation of church and state was the logical extension of the theology of Protestantism, which stresses the individual's personal relationship with God, unbrokered by human institutions whether political or religious. In Europe, the Protestant Reformation usually led to the replacement of Roman Catholic establishments by Protestant ones, such as the Church of England. But most of the settlers of the American colonies were dissenting Protestants fleeing the establishments of Catholicism and Anglicanism alike. By the time of the American Revolution, the religious composition of the nation was 98.4 percent Protestant, 1.4 percent Roman Catholic, and 0.15 percent Jewish. Moreover, among the Protestants, 75 percent were dissenting (non-Anglican) sects, mostly of Puritan extraction: Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, and others. These dissenting Protestants set the pattern for the attitudes of Americans—including American Catholics—toward church and state.

Wycliffe: Bibles to the People

Puritanism was never a particular denomination, but rather represented a tendency that manifested itself in many different sects. The Puritan impulse was to contrast the pure Christianity of the New Testament with what it believed to be the corrupt Christianity practiced by existing religious institutions.

John Wycliffe, writing in the 14th century, more than a century before the Protestant Reformation, was the father of the Puritan movement in England. He attacked papal extravagance and temporal power, noting that the primacy of Peter in the New Testament was not in worldly grandeur and might, but in faith and humility. Christ himself had no political power, Wycliffe pointed out in *De Potestate Papae:* "It is the plain fact that no man should be pope unless he is the son of Christ and Peter, imitating them in deeds." For his arguments, Wycliffe relied on Scripture, often comparing the wealth and pomp of the popes of the Middle Ages with the poverty and humility of Peter. He also attacked what he called the "Caesarean clergy," and articulated the separation of church and state concept in even more radical terms than our own First Amendment: "No man is honorable who joins together the peculiar value and authority of the clerical office with the authority and value of the lay office." Such a union was "inexcusable" and "blasphemous."

BENJAMIN HART *is director of lectures and seminars at The Heritage Foundation. This article was adapted from his newly released book,* Faith & Freedom: The Christian Roots of American Liberty.

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

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Roger Williams coined the phrase, "wall of separation between church and state," that Jefferson used in his letter to the Danbury Baptists.

Scripture, he believed, was a far better authority than a pope or priest—"the Bible is one perfect word proceeding from the mouth of God." Following this conviction, Wycliffe produced the first English translation of Scripture, to permit average people to circumvent church authorities and read God's words for themselves, in their native tongue instead of in High Latin. Wycliffe wanted the believer to know God personally and go to Him directly, rather than through church officials. Salvation was solely a matter between the individual and his Maker, and had nothing to do with the state or any human authority. Wycliffe also organized a corps of preachers to bring the Bible to the poor and illiterate. This enterprise began what became known as the Lollard Movement, and had major social and political implications for England and, later, America.

The tendency of Lollardy and its children was to tear away authoritarian structures, to undermine hierarchy, and to decentralize. Lollard theology challenged directly the church-state relationship, and the collision that resulted was often bloody. Henry IV and other 15th-century monarchs advanced a systematic campaign to suppress Lollardy. Thousands of martyrs were burned at the stake. Wycliffe's works were incinerated in 1410. His bones were exhumed in 1482, burned, and the ashes scattered into the River Swift. Despite all this, complaints were rampant in ruling circles that the Lollard "heresy" continued to spread. Everywhere the heresy was the same: the Bible is the sole authority, everyone is his own priest, and unlicensed preaching in private homes is desirable. Historians estimate that by the middle of the 15th century half the English population held Lollard views. Although the Anglican Church, with Lollard support, had under Henry VIII broken with Rome, to the dissenting Lollard Protestants there seemed little difference between Roman Catholicism and English Anglicanism. After the break, the Anglican Church service underwent a few modifications, but remained almost identical to the Catholic Mass. What had occurred in England was a schism, not a reformation. The church-state relationship was still intact, in fact more firmly than before.

The Pilgrims' Voluntary Covenant

The Pilgrims of Plymouth, Massachusetts, came out of this Lollard tradition. Pastor John Robinson formed a congregation in Scrooby, England, that met in the home of Postmaster William Brewster, and were often called "Brownists," after Robert Browne who had founded a Congregational church at Norwich. In his famous *Treatise of Reformation Without Tarrying for Any,* Browne outlined his view of the church: "The church planted or gathered here is a company or number of Christians or believers which, by willing covenant made with God, are under the government of God and Christ, and keep His laws in one holy communion." Robinson's view of the church, which was similar, can be found in his *Justification of Separation from the Church of England,* published in 1610: "A company of faithful people thus covenanting together are a church, though they may be without officers among them, contrary to your popish opinion." These were, in other words, *voluntary* assemblies of the faithful.

Harried by King James I, Robinson's Scrooby congregation fled to Holland, and then embarked on a precarious journey across the Atlantic in the *Mayflower.* Robinson wrote that like "the people of God in old time, they were called out of Babylon, the place of their bodily bondage,

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

John Locke's social contract theory was based in part on the Pilgrims' Mayflower Compact.

and were to come to Jerusalem, and there build the Lord's temple."

The Pilgrim mission was purely religious: to follow God's will as outlined in the Bible, unencumbered by corrupt human ecclesiastical and governing institutions. But it also had important implications for the American political order. In the autumn of 1620 before disembarking at Plymouth, the Pilgrims signed the historic Mayflower Compact—an agreement, a sacred "covenant," making them a "civil body politic," and promising "just and equal laws." This covenant had a powerful impact on the "social contract" thinking of John Locke. Locke was educated by Protestant dissenters in England; his ardent spirit for liberty developed largely from his admiration of Protestant sects founded on the "right of private judgment." Locke was committed not only to their political cause of religious liberty, but was sympathetic also to their religious convictions. He took much of his social contract theory from Scripture and his experience with the congregational churches, which were patterned after the apostolic churches.

Robinson's Scrooby congregation generally held more radical views than those who came over a decade later in the Great Puritan Migration of the 1630s. Robinson's followers were Separatists; they wanted nothing to do with the Church of England, which they viewed as an apostate church. However, John Winthrop, the founder of Massachusetts Bay, and his followers considered themselves still to be part of the Anglican Church, although they believed the Church in its present form to be corrupt and ungodly. They sought to establish a genuine Bible commonwealth as a model for the Anglican Church.

Nevertheless, even in Massachusetts Bay we find the seeds of separation of church and state. In his discourse on civil government, the Reverend John Cotton, one of the leaders of the Bay, argued that in a Christian commonwealth civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions must be separate and distinct: "For in a Christian communion there are . . . different administrations . . . ecclesiastical and civil: ecclesiastical administrators are a divine order appointed to believers for holy communing of holy things; civil administrators are a human order appointed by God to men for civil fellowship of human things." Both administrations are the gift of God for man's benefit, Cotton maintained, "yet they differ in their . . . ends. . . . The things about which civil power is primarily conversant are . . . the things of this life [such] as goods, lands, honor, the liberties and peace of the outward man. The things whereby church power is exercised are . . . the things of God [such] as the souls and consciences of men, the doctrine and worship of God, the communion of saints. Hence they also have: a) different laws, b) different officers, c) different powers . . . according to their different objects and ends."

Thomas Hooker's Separation

Following this reasoning, church officers in Massachusetts Bay were prohibited by law from holding civil office. Moreover, New England Puritanism tended always to move toward the Separatist Protestantism of the Plymouth community. Indeed, New England was settled almost entirely by migrating congregations that split off from the mother colony at Massachusetts Bay, each attempting to

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establish a more pristine Christian community modeled after the early churches found in the New Testament's Book of Acts, and each founder, usually a minister, trying to "out-Protestantize" the others.

Thomas Hooker, who settled Hartford, Connecticut, played an important role in developing a Christian doctrine of separation. Although he himself was not an avowed Separatist, he had many Separatist followers. Hooker's views on the Congregational church polity were essentially democratic, and are explained in his great work, *A Survey of the Sum of Church Discipline.* The Anglican Church condemned the work as heretical, especially Hooker's apologetics on behalf of "liberty of conscience."

Thomas Hooker criticized not only the Church of England, but also the New England congregations, which he thought were too quick to censure and excommunicate. He sought always to lower barriers to church membership, believing it was far better to let in a few "hypocrites" than mistakenly to exclude true Christians. Hooker thought church discipline should be as uncoercive as possible. During his ministry only one person was excommunicated from his church.

On January 14, 1639, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, which included many provisions essential to free and open government, were adopted under the direction of Thomas Hooker. Each town was to have proportional representation, and each was to send elected representatives to the government in Hartford. In the event the governor acted arbitrarily or attempted to govern contrary to established laws, the people were entitled to call a convention and dispose of the affairs of the commonwealth. The Fundamental Orders provided for regular elections, while setting strict limits on the power of those elected. Moreover, the franchise was not limited to church members (as it was in Massachusetts Bay); voters in Hooker's colony merely had to be inhabitants of "honest conversation," though they could not be Quakers or atheists.

Though Hooker was a democrat who believed fervently in protecting people's right to be wrong, he was not a moral relativist or theological liberal. He believed Scripture to be absolutely inerrant, and that for every act of church or civil government a specific chapter and verse must be cited. Thus, Connecticut from its earliest days was ruled by laws rather than by men. While stressing that God is infinitely humane, as illustrated by Jesus healing the afflicted, Hooker also warned that "mercy will never save you unless it rules you, too." This idea became the underlying principle of Connecticut's government.

Roger Williams' Garden

The ministry of Roger Williams was another important landmark for America's evolving tradition of religious liberty. Williams, like Hooker, believed Massachusetts Bay had fallen short of the New Testament church model, but unlike Hooker he decided to stay and fight. Williams, who arrived in Massachusetts in 1631, first attacked the Bay churches for failing to sever completely their ties with the Church of England.

A stricter Calvinist than mainstream New Englanders on such issues as predestination and irresistible grace, Williams argued that the Massachusetts churches had been too lax in admitting "non-elect" people, mixing the "herds of the world" with the "flock of Christ." He denounced the residency oath on the grounds that "a magistrate ought not to tender an oath to an unregenerate man." He believed church and state should be utterly separate because he believed that the state poisons Christianity, and that Jesus, not a cabal of government officials, selects His people. He argued that civil society must be completely secularized so that the religious life would be authentically spiritual. " 'Tis but worldly policy and compliance with men and times (God's mercy overruling)" that leads men to "murdering thousands and tens of thousands," he said.

The separation of church and state was the logical extension of Protestantism, which stresses the individual's personal relationship with God, unbrokered by human institutions whether political or religious.

Williams was an Anabaptist, a radical Separatist, who represented an extreme of the Protestant spectrum, indeed too extreme for the General Court of Massachusetts Bay. He was expelled from the colony. In January 1636, he and five of his followers bought from the Indians a plot of land at Narragansett Bay and founded "Providence."

Rhode Island became a haven for dissident Christian denominations. Williams favored religious liberty, not because he thought it was the most economical and peaceful way for people to live together, but because he saw freedom as a preliminary requirement for a truly Christian pilgrimage. He never sought to place natural rights ahead of the Holy Spirit in importance, a crucial distinction in recounting the history of American political ideas. As the Harvard historian Perry Miller writes, for Williams "there was never any virtue in freedom of and by itself; freedom was something of a negative, which protects men from worldly compulsions in a world where any compulsion, most of all one to virtue, increases the quantity of sin. Liberty was a way of not adding to the stock of human depravity; were men not sinful, there would be no need of freedom."

Thomas Jefferson almost two centuries later would echo Williams's views in a letter addressed to the Danbury (Connecticut) Baptist Association on January 1, 1802. Jefferson wrote:

> Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions

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

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George Whitefield and the Great Awakening of the 18th century. No single person, priest, or institution could be considered the sole oracle of truth.

> only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that an act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus *building a wall of separation between church and state* [emphasis added].

Interestingly, Jefferson borrowed from Williams this now famous phrase—"a wall of separation between church and state"—when he wrote to assure the Baptist ministers in Connecticut that the federal government could in no way interfere with the religious practices of their churches and local communities. In recent years, the separation of church and state principle has been used by some civil libertarians as a weapon to ban religious expression in public schools (a development that most likely would have horrified both Williams and Jefferson). Williams and Jefferson sought not to undermine religion but to remove the instruments of coercion so that the spirit of true religious faith and conviction might flourish.

John Clark was another Anabaptist disrupter. He followed Williams to Rhode Island, but decided to return to Boston in 1651 where he and some of his followers were fined (less for their views than for the fact that they were making public nuisances of themselves). Clark subsequently published a small tract entitled *Ill News from New England* in which he outlined abuses of civil liberties taking place in the Bay and argued that Christ gave no man authority to compel the consciences of others. Clark's arguments were convincing and by 1686 Baptist churches began springing up along the Eastern Shore.

The Quakers' Inner Light

Like the Baptists, the Quakers rejected all mediators between the individual and God. They broke with mainline Christianity, however, with their reliance on what they called the "inner light," God's direct revelation to each individual, which in their view superseded even Scripture. In stark contrast to orthodox Christians (whether Puritan, Anglican, or Catholic), the Quakers believed that the "inner light" enabled everyone to overcome sin, whether or not they had heard the Gospel; they also believed human nature to be naturally virtuous. Thus, there was no need for formal religious institutions of any kind.

The Quakers applied their libertarian theological perspective to politics. With the "inner light" guiding behavior, not only were churches not needed, government was not needed either. William Penn, who founded Pennsylvania in 1681, shared this view. Penn's famous constitution for the colony, the Charter of Liberties, guaranteed more freedoms than any previous constitution. Penn was reluctant to prescribe any political form at all, but was then convinced that "any government is free to the people under it (whatever be the frame) where laws rule." Although Quakerism was the official religion of Pennsylvania, Penn stressed that no religion would be compulsory. As a result, Pennsylvania enjoyed tremendous prosperity as Lutherans, Huguenots, Mennonites, and Catholics from Europe poured into the colony on the promise of religious liberty.

The Quakers had to leave the Pennsylvania Assembly during the French and Indian War of the 1750s, however, because their pacifist philosophy did not permit them to mount any kind of armed defense, even when the Indians routinely massacred the mostly non-Quaker settlers on Pennsylvania's western frontier. The Quaker aversion to violence also meant refusal to fight for American independence and they generally retreated from public life. Thus, the Quakers had little influence ultimately on the shape of the nation's political order.

Rock 'n' Roll Revivalism

Far more important was the Great Awakening in religion, which occurred in the colonies during the mid-18th century. Although the revival was not an explicitly political movement, it had profound political implications. It is difficult for today's readers to fully comprehend the power of the Great Awakening, but if we could see television footage of the events that took place across the American countryside during the revival, first sparked by Jonathan Edwards in Northampton, Massachusetts, and carried on by other revivalist preachers, the combination of the civil-rights movement, campus riots, and rock festivals of the 1960s would appear mild in comparison.

Ironically, the man who came to symbolize the revival was an Anglican from England named George Whitefield who was a friend of both John and Charles Wesley, the

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founders of Methodism. Whitefield, the "boy preacher," arrived in America in 1738 at age 19. America's first traveling evangelist, he preached in spectacular fashion in the open fields of hundreds of towns and villages. His voice could be heard clearly without the assistance of electronic device by 30,000 people. One especially spellbinding sermon was delivered from the courthouse steps of Philadelphia. The mob filled Market Street and stretched down Second Street. The people of Philadelphia craned their necks out windows to hear him lambaste the clergy of the mainline churches, calling them unconverted and strangers to Christ.

"Father Abraham," Whitefield bellowed, "whom have you in Heaven? Any Episcopalians? No! Any Presbyterians? No! Any Independents or Seceders, New Sides or Old Sides, any Methodists? No! No! No! Whom have you there, then, Father Abraham? We don't know these names here! All who have come are *Christians*—believers in Christ, men who have overcome by the blood of the Lamb and the word of His testimony. Oh, is that the case? Then God help me, God help us all, to forget having names and become Christians in deed and in truth." He waved his arms, gestured violently, shouted and danced to the delight of the gathering throngs, who had grown weary of the highbrow, heavily annotated and gentlemanly styles of preachers from Harvard and Yale. During a Whitefield sermon, people often would shriek, roll on the ground, dissolve into tears, or run wild with religious ecstasy.

Franklin Empties His Pockets

Even the agnostic philosopher David Hume once said of Whitefield that it was worth traveling 20 miles to hear him. The usually skeptical Benjamin Franklin admitted that Whitefield's "oratory made me ashamed. . . . I emptied my pockets in the collection dish, gold and all." Franklin wrote of "the extraordinary influence of Whitefield on his hearers," saying that afterwards "one could not walk through the town in an evening without hearing psalms sung in different families of every street."

Other revivalist preachers imitated Whitefield and descended with zeal upon the various mainline Protestant churches, which were often distressed at the threat the Awakeners posed to the social fabric. The revival crossed denominational boundaries and put constant pressure on established religious and governing institutions. No minister, no official, was immune from verbal assaults by these "New Light" preachers. This had a leveling effect on privileged position, and as such was a powerful democratic force. Anyone could have his say. No single person, priest, class of people, or institution could be considered the sole oracle of truth. Revival was incompatible with theocracy or aristocracy. "Who said one needed a license or a college degree to preach the Gospel?" the Awakeners would ask. "Certainly not Jesus." Like politicians and businessmen, ministers, too, would have to compete in the marketplace.

In 1755, Baptists from Connecticut traveled to North Carolina and began rolling, singing, and shouting in religious ecstasy. They denounced the Anglican clergy, endured occasional floggings and imprisonment, but rapidly gained a following. Their influence spread to Virginia, the stronghold of the planter aristocracy. It was from this movement that Southern Christianity began to take its characteristic form. Among Whitefield's most ardent followers were black slaves; the black Gospel music so popular today came out of this revivalist tradition. During the 1770s the Anglican Church still held sway in Virginia, but was tottering under the pressure of John Wesley's Methodists, who shrilly denounced planter society for its spiritual complacency, extravagant living, and slave ownership.

King George's Bishops

The struggle for religious freedom in America had nothing to do with hostility toward religion. Rather, it was a quest for spiritual purity, indeed for a more fervent and personal relationship with God than the state-run Anglican Church could offer. From its beginning, the colonization of America took place mostly under the auspices of pilgrimages of dissent. New England, especially, wanted no part of the British system; it would not abide by the protectionist trade laws imposed by the Navigation Acts, and above all wanted no part of the Anglican Church.

The First Amendment was intended to protect a religious people from government interference, not to protect government from a religious people.

The Crown was constantly threatening to install bishops in the colonies to administer American churches according to acceptable English ways. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, originally established in 1701 by the Church of England to convert the Indians, had become by the middle of the 18th century an instrument for bringing America's Protestant dissidents into communion with the Anglican Church. Congregational, Presbyterian, and Baptist ministers would respond to every rumor of London's imposition of bishops with flurries of impassioned sermons, scathing editorials, and shrill pamphlets denouncing the proposal. When the Reverend Jonathan Boucher, an Anglican rector from Annapolis, returned to England in 1775 he said the issue of bishops was the backbone of the revolutionary cause. According to the historian Arthur L. Cross, "the efforts of the Episcopalians to push their plan [to install bishops in America] was at least one of the causes tending to accentuate the growing alienation between Great Britain and her colonial subjects beyond the seas which prepared the ground for revolution soon to follow."

The Reverend Jonathan Mayhew, a Harvard graduate and pastor at Boston's West Church, passionately warned that bishops were instruments for "establishing tyrannies over the bodies and souls of men." An Anglican bishop, in the minds of the dissenting denominations, was merely an extension of the arm of the London government—"differ-

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ent branches of the same plan of power," as Mayhew put it. The great Protestant enterprise in America was to limit government power, especially in the area of religion.

The Americans saw all men and all human institutions as fallible—an essential Protestant tenet. Scripture was inerrant, according to the prevailing Protestant view, but institutions and even human understanding of the Scriptures were imperfect, which is why there were so many Protestant sects. But the fact that there were so many different

Once the Catholic Church was decoupled from the state, as it was from the beginning in America, its influence tended to reinforce the spirit of freedom and democracy.

Christian sects did not bother most Americans, since most agreed on the essential doctrines of the faith. Americans wanted a government that did not favor one Christian sect over another. The general feeling was that competition between the various churches was desirable, tended to breathe fire into the religious life of a nation, and prevented one denomination from becoming complacent, comfortable, and arrogant, as had the Anglican Church.

Madison's Holy Author

The battle for religious freedom in Anglican Virginia between 1776 and 1786 is illustrative. As Thomas Jefferson noted in his autobiography, in Virginia, though the official church was Anglican, "the majority of our citizens were dissenters," meaning they were Separatist Protestants, the descendants of John Wycliffe and the Puritans. Indeed, reported Jefferson, "the first republican legislature was crowded with petitions to abolish the spiritual tyranny" of the Anglican Church.

The "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" to disestablish the Anglican Church was penned by Jefferson, proposed by James Madison, and passed by the Virginia assembly on January 16, 1786. There was almost no opposition to the bill in the final vote, not because there was any sentiment in Virginia against Christianity, but because there was steadfast opposition to the legally favored status of the Anglican Church, which had become a minority sect in Virginia. In fact, the bill justifies itself on Protestant theological principles:

> Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was His almighty power to do; that impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world, and through all time. . . .

The Presbyterian Minister Caleb Wallace made a similar case in support of Jefferson's and Madison's bill. It is, he said,

> impossible for the magistrate to adjudge to the right of preference among the various sects that profess the Christian faith without erecting the chair of infallibility, which would lead us back to the Church of Rome. . . . Neither can it be made to appear that the Gospel needs any such civil aid. We rather conceive that when our blessed Savior declares His kingdom is not of this world, He renounces all dependence on state power, and as His weapons are spiritual, and were only designed to have influence and judgment on the heart of man, we are persuaded that if mankind were left in the quiet possession of their inalienable rights and privileges, Christianity, as in the days of the Apostles, would continue to prevail and flourish in the greatest purity, by its own native excellence, and under the all disposing providence of God. . . .

This was the generally held American perspective. Liberty of conscience was good because it aided genuine Christianity. Most believed that in a free society, truth, if allowed to flourish, would prevail. To believe otherwise was to lack faith in the power of God's Word and His saving grace. Thus when the First Amendment to the Constitution, which includes the religion clause, was proposed by James Madison and the Congregationalist minister Fisher Ames, no one interpreted this measure as in any way hostile to Christianity.

Congress Shall Make No Law

The religion clause of the First Amendment states: *Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.* The clear intention of the First Amendment was to guarantee freedom of religious expression. Its purpose was to protect a religious people from government interference, not to protect government from a religious people.

An important objective of the religion clause was to avert disunity among the states, which would have occurred if the federal government had favored a particular denomination over all others. The First Amendment was designed to avoid sectarian conflict over the control of the government. What could not occur under the American system was the establishment of, say, the Baptist Church as the official faith of the nation.

The First Amendment, however, in no way prevented the federal government from holding a general religious perspective. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, who was appointed to the Court by James Madison, wrote in his classic of American law, *Commentaries on the Constitu-*

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tion of the United States: "the real object of the First Amendment was not to countenance, much less advance, Mohammedanism, Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age. . . . " Nevertheless, Story observed, "the general if not universal sentiment in America was that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state so far as it was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation."

Evidence for Justice Story's view can be found in one of the initial acts of the first House of Representatives, which was to elect a chaplain, the Reverend William Linn, who was paid an annual salary of $500 from federal funds. James Madison sat on the committee that recommended that Congress employ a chaplain. Also passed, the day after the First Amendment was adopted, was a national day of "Prayer and Thanksgiving," a holiday we still celebrate. As president, Madison issued numerous Thanksgiving Day proclamations that were extremely religious in content. Also, the First Amendment was in no way supposed to contradict the Northwest Ordinance, first passed in 1787 and reenacted in 1789, which set aside federal lands and funds for the building of schools in order to promote "religion, morality, and knowledge," such things "being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind."

To Bigotry No Sanction

Although Christianity was the general religious perspective of America's people and its government, it was not hostile to freedom for other religions. Indeed, America was a refuge for Jews fleeing persecution in Europe. Though the Jewish population during the American Revolution was small (only about 3,000), for the most part it staunchly supported the patriot cause. George Washington's celebrated statement that the U.S. government "gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance" was contained in a letter to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island. He wrote to a Savannah synagogue: "May the same wonder-working Deity, who long since delivered the Hebrews from their Egyptian oppressors, planted them in a promised land, *whose providential agency has lately been conspicuous in establishing these United States as an independent nation* [emphasis Washington's], still continue to water them with the dews of heaven and make the inhabitants of every denomination participate in the temporal and spiritual blessings of that people whose God is Jehovah."

From its earliest colonial beginnings, America was remarkably hospitable to the Jewish people. The Puritans, though dogmatic and unwavering in their own religious

John T. Hopf

Touro Synagogue, Newport, Rhode Island, built 1763. Christian America was a refuge for Jews fleeing persecution in Europe.

convictions, felt for them a particular affection. The Puritans saw themselves as the new Israelites, driven out of England and into the wilderness by the Stuart kings, just as the children of Abraham were hounded out of Egypt and into the desert by Pharaoh. Cotton Mather suggested Hebrew as the national language. Oliver Cromwell, the great warrior and leader of the English Puritan Revolution, admitted the Jewish people back into England during his reign after they were earlier expelled. Roger Williams, one of the most fervent of the early American Protestants, argued "it to be the duty of civil magistrates to break down that superstitious wall of separation (as to civil things) between us Gentiles and the Jews, and freely (without their asking) to make way for their free and peaceable habitation amongst us." Moreover, Williams's case was drawn almost entirely from the Bible: 1) "The holy Scripture saith that they are a beloved people," and 2) "They are a people above all the people and nations in the world, under most gracious and express promises."

For Williams, a crucial test of a nation's true Christian spirit was its treatment of the Jews, whom the Puritans saw as God's first children. Williams argued that the spirit of persecution was "opposite" not only to the fundamental requirements of just social order, but "to the Jews' conversion to Christ, by not permitting them civil life or being." Thus, while there were certainly instances of religious intolerance, anti-Semitism was contrary not only to America's political tradition, but also to America's theological tradition.

Far more disparaged than the Jews in early America were

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the Roman Catholics. Protestants considered Catholicism not only heretical, but also totalitarian—responsible for the initial marriage of church and state under the emperor Constantine. Maryland (colonized by Catholics) instituted in 1649 "An Act Concerning Religion," providing for religious tolerance; Protestant adversaries charged, however, that the "papists" did this not from theological conviction, but because they were a minority in Maryland.

Attitudes toward the Catholic Church softened after the War of Independence when Catholic France helped save the American cause. In addition, American Catholics adopted Protestant notions of church and state. John Carroll, America's first Catholic bishop, warned Rome not to intrude into American public affairs, and argued that America is proof that "general and equal toleration, by giving free circulation to fair argument, is the most effectual method to bring all denominations of Christians to a unity of faith." Moreover, Carroll castigated those Protestants who claimed a monopoly on truth and morality. Indeed, Tocqueville, a Catholic, noted that once the Catholic Church was decoupled from the state, as it was from the beginning in America, its influence tended to reinforce the spirit of freedom and democracy.

Church without an Army

Ever since the Pilgrims first landed at Plymouth Rock, the vast majority of Americans have seen the roles of church and state as distinct—but as complementary and not contradictory. Indeed, the major reason the Separatists opposed the church-state union was that it necessarily subordinated the spiritual realm to secular concerns.

Jesus rode into Jerusalem on a donkey, not with an army, which suggested the way in which he chose to win converts. Indeed, Jesus explicitly commands his followers not to use force in conversions: "The rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them; and their great men exercise authority over them. But it is not so among you" (Mark 10:42-3). Peter exhorts elders of the churches to "shepherd the flock among you, not under compulsion, but voluntarily, according to the will of God" (I Peter 5:2). The early churches of the New Testament were autonomous, and though they were held together by a common faith, they carried out their respective duties in various ways. Paul wrote in a different style to the church at Rome than he did to the church at Corinth or the churches of Galatia, because their customs and ways of thinking were different.

Paul says in his letter to the Romans (v. 13:4) that government's purpose is to bring "wrath upon the one who practices evil," meaning criminals, foreign invaders, and those who threaten the person, property and liberty of others. This is, in fact, the only government function explicitly sanctioned in the New Testament. The major source of conflict throughout history is the tendency of the state to take on the responsibilities of the church, even going beyond—defining dogma, compelling people to submit to authorities with whom they do not agree, and generally penetrating the domain of conscience. Significantly, Paul's letter to the Christians in Rome restricts the state to punishing wrongdoers and not wrong thinkers.

Flourishing Christianity

Despite the hostility of large segments of the intellectual community in America to Christianity, and ill-conceived decisions handed down by the Supreme Court regarding the First Amendment, America still remains by most measurable accounts the most Christian nation in the world (with the possible exception of Poland). According to a survey of American religious beliefs published by the *Washington Post* (April 5, 1986), 91 percent regard themselves as religious; 84 percent believe the Bible is the "actual" or "inspired" word of God; and 86 percent believe Christ rose from the dead. According to a Gallup Survey (April 1987), 69 percent defined themselves as members of a particular church or synagogue; while 57 percent said their religious faith could "answer all or most of today's problems." On any given Sunday more than 40 percent can be found in church. Thus the separation of church and state, far from undermining Christianity, has actually helped preserve America's predominantly Christian character. By contrast, the national Christian churches still in existence—England's Anglican Church and Sweden's Lutheran Church, for example—are for the most part dead artifacts and exercise very little influence over the moral and spiritual lives of the people, suggesting that the quickest way to kill the religious life of a nation is through government involvement.

A strong case can be made that Christianity, and religion generally, is far stronger in officially atheist Russia than in Anglican England. Thus, the efforts of some well-intentioned Christians to obtain government sanction for their religious beliefs is misdirected, and indeed tends to subvert the very cause they wish to promote. The 18th-century British theologian Joseph Priestley maintained that even unbelievers have their purpose in the general plan; for in the face of their objections, Christianity is constantly forced to purge itself of human corruption and return to its original purity: "A Truth that has never been opposed cannot acquire that firm and unwavering assent, which is given to that which has stood the test of rigid examination." Christianity, after all, spread most rapidly throughout the pagan world during the first three centuries, not when it was allied with the state but when it was opposed by the state. Moreover, Christians today need not find themselves on the defensive in the political debate when accused of attempting to "impose their views" on the rest of the nation; they can merely answer that it was Christianity that brought religious freedom to America in the first place. For, as the Whig statesman Edmund Burke predicted in his famous speech on reconciliation in the House of Commons in March 1775, London would inevitably fail to subject the American colonies to its will for the very reason that "the people are Protestants; and of that kind which is most adverse to all implicit subjection of mind and opinion." ☎

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

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



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The Reluctant Cowboy

Sometimes the United States Must Act Alone

Kiki Bhatia

Governor Michael Dukakis's emphasis on "multilateralism" in American foreign policy—his insistence that America can "no longer roam the world like a lonesome cowboy"—sounds superficially appealing but would have damaging consequences if translated into policy. It is almost always desirable to keep our allies informed of our actions, and to seek their support and cooperation. But to let our allies veto our military movements would be a sugar-coated prescription for isolationism. To maintain peace and freedom in the next four years, the president of the United States must be prepared to exercise unilateral force when necessary.

As three episodes of the Reagan era illustrate, allied support is not always forthcoming for the decisive action needed to protect our security during a crisis. In all three cases, cooperation from the allies came only after the U.S., alone among the Western powers, moved swiftly to contain global or regional dangers.

Pacifying the Caribbean

October 25, 1983—A violent *coup d'état,* led by a radical, Soviet-armed Marxist faction on the Caribbean island of Grenada, prompted eight of its neighbors to appeal to the United States for protection. President Reagan moved forcefully and decisively, dispatching 15,000 Marines and airborne troops to rescue American students held hostage and to restore democracy. The U.S. informed no one until just before the operation began; any leak might have allowed the Grenadians and Cubans to beef up defenses, thus endangering the lives of American servicemen. "Prior consultation," according to Constantine Menges, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1983-86, "was neither feasible nor desirable."

Our European allies were shocked that the United States would take such bold action without first consulting them. Upon being informed of the planned invasion just hours before the landing began, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher telephoned President Reagan to urge him to reconsider. European leaders have always found American "gunboat diplomacy" distasteful, and Thatcher felt that this episode came at a particularly inopportune time—just prior to the politically sensitive West European deployment of Pershing IIs.

After the U.S. invasion, opposition leaders across the continent joined the British, French, West German, Dutch, Belgian, and Italian governments in expressing their disapproval. Words were not minced; a French delegate to the United Nations said, "France deeply deplores this armed intervention." The U.S. rapidly found itself isolated in multinational bodies such as the Organization of American States. In the U.N. Security Council, the United States was forced to stand by itself in vetoing a resolution, supported by 11 of the 14 other members of the council, condemning the invasion and demanding the removal of American troops. Britain joined Togo and Zaire in abstaining.

Reaction in the Caribbean was significantly different, however. Within three days of their arrival, American troops had rescued 800 American medical students, and subdued over 1,000 heavily armed Cuban "advisors." Huge caches of military equipment had been discovered, clearly indicating that Grenada's revolution was never intended to be self-contained. The bold use of force on Grenada broadcast to Cuba and Nicaragua that the United States would not tolerate Soviet-financed military expansionism in the Caribbean. Grenadians themselves greeted American troops as liberating heroes, and were concerned only that the United States might leave too soon, thereby opening the door to a Communist resurgency. Since 1983, democracy and economic stability have gradually returned to the tiny island.

As the positive results of American involvement became apparent, European and Latin American leaders quickly toned down their criticism. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke of the importance of being "understanding of the invasion." Previously silent leaders, such as former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, even stepped forward to express support for American actions: "Taking into account the information on the Cuban presence on the island of Grenada and also the construction of an airfield whose nature does not correspond to the normal needs of the island, I approve of the American intervention on Grenada." Meanwhile, deployment of the Pershing IIs proceeded on schedule in Europe, and the

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political leaders who supported deployment were re-elected.

In retrospect, the rollback of Communism and the restoration of democracy in Grenada may well have been Ronald Reagan's greatest foreign policy success in the Western hemisphere. Yet the entire operation hinged on the United States' willingness to act alone. Had President Reagan allowed allied response to play a major role in deciding whether to proceed with the intervention, America might never have moved, and Grenada, according to Menges, "would have become more repressive domestically, and a base for subversion throughout the Eastern Caribbean."

Striking at Terrorism

April 14, 1986—The United States conducted a surgical air strike on selected military and intelligence targets in Libya. The raid was prefaced by six months of heightened terrorism in Europe and the Middle East, including the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque, massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports, and the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship. Evidence pointed to Libyan involvement in all four incidents. On April 5, American intelligence had intercepted instructions transmitted from Tripoli to Libya's East Berlin embassy to begin attacks on "American targets," and later, congratulations for the successful bombing of the discotheque. This new evidence added to a long-standing record of Libyan financial support for and training of terrorists.

American efforts to seek European support and cooperation in taking a stand against Libyan-sponsored terrorism had long met with indecision. Earlier that year, West European governments had refused to join America's economic and arms embargo of Libya, explaining that they believed such sanctions would not work and that the economic costs would be too high. West Europeans had been equally victimized by the recent incidents and their governments were well aware of Libyan Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's sponsorship of terrorism; the new evidence came as no great surprise. Nonetheless, fearing possible counter-retaliation, all of our European allies, with the sole exception of Great Britain, refused to cooperate in the retaliatory raid. France, Portugal, and Spain even denied the U.S. Air Force overflight rights, forcing the American pilots to fly an unnecessarily long and dangerous route. Insisting that, if necessary, a superpower must act alone, Reagan opted for the surgical strike anyway.

In some instances—economic sanctions, for example—unilateral actions prove completely ineffective.

The governments of Greece, Holland, France, West Germany, Belgium, and Spain immediately criticized the American action, and condemned Margaret Thatcher for

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collaborating with it. The sentiments of European leaders were well represented by then Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi: "The position adopted by Europe was ignored . . . [the raid] is a decision that does not take due account of the value of the European-American partnership." Further still, West European governments accused the United States of violating international law and predicted that the strike would only prompt even more bloody terrorist reprisals. Such reprisals never came. Instead, according to a State Department report, Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks declined dramatically after the raid, from 19 in 1986 to six in 1987, while the number of anti-American attacks worldwide dropped by 25 percent. Colonel Qadhafi himself found his regime increasingly isolated internationally, and destabilized domestically.

As Libyan-sponsored attacks on innocent civilians slowed, the reaction of our West European allies changed; the flow of condemnations from West European leaders ceased and the rhetoric assumed a more positive tone. Less than one month after the strike, a top Italian official explained in *The Economist*, "Rather than allowing Qadhafi to separate America from Western Europe, we want to split Qadhafi from the rest of the Arab world." Rhetoric was not all that changed. As Christopher Harmon of the Naval War College's Department of Strategy commented, "The strike on Libya encouraged the Europeans to enact stronger counter-terrorist policies of their own. Psychologically, by assuming the leadership position, we toughened them."

Western Europe and Japan, which obtain most of their oil from the Gulf, have more of a stake in the freedom of the seas. But, when the U.S. approached its allies about a multilateral venture to keep peace in the Gulf, it was greeted with the shuffling of diplomatic feet.

At the annual economic conference of the seven industrial democracies held in Tokyo less than a month after the strike, the leaders of the Free World resolved to step up their counter-terrorist activities. The resolution was translated into action. Six West European governments presented their own evidence of Libyan complicity with terrorism. Britain, West Germany, Italy, and France all expelled Libyans suspected of terrorist involvement. Libyan embassy staffs were cut, standards for granting visas to Libyans were raised, and an embargo on arms to Libya was enacted. Airport and border security was significantly strengthened, and communication between the counter-terrorist intelligence networks in Western Europe and North America improved. The result? While state-sponsored terrorism remains a threat, today nations such as Libya are far more cautious about their involvement in promoting terrorism.

Stabilizing the Persian Gulf

April 1987—Iranian attacks on oil shipping in international waters in the Persian Gulf prompted the United States to send naval forces into the region. Later, President Reagan extended American protection by ordering the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers. American interest in the Gulf was twofold: to protect freedom of the seas for American commercial vessels and to preempt Soviet intervention in the tumultuous region.

These goals were not exclusively American. Western Europe and Japan obtain most of their oil from the Gulf; if anything, they have more of a stake in freedom of the seas in the region than the United States. Yet when America approached its European allies and Japan about a multilateral military venture to keep the peace in the Gulf, it was greeted with the shuffling of diplomatic feet. Any foreign involvement in the Gulf was considered simply too risky. American policy was criticized as "courting disaster" and "unduly provocative." Cognizant of the dangers yet wary of the alternatives, President Reagan decided to maintain an American naval presence in the region.

Iranian mining of the Gulf in late July 1987 again prompted the United States to turn to Western Europe for help. America lacked needed minesweepers, and requested minesweeping assistance from its West European allies. Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and West Germany unanimously refused. The excuses and explanations varied. Italy's acting prime minister, Amintore Fanfani, commented, "We are not marines," while its foreign minister, Giulio Andreotti, suggested that "if there is a problem of security for the ships in the Gulf, it's better that this problem be dealt with by the United Nations." British Foreign Office official David Mellor simply explained, "Our feeling is that in the short term, it's better for us not to contribute to any escalation in tension."

Two months later, the West European allies had dramatically reversed their position. The demonstration of strong American leadership, combined with increased Iranian mining of the Gulf, had prompted Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and even West Germany to dispatch naval forces to support the U.S. ships. Rhetoric had also changed. David Mellor, the same British Foreign Office representative who had justified British nonparticipation only a month earlier, now scorned the idea of a United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping force as "escapism," and criticized the countries urging such a solution for not even trying to resolve the situation.

The allies' reversal was both militarily and politically significant. The West Europeans currently have more vessels (albeit smaller ones) than the does U.S. in the Gulf. More important, the multinational presence demonstrated an international consensus on defending freedom of passage on international waters.

Although the jury is still out, it appears that the firm defense of American and European interests in the region

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helped to stabilize the Persian Gulf. The Soviets did not establish control in the region. Ayatollah Khomeini's capacity to manipulate the West and the Gulf states through terrorist attacks was diminished. Partly as a result, the Iran-Iraq war appears to be nearing a resolution. Would the Europeans ever have made the move without the American unilateral initiative? Probably not. As Daniel Hermand of the French Institute of Military Affairs remarked in the *Christian Science Monitor,* "Since we Europeans aren't united, it's hard to take a strong reaction to events. We wait for the Americans to do something and then we slowly come around."

A Policy of Paralysis

Grenada, Libya, and the Gulf are simply three areas where a strong, unilateral American action met with positive results, ultimately prompting our allies to rally round. They do not, of course, make a case for unilateralism at all times. Indeed in some instances—economic sanctions, for example—unilateral actions prove completely ineffective, and in almost all cases, cohesive multilateral action offers at least political advantages. However, as Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, recently pointed out in a *New York Times* op-ed: "Multilateralism is always desirable, but the real question is what we do when an immediate and forceful multilateral effort is not possible. Is multilateralism nothing more than a dodge for simple inaction, . . . an incantation offered in the hope that it will make hard choices go away?"

Grenada, Libya, and the Gulf were all "hard choices," dangerous situations in which our allies—for a combination of domestic, international and institutional reasons—were unwilling to cooperate or to support us. In each case, the United States decided to act forcefully and unilaterally, and ultimately, in each case, American action prompted the desired result.

Had Governor Michael Dukakis's policy of mandated multilateralism been in effect, however, the outcomes might have been very different. The inability to secure allied support might well have paralyzed U.S. policy, resulting today in the Communist subversion of other islands in the Caribbean besides Grenada, a West continually intimi-

In Grenada, Libya, and the Persian Gulf, cooperation from the allies came only after the U.S., alone among the Western powers, moved swiftly to contain global or regional danger.

dated and manipulated by Libyan-sponsored terrorism, and a Persian Gulf under Soviet or Iranian control.

Our allies do not always share with us common national interests, or the same sense of responsibility for ensuring international peace and stability. To depend on allied support in our foreign policy stances would therefore rapidly reduce the U.S. to its isolationist stances of the 1930s, jeopardizing our allies' freedom as well as our own.

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THE OTHER SIXTIES

A Flag-Waver's Memoir

LEE EDWARDS

For me, as for most young conservatives, the '60s were the decade not of John F. Kennedy but Barry M. Goldwater, not Students for a Democratic Society but Young Americans for Freedom, not *The New Republic* but *National Review,* not Herbert Marcuse but Russell Kirk, not Norman Mailer but Ayn Rand, not Lyndon Johnson's Great Society but Ronald Reagan's Creative Society, not a "meaningless" civil war in Vietnam but an important battle in the protracted conflict against Communism.

For us, the '60s began not with a bang but with a book, *The Conscience of a Conservative* by Barry Goldwater, who declared, without apology, that the nation must return to the "ancient and tested truths that guided our Republic through its early days." He defended the Constitution as a vital barrier against "the natural tendency of government to expand in the direction of absolutism." He asserted that in the ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union and its satellites there can be no substitute for victory. *The Conscience of a Conservative* sold 3.5 million copies between its publication in the spring of 1960 and Goldwater's run for the presidency in 1964. It made Barry Goldwater a major political figure and helped turn a disjointed conservative movement into a national political force that has dominated the Republican Party for a quarter of a century and helped elect Republicans to the presidency in four of the last five national elections.

Tear Down the Wall

The other significant political event of 1960 for conservatives was the founding of Young Americans for Freedom, which served as the rapid deployment force of conservatism for most of the decade. YAF battled the leftist National Student Association on the campuses; demonstrated from coast to coast (picketing the White House, for example, in *favor* of the House Committee on Un-American Activities); provided workers for political races, large and small—from Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign to William F. Buckley, Jr.'s race for mayor of New York City; collected food, medicine, and clothing for Vietnamese war refugees; sponsored "bleed-ins" (blood donation drives) and mail campaigns for U.S. soldiers in Vietnam; and worked to restore sanity and stability at colleges and universities, which were being torn apart by the New Left.

Young Americans for Freedom specialized in the audacious. I remember in particular the astonishing YAF rally in March 1962, when 18,500 militant conservatives filled New York City's historic Madison Square Garden to send an unmistakable signal to the Eastern liberal establishment: Conservatism had come of political age. I remember Brent Bozell, author, activist, and conservative Catholic, crying out, "Tear down the Berlin Wall!" and the crowd roaring its approval. We were ready to march to Berlin and beyond. I remember the passionate ovation we gave Barry Goldwater when he appeared, the last speaker of a very long evening, and how the crowd wouldn't stop chanting "We want Barry!," "We want Barry!," for 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 minutes until, finally, an exasperated Goldwater yelled into the microphone, "Well, if you'll shut up, you'll get him!" That night Goldwater predicted that a "wave of conservatism" would eventually triumph in America. Unlike many other political prophets in America, he has been proven right. But his prophecy was deemed preposterous by conventional, that is, liberal, experts in the era of the New Frontier. To understand why conservatives were able to fill Madison Square Garden and why Goldwater's prediction was not vainglorious, we must go back almost a decade.

The '50s: A Conservative Wasteland

In the spring of 1953, there seemed to be no conservative movement in America. The previous year, the champion of the Republican conservatives, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, had been decisively defeated for the GOP presidential nomination by a nominal Republican and determined nonideologue, Dwight D. Eisenhower. In that far-off year, there were few conservative publications—*Human Events* was a newsletter and *The Freeman* was in financial straits—and there were no conservative think tanks.

During the '60s, LEE EDWARDS *was founding editor of* The New Guard, *the magazine of Young Americans for Freedom; director of information for the Goldwater for President Committee; and president of a public affairs firm for conservative causes. He is currently lecturer in politics at Catholic University of America and senior editor of* The World and I *magazine.*

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

Mike Lien/New York Times Pictures

Lee Edwards in 1969, leading a giant rally in support of American soldiers in Vietnam

Of conservative intellectuals and their works, there were few: Friedrich Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* was much admired and sometimes quoted; Richard M. Weaver had written *Ideas Have Consequences* in 1948 and its trenchant argument that the West was in decline because of the ascent of bad ideas was still echoing through the American academy; Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss, both emigrés from Nazi Germany, were actively challenging liberal shibboleths; a young Yale graduate named Bill Buckley had aroused the liberal establishment with his accusatory *God and Man at Yale;* the first conservative youth organization, the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, had just been formed, but its future and impact were uncertain. It seemed as though liberalism, the dominant ideology in the universities, churches, unions, and public policy institutions, would continue to reign for many a year. And yet by the mid-1960s, there was a conservative movement in America, clearly visible, clearly definable, clearly capable. There were national conservative organizations, influential conservative publications, best-selling conservative books, and a conservative presidential candidate. What had happened? What was the catalyst or catalysts? Had there been a collapse of liberalism, a renaissance of conservatism, or both?

There are many reasons for the emergence of modern American conservatism, as George Nash has shown in his incisive examination of the movement's thinkers, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*. I believe that the political impact of the post-World War II conservative movement can be traced essentially to three men—Russell Kirk, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Barry Goldwater. First came the man of ideas, the intellectual, the philosopher; then the man of interpretation, the journalist, the popularizer; and finally the man of action, the politician, the presidential candidate.

Prophet of Piety Hill

Russell Kirk was only 35 when his eloquent work *The Conservative Mind* appeared, or rather exploded, on the scene in 1953. Liberals jeered that the title was a perfect oxymoron, but they stopped laughing when they read *The Conservative Mind* to discover a brilliant distillation of conservative thinking over the past 150 years and a scathing indictment of every liberal nostrum, from the perfectibility of man to economic egalitarianism.

Robert Nisbet wrote to Kirk that he had done the impossible: he had broken "the cake of intellectual opposition to the conservative tradition in the United States." The *New York Times* favorably reviewed *The Conservative Mind* as did *Time*, one of its senior editors going so far as to call it the most important book of the 20th century; 47 of the first 50 reviews were favorable.

What accounted for the extraordinary positive reception of *The Conservative Mind*? First, it was a remarkable feat

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of scholarship: the synthesis of the ideas of some of the greatest conservative thinkers of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, men like Edmund Burke, the Adamses, Tocqueville, Disraeli, Brownson, Paul Elmer More, Santayana. Second, it was written by a young American intellectual who had taught, not at Harvard or Yale, but Michigan State. Here was no European emigré, no Eastern establishment apostate, no Southern agrarian, but someone who had grown up on Main Street in a small Midwestern town. Third, the book established conclusively that there *was* an intellectual tradition of American conservatism, that distinguished men of learning and letters had long been conservative. In a word, Russell Kirk made conservatism intellectually *respectable.* Before Kirk, conservatism and extremism were one and the same to most liberal intellectuals.

Bobby Kennedy's conservative campaign themes proved our thesis that Goldwater had moved even liberal Democrats to the right.

Popular Aristocrat

Then it was the popularizer's turn and not a moment too soon. Conservatives on all sides were lamenting the liberal control of communications. Kirk himself asserted that most American periodicals reflected the "oppressive ideology" of "ritualistic liberalism" and announced his intention to begin an avowedly conservative journal. After several years of preparation and with the financial help of publisher Henry Regnery, Kirk's quarterly journal finally appeared in 1957; its ironic title was, and is, *Modern Age.* But two years before that, a conservative weekly magazine had already been started under the editorship of a brilliant, iconoclastic young conservative, William F. Buckley, Jr. *National Review,* promised Buckley, would "revitalize the conservative position" and "influence the opinion-makers" of the nation. The publication had its work cut out for it. In 1955, liberals had eight magazines of opinion they could read and write for, including *The New Republic, The New Leader, The Reporter,* and *The Nation;* conservatives really had none.

Buckley constructed one of the most eclectic mastheads in American intellectual journalism, enlisting James Burnham, Whittaker Chambers, John Chamberlain, Max Eastman, Eugene Lyons, Frank Meyer, Russell Kirk, Frank Chodorov, and Freda Utley. They represented what were then the three main strains of American conservatism: traditionalism, libertarianism, and anti-Communism. The conservative coalition welded by Buckley made *National Review* a unique, exciting, and influential magazine. By the late 1950s, editor Buckley could declare with justification: "*National Review* . . . is no longer a flash fire by the Neanderthal Right. It is the voice of American conservatism, and more and more, it is recognized as such."

When *National Review* was born, conservatives were universally depicted as humorless, the willing captives of Big Business, limited in intelligence and imagination, and resistant to change or reform of any kind. It is no exaggeration to say that one man, Bill Buckley, erased forever the liberal clichés about conservatives with his wit, erudition, gilded lifestyle, and willingness to take on any liberal, from John Kenneth Galbraith to Gore Vidal, in any public forum, and top him. Russell Kirk made conservatism respectable, Bill Buckley made it fashionable.

Goldwater's Conscience

Then came the third man who forged the modern conservative movement. In 1952, when Dwight Eisenhower denied Robert Taft the presidential nomination and easily defeated Democrat Adlai Stevenson for the presidency, a 43-year-old Phoenix businessman and civic leader was elected to the U.S. Senate from Arizona. Barry Morris Goldwater was a man of the West, where freedom and independence were not simply words but things worth fighting and even dying for. He despised dissembling and disloyalty. He valued family and friendship. He insisted on speaking his mind, regardless of the consequences.

In his first term, he took on union leader Walter Reuther, even proposing to contain unions' power by giving states the right to control and regulate strikes, picketing, and secondary boycotts. He did not hesitate to oppose the spending programs of the Eisenhower administration, although it was the first Republican administration in 20 years; he placed principle above party. He easily won reelection in 1958 when many Senate Republicans went down to defeat. The following year, Goldwater electrified the conservative movement when he referred to the domestic policies of the Eisenhower administration as a "dime store New Deal."

Soon thereafter, the senator was approached by Clarence Manion, former dean of the Notre Dame law school, who suggested that Goldwater write a book, a political primer, for American conservatives. Manion proposed Brent Bozell, who had written speeches for Goldwater, as a possible collaborator. This was the genesis of America's most successful political book of this century, *The Conscience of a Conservative,* whose basic truths and eloquent rhetoric still ring true nearly 30 years later.

Barry Goldwater was the first ideological presidential candidate. He was not so much the candidate of a political party as the personification of a political movement. To him, ideas, not voting blocs, were important. To him, principle, not power, should be the core of the presidency. To him, politics was a means and not an end. In 1964, he ran as a conservative, plain and unabashed. In his words, he offered "a choice, not an echo." And in November 1964, he was crushed, annihilated, buried, by Lyndon Baines Johnson. Barry Goldwater received 27 million votes, 39 percent of the total. He carried only six states—his home state of Arizona and five Deep South states, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Georgia. Every voting group, with the exception of Southern whites, picked Johnson over Goldwater. Why? First, there was the

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simple political fact that *no* Republican could have defeated Johnson after the assassination of John F. Kennedy. The American people wanted to give the new president a chance to carry out his and the martyred president's programs. They were in no mood to put a third different man in the White House in less than one year.

LBJ's Smears, Rocky's Betrayal

Second, Johnson conducted a brilliant campaign; we conservatives did not. From the first we were placed on the defensive with the smear that Goldwater was a warmonger and Johnson was a peacekeeper. Our candidate, to be honest, contributed to the distortion by occasional imprecision in his rhetoric and by his insistence on setting the record straight, which only called attention to the fact that something was wrong with the record. We were placed in a no-win situation, and we didn't. We took solace in black humor. Our favorite line a few years later was: "Well, they warned me that if I voted for Goldwater, we'd get into a war. Well, I did and we have."

A third reason why Goldwater did not win in 1964 was that the Republican Party never united behind him. Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, and other GOP leaders refused to appear on the same platform with Goldwater in the fall, treating him like a political leper. One exception was Richard Nixon, who campaigned widely for the party's standard bearer and earned the gratitude of many conservatives who then supported him for the presidential nomination in 1968. The political ostracism was extreme: In some states, Goldwater-Miller literature was never unpacked, let alone distributed.

Pyrrhic Defeat

The fourth and perhaps most important reason for Goldwater's defeat was that the American people were not yet ready to admit that the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society could not create a brave new world. In fairness to the people, such a new world, centered on the premise that for every societal problem there was a governmental solution, still seemed possible in 1964. It was the policy and fiscal excesses of the Great Society from 1965-1968 (as Charles Murray has conclusively shown) that eventually exposed liberalism for the ineffective, contradictory, intellectually sterile philosophy it is. But that was not clear to the voters in 1964, and so Barry Goldwater was a lonely, and many said loony, voice crying in the wilderness. But he was heard by conservatives, young and old. Goldwater ran as a conservative candidate on a conservative platform. He articulated conservative ideas from coast to coast, daring to talk about social security (it's in actuarial trouble—let's privatize at least part of it), farm subsidies (let's work toward reducing and even eliminating them), the Tennessee Valley Authority (sell it to the private sector), law and order (the rights of victims should take precedence over the rights of criminals), foreign aid (let's stop propping up governments and regimes that spit in our face), and Communism (why not victory?). Beyond argument, by his articulation of private solutions to public problems, Barry Goldwater prepared the way for Nixon's victories in 1968 and 1972 and Reagan's triumphs in 1980 and 1984.

Burning Rubber

There is another and no less important legacy of the 1964 campaign. Thousands of young conservatives entered politics because of Barry Goldwater's run for the presidency. Today they sit in Congress or head think tanks or manage government agencies or edit magazines. They form a national network committed to conservatism, if not one particular conservative, as this year's presidential nominating process showed. In *The Making of the President—1964*, Theodore White wrote prophetically that "one cannot dismiss Goldwater as a man without meaning in American history. Again and again in American history it has happened that the losers of the presidency contributed almost as much to the permanent tone and dialogue of politics as did the winners." In the wake of the Goldwater defeat, conservatives agreed that while we needed to translate our principles into issues more effectively, America had not repudiated our philosophy. Writing in *National Review*, Ronald Reagan stressed that conservatism had not been routed—only a "false image" of it had. Starting with his election as governor of California in 1966, Reagan has spent the last 22 years presenting a true image of conservatism based on its adherence to traditional values, its belief in the central role of the individual in society, and its opposition to tyranny of the Left or the Right.

For us, the '60s were the decade not of Students for a Democratic Society but Young Americans for Freedom, not Norman Mailer but Ayn Rand, not a "meaningless" civil war in Vietnam but an important battle against Communism.

Tested in the fires of a presidential campaign, young conservatives cast about in 1965 for a suitably controversial cause. We found it in Young Americans for Freedom versus the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. With the open encouragement of the United States government, Firestone announced plans in 1965 to build a synthetic rubber plant in Communist Romania. YAF's Philadelphia chapter, under the direction of John LaMothe, initiated a nationwide protest against trading with the enemy. Within a few weeks there were picket lines, demonstrations, letter-writing campaigns, and boycotts against Firestone dealers. Officials of Firestone attempted to persuade LaMothe, Jay Parker, and other YAF leaders to abandon the boycott but failed. They then decided, erroneously, that YAF could get no tougher and proceeded with construction plans.

That is, until YAF announced that it was considering handing out 500,000 leaflets at the Indianapolis "500" on

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

Barry Goldwater was not so much the candidate of a political party as the personification of a political movement.

Memorial Day, informing the several hundred thousand spectators and millions of television viewers of Firestone's pro-Communist plans. YAF added that it might hire an airplane with a large banner to fly back and forth over the field all day, denouncing Firestone's plan to build a plant in Communist Romania. The "500," of course, is one of the most widely reported sports events of the year. Firestone uses the event to promote heavily its tires and other products. Facing an implacable YAF, Firestone abruptly canceled the synthetic rubber plant project, and Young Americans for Freedom's campaign was cited as the major reason in news stories and editorials from coast to coast. It is instructive to compare YAF's strategy of nonviolence with the confrontational tactics of the leftists Jerry Rubin, Tom Hayden, and Rennie Davis, who were soon to plunge the campuses and much of the nation into a period of violent demonstrations and blood-stained riots against the war in Vietnam.

An American Tragedy

I must say something here about the three political assassinations that tragically marred the '60s. Every American was traumatized by the murder of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963. Like everyone else, young conservatives sat in front of their flickering television screens throughout that long weekend, watching replays of Kennedy's death, admiring the incredible calm of Jackie Kennedy, and staring in disbelief at the gunning down of Lee Harvey Oswald. We also began to realize what a different presidential campaign it would be with Lyndon B. Johnson running against our man, Barry Goldwater. In fact, we were not even sure that Goldwater would be a candidate. He had been looking forward to campaigning against President Kennedy; the two men had discussed the possibility of conducting a series of debates across the country, much like the Lincoln-Douglas debates of a century before. We knew that Lyndon Johnson was a far different man and would be an opponent who would seek and give no quarter. We feared that most if not all of Barry Goldwater's enthusiasm for a presidential campaign might have died with Kennedy.

So we began bombarding Goldwater and his campaign staff with letters, telegrams, and telephone calls, arguing that he had to run—for the future of the conservative movement and the nation. We later learned that Goldwater had indeed decided not to run, reasoning that he had little chance of defeating LBJ, but changed his mind at the 11th hour because of the entreaties of young conservatives and because, as he later wrote, "Circumstances had made me the leader. I could not in conscience refuse the responsibility no matter how distasteful the prospect, no matter how uncertain the outcome."

If Barry Goldwater had not entered the race for the Republican presidential nomination in 1964, the development of the conservative movement as a national political force would have been set back a decade or more. Thousands of young men and women who entered politics because of the Goldwater candidacy would have stayed on the sidelines. The Republican Party would have remained in the hands of the Eastern liberal establishment, which would have nominated Nelson Rockefeller. Conservative ideas and programs would never have received the national attention they did throughout that campaign year. And an attractive, articulate television and film star named Ronald Reagan would not have had the opportunity to deliver a televised campaign speech that made him a national political "star" overnight and led to his running successfully for governor of California.

Ambivalence About Dr. King

For conservatives, Martin Luther King, Jr., was the charismatic leader of a minority with whom we had little contact. In August 1963, out of curiosity, I "marched" with a quarter of a million people of many colors and faiths to the Lincoln Memorial and listened to Dr. King's soaring "I Have a Dream" speech. There had been many predictions of violence, but the people came and went peacefully. I was deeply moved by the spirit of brotherhood and, yes, love that permeated the great throng. But I could not accept their solution. Most blacks looked to the federal government to solve their problems. Conservatives saw the federal government as the problem. In truth, we spoke two very different languages, and there were few interpreters on either side. You could count on the fingers of one hand the young black conservatives in the 1960s. Jay Parker, who served on the YAF board of directors, was a rare exception; Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams were yet to be heard of.

More barriers were built when our leader, Barry Goldwater, voted against the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 on the grounds that Titles II and VII, dealing with fair employment practices and public accommodations, were unconstitutional. Goldwater did not have a racist bone in his body. Three months before the march on Washington, which he endorsed from its inception, he told students at a graduation ceremony, "If I were a Negro, I don't think I would be patient." As a member of the Phoenix City

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Council, he voted to desegregate the airport restaurant; he was a member of both the Phoenix and Tucson NAACP. In *The Conscience of a Conservative,* he stated his agreement "with the objectives of the Supreme Court in the Brown decision." But he still voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, explaining:

> I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort, and I believe that though the problem is fundamentally one of the heart, some law can help, but not law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the face of the Constitution. . . .
>
> If my vote is misconstrued, let it be, and let me suffer the consequences. My concern extends beyond any single group in our society. My concern is for the entire nation, for the freedom of all who live in it and for all who were born in it.

Goldwater cast his "no" vote less than one month before the Republican National Convention in San Francisco. Can we imagine any presidential candidate today risking so much for a matter of principle? Goldwater suffered serious political consequences.

Most of the American press branded Goldwater, and therefore conservatives, as segregationist, although Arthur Krock of the *New York Times* wrote that "the senator set an example of political and moral courage that was the more admirable because of the immediate circumstances." Like many conservatives, I was horrified by King's brutal murder. But, to be honest, we did not appreciate being called racists by King and other black leaders. We also noted Dr. King's increasing dependence on radical leftists for foreign policy advice; his criticisms of our involvement in Vietnam broadened to include the American military and capitalism. I could not understand his odyssey, in just a few short years, from Christian pastor and disciple of Gandhi to strident prophet and anti-war activist.

Lukewarm for Nixon

Robert Kennedy was a Democrat and a liberal and against the war in Vietnam, three things most of us were not. But even so, his assassination in 1968 sent something of a shiver down our backs; was America entering, we wondered, some kind of pre-revolution period? We marveled at the passion Bobby Kennedy aroused among the young, the poor, and the disadvantaged. We noted that he sounded conservative themes in his campaign, proving our thesis that Barry Goldwater had moved even liberal Democrats to the right. Kennedy said he was for law and order, against overcentralization of government, for the stimulation of private enterprise for public welfare, all conservative themes. Politically, his death meant that the Democrats would almost surely nominate Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Conservatives such as F. Clifton White, William Rusher, and other founders of the Draft Goldwater Committee were already battling the Nixon juggernaut and trying to nominate Governor Reagan of California for president. But we were too few and too late: by the time we persuaded Governor Reagan to let us try to line up delegates and delegations, conservative stalwarts like Strom Thurmond, John Tower, and Barry Goldwater had already committed themselves to Nixon.

Young Americans for Freedom served as the rapid deployment force of conservatism for most of the decade.

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

Selma, Alabama, 1965. Conservatives were wrong about civil rights in the 1960s; legally right, perhaps, but morally and politically wrong.

We worked for Richard Nixon in the fall and celebrated quietly when he narrowly won, but we did not deceive ourselves that he would be the apotheosis of conservatism in the White House. For myself, I remembered that telltale article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1967 about the United States' establishing better relations with what he now called, oh-so-respectfully, the People's Republic of China. Red China was no longer an appropriate appellation although he had used it for 20 years.

Pledging Allegiance

Nevertheless, we admired President Nixon for sticking to his guns, and American bombs, in dealing with Hanoi. Conservatives knew why the United States was fighting in Vietnam: because the Communists were trying to seize by force a friend and ally, the Republic of Vietnam, and because we believed in the domino theory—if South Viet-

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nam fell, Laos and Cambodia would surely follow. We hadn't cared for Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the war; you can't kill a boa constrictor by gradually strangling it to death. Barry Goldwater had it right—let the military do whatever had to be done to win the war and then come home. A lot of people thought that was simplistic in 1964, before 58,000 Americans died and some $155 billion were

Russell Kirk made conservatism intellectually respectable. Bill Buckley made it fashionable.

expended on America's longest war. We didn't think that Nixon would go as far as Goldwater, but we hoped he was tough enough to end the war with honor for America and with hope for South Vietnam. Most of us resolved to help Nixon achieve those two goals.

It was natural, therefore, on Veterans Day, 1969, for me to serve as the coordinator of a giant rally at the Washington Monument that supported our fighting men in Vietnam. Our meeting occurred just a few days before several hundred thousand peaceniks demonstrated in the nation's capital against the war. For several months, Professor Charles Moser of George Washington University and I worked to put together a coalition of veterans, civic and other groups. Our program was prudently balanced, including Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, a Boy Scout for the Pledge of Allegiance, a beautiful young black girl to lead the Star-Spangled Banner, and a folk singer named Tony Dolan, who later became one of President Reagan's top speechwriters. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, a crowd estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000 turned out, one of the largest conservative gatherings in the city's history.

National media coverage was assured, and I wanted something special to capture the camera's and the public's eye. We ordered 10,000 miniature U.S. flags, which were passed out before the rally began. I was the first speaker, and looking out at the crowd, I said: "Please join me in waving the American flag you are holding so that the nation and the world can see the real face of America." I know that I shall never see a more beautiful sight in my life than that fluttering field of red, white, and blue, with the white Washington Monument piercing the blue sky in the background. The following week, *Time* used our field of U.S. flags in front of the monument as the cover photo for its story about the anti-war and pro-victory rallies in Washington, D.C.

The Right, It Is A-Changin'

These are some of my memories of the '60s, a decade of conscience, when thousands of young conservatives entered politics for the first time; when Barry Goldwater ran for president on a platform defiantly to the right of Calvin Coolidge and lost by 17 million votes; when Bill Buckley, campaigning for mayor of New York City, made headlines by insisting that he would call for a recount if he won; when we discovered that a letter, an envelope, and a stamp could raise millions of dollars and mobilize millions of voters; when we picked the star of *Knute Rockne—All American,* the GE Theatre, and the governor's mansion in Sacramento as our next presidential candidate because he argued it was possible to be right and to be president.

And what of today? Looking back at what we were 20 years ago, it's obvious that conservatives have changed, for better and for worse. First, we are more confident, more poised, more professional. We know how to mobilize, how to raise money, how to package ideas. The news media, once our second favorite target (after the Eastern liberal establishment), have become our happy hunting ground. Conservative columnists fill the newspapers, conservative commentators are featured on national television, the nation's capital has a daily conservative newspaper. *National Review* is one voice among a chorus of conservative journals. Conservatives, like myself, once described in print as a "son of a Birch," have come a long way.

Second, we know how to win elections. We proved that, not only with Ronald Reagan's remarkable victory in 1980 (We should not forget that after Iowa and before the New Hampshire primary, Reagan was dismissed by the experts as too old, too conservative, and too dumb to be president.), but also with a series of senatorial wins in 1978 and 1980, primarily as a result of the Senate debate on the Panama Canal Treaties. This was the high point of the New Right, which from 1977 to 1982 dominated much of the political landscape of America, using direct mail, negative advertising, shrewd public relations, and the Religious Right as its major weapons. The New Right no longer exists, except in the clichés of the press, but it made a real difference during those critical years, with Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, Terry Dolan, and Howard Phillips leading the charge.

Third, we have begun to learn how to govern at the national level. We had only the foggiest notions about

Through his articulation of private solutions to public problems, Barry Goldwater prepared the way for Nixon's victories in '68 and '72, and Reagan's triumphs in '80 and '84.

governance in November 1980, after Reagan won, and despite the best efforts of Lyn Nofziger and others in the White House, many good conservatives did not wind up in the Reagan administration because we had so little managerial experience. But after the last eight years, there are hundreds, even thousands, of conservatives between the ages of 30 and 50 who know how to run the government

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and cope with the bureaucracy, and they will be ready to serve in the next conservative administration. This conservative cadre may be one of the most important legacies of the Reagan years.

Conservative Second Thoughts

Fourth, we have changed in the way that we look at issues; we have learned to be less dogmatic, to bend not the principle but the application of the principle, as in education. In 1964, we were flat out against federal aid to education; today we talk about tuition tax credits. In 1964, we opposed any form of federal health insurance because it would lead to socialized medicine; today, many if not all conservatives concede that some kind of catastrophic insurance with federal involvement is necessary. And then there is civil rights. We were wrong about civil rights in the 1960s; legally right, perhaps, but morally wrong, and politically wrong as well. Blacks needed legislation in 1964 and 1965 to redress grievances and guarantee certain rights, and because our presidential candidate and movement leader voted "No" (albeit with the best of intentions) we have been castigated as "racists" and "bigots" ever since. Jack Kemp and other congressional conservatives have been building bridges to blacks. They are to be commended for reaching out to a group that shares our beliefs in family, church, and community. Conservatism will never be the dominant political philosophy of America without broad representation of this country's 30 million blacks.

Our positions on some issues, such as Communism, have not changed. We believed then and we believe now that we are in a protracted conflict, political, economic, military, with the Soviet Union and its satellites, and no amount of Moscow propaganda about glasnost and perestroika can change that. Gorbachev can withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, he can allow private enterprise to flourish in Siberia, he can permit Sakharov to hold as many press conferences as he wants, he can invite Solzhenitsyn to address a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, he can even tear down the Berlin Wall, and it will all add up to smoke and mirrors unless and until he and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union abandon permanently their Leninist dream of socializing the world. Then and only then will conservatives stop being anti-Communist.

Not By Politics Alone

Fifth, and finally, conservatives have changed, and for the worse, in our balance between being philosophically sound and technologically proficient, to use Morton Blackwell's favorite phrase. We now focus too much on how to do things; we are not paying sufficient attention as to why we do them. Twenty years ago, I was the ultimate political activist, throwing myself into every event, project, and organization that came along. There were many like me. We thought that we could change the world overnight. We thought that if we elected a conservative as president, that very act would usher in a conservative millenium. Well, we did and it hasn't. That's not the fault of Ronald Reagan, the most conservative president of this century and probably in U.S. history.

Too many of us have forgotten that man does not live by politics alone. We need to remind ourselves that as conservatives, we are concerned about the whole man, his mind, his heart, his body, and his soul. We could elect a conservative president, a conservative Congress, conservative majorities in 30 state legislatures, conservative governors from Maine to California, and our work would still not be done. We need more conservatives in the academy and in the arts. We need conservative poets and dramatists as much as we need conservative senators and mayors. We need conservative preachers and priests and rabbis who will teach the Gospel or the Torah and not just social action. We need businessmen who will not try to rip off the Pentagon or other government agencies. And, oh, how we need conservatives to go back to the grass roots to work for conservatism there. There are just too many conservatives in Washington. Thank God we have multiplied in numbers so that when we call a meeting, we need something larger than a phone booth—a common joke 20 years ago here in D.C.—but we do not need the thousands of conservatives, especially the younger ones, who now crowd the nation's capital. Go home, young conservatives, go home. ☎

The New Right no longer exists, except in the clichés of the press, but it made a real difference during those critical years.

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SAM NUNN'S GOOD IDEA

Protecting Against Ballistic Mishaps

GREGORY FOSSEDAL

Last January, Senator Sam Nunn delivered an address that may stand out as the second seminal address on U.S. strategic policy in this decade. Stepping up to the podium to receive an award from the Arms Control Association for his work in restraining Ronald Reagan's Star Wars program, the Georgia Democrat surveyed the nuclear balance, conventional arms in Europe, and the prospects for U.S.-Soviet arms reductions in 1988. Then he said:

> The reality of our society's vulnerability does not mean that there are no valid goals for defense. . . . I can envision certain defensive deployments which could be in the interest of both our nation and the Soviet Union. If carefully redirected, our research efforts could produce options for limited deployments to deal with the frightening possibility of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch. Such defensive deployments might be possible within the terms of the ABM Treaty, [a 1972 pact banning all but a very limited defense] or, at most, require a modest amendment. . . .
>
> I believe both superpowers might find common interest in taking out such an "insurance policy." This concept is a logical follow-on to the recent U.S./Soviet agreement on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and could be coupled with other imaginative steps to reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war.

From a certain perspective, this can be seen as a marginal change from or addition to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which includes a broader shield against even substantial nuclear attacks. Yet to view the address chiefly in reference to the SDI debate, however important it was in those terms, may be to miss its even broader significance. For the last 40 years, U.S. strategic doctrine has concentrated almost completely on one task: deterring the leaders of other countries from ever ordering a nuclear launch. And, it has centered on one set of leaders, those in the Soviet Kremlin.

We build our weapons in the hope that no sane Soviet leader would order an attack on the United States. Even Reagan's SDI program accepts this historic focus on a potential full-scale Soviet launch—while differing considerably on how the introduction of defenses might change the deterrence equation. While curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has always been a goal of U.S. diplomatic policy, a strategic policy for dealing with the prospects of spreading weapons and nuclear accidents has been left unaddressed.

But what if nuclear weapons were used without an order from the Kremlin? What if a submarine commander, or one of the KGB officers said to oversee Soviet missile forces, decided to fire without authorization from the top? Indeed, what if Syria, Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, or any of about two dozen other countries were to build and use nuclear weapons of their own? What if the PLO made and used cheaper chemical weapons against America or one of its allies?

While these questions have long troubled some defense analysts and U.S. politicians, they attracted little public interest until Nunn's speech. Shortly after Nunn's speech, however, Star Wars enthusiasts in Congress such as Jack Kemp, Malcolm Wallop, and Gordon Humphrey drafted legislation calling for the reactivation of America's missile defense site at Grand Forks, North Dakota. Representative James Courter, former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former National Security Advisers Richard Allen and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ford-era Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wrote to the president, urging him to support those bills. Such unlikely allies as House Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin and *New York Times* columnist Tom Wicker cheered the speech. Even a *New York Times* editorial, while fretting that Nunn's shield might lead to a full ABM Treaty breakout, conceded that an insurance defense would counter real risks. And, the Marshall Institute's Pete Worden, while suspecting that Nunn simply meant to "derail" the SDI program, applauded the idea of shielding against other-than-10,000-warhead attacks.

Dukakis Shows Interest

Even the relatively cautious campaigns of Vice President George Bush and Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis have shown interest. In a recent Chicago address

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James R. Spring/Missiles by Shelly Fischman

Oops, there goes Cleveland.

George Bush pledged not to leave the United States defenseless against ballistic missiles, emphasizing the threat from accidental or minor launches. John Lehman, a possible Bush-administration Secretary of Defense, calls the Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS) "a serious response to a serious threat." Another Defense Secretary candidate, Brent Scowcroft, terms it "very worth looking at."

Janne Nolan, a Dukakis adviser and scholar at the Brookings Institution, told *The Spectator* of London that the Democratic nominee might favor an ALPS shield against rogue missiles. "The public has generally perceived more of a threat from accidental launch of a Third World madman than anywhere else," Nolan told me, "and the public may be right." Dukakis hasn't commented on ALPS, but unlike former Democratic nominee opponents Albert Gore and Jesse Jackson, he hasn't opposed it. And Nolan isn't his only brain truster taking the idea-worth-considering position. "It's an interesting idea that needs to be explored," Harvard's Joseph Nye commented in a prepared statement. This is a far cry from the hoots of derision that greeted strategic defenses when President Reagan initially proposed them.

Indeed, scientists and defense experts who take very different stands on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance broadly agree that the threat of unauthorized or small-power use of such weapons is a real and perhaps growing one, not simply a screenplay idea for *Dr. Strangelove* or *War Games*. "The more I consider these weapons," the Hoover Institution's Edward Teller argues, "the more I am convinced they are most likely to be used as the result of a gross human or technical error, or by some irresponsible leader—and not in a deliberate attack by our leaders or even the Soviets." A 1983 report published by a Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction set up by Senators Nunn and John Warner contended: "There are an increasing number of circumstances that could precipitate the outbreak of a nuclear war . . . possibly involving [accidents], other nuclear powers, or terrorist groups. The spread of nuclear know-how, equipment, and materials also suggests a rising risk. While the specific risk in any one year is low . . . the cumulative risk covering all such groups over 10 or 20 years may be very great indeed."

Most Ominous Scenarios

Dealing with terrorists, madmen, and technical accidents, of course, involves a certain amount of assumption-making and outright guessing. This makes the problem of

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Oops Scenarios

1) The Soviets fire the wrong missile during an ICBM test—it's a live one, aimed at the United States.

2) A Soviet KGB officer, for whatever reason—he's mad, he wants to start a world war, he thinks he's going to the Gulag, he's involved in a bitter battle between party officials over glasnost—orders a base commander to fire 10 missiles. Or, a base commander does same to the KGB officer in control of warheads—or shoots him—thwarting the usual check system by ordering his subordinates directly while claiming a non-existent "crisis" is underway.

3) Same as scenario 2 for a Soviet submarine commander whose ship is sinking and who tries to scuttle his dangerous load—or a bomber pilot who has been experimenting with drugs and has a flashback. Or, the reverse: a mad U.S. officer launches weapons at the USSR.

4) A missile from a Soviet ICBM base or ship simply fires inadvertently (e.g., an electronic error or a malfunction in the fueling system occurs). Or, the same happens to a U.S. missile.

5) The wrong instructions are transmitted to a missile base, or bomber, or submarine—say by electronic error, or a rogue in the command and control operation—which then proceeds to attack the United States. Or the reverse happens, and the U.S. inadvertently attacks the USSR.

6) During a multisystems certain weapons are put on unlocked status, and an individual errs, or fires, or circumvents safety checks.

7) Any of above scenarios for China.

8) A Soviet battlefield commander in Europe thinks he sees a Western attack: a false alarm. He fires.

9) Libya, Syria, Iraq, the PLO, or some other nation or organization builds a crude nuclear weapon and launches a cruise missile or bomber attack on Israel, or the U.S.

10) Libya, Syria, Iraq, the PLO, or some other nation or organization steals a cargo of U.S. or Soviet weapons, or takes hostage a U.S. air base or ship, and launches a cruise missile or bomber attack on Israel, or the U.S.

11) Brazil, Pakistan, India, Argentina, Taiwan, South Africa, or some other nation or organization develops an ICBM and either uses it deliberately or mishandles and thereby fires it.

12) Any of the countries and organizations mentioned in scenarios 10 or 11 deliver a chemical weapon strapped to a missile.

13) A Soviet or Chinese missile fires by accident. It's unarmed. But communications bog down and the fact that it's unarmed somehow can't be communicated to the U.S., which orders a limited retaliatory strike, escalating into an all-out war.

Note: This chart was compiled with Zelda Novak, a former researcher at the Hoover Institution, with additional assistance from the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution.

forming a sensible policy to reduce the risk of nuclear or chemical attack all the more complicated. In an effort to at least clarify the problem, several colleagues at the Hoover Institution helped me this spring to compile a list of potential disasters. Recognizing that strategic nuclear concepts require an acronym, we called this list "Ominous Outcomes, Ordinanced or Otherwise: Possible Scenarios," or "OOOOPS." This initial list was circulated to more than 20 scientists and strategic experts who offered their suggestions and criticisms; as a result of their review, several scenarios were dropped as implausible, while several ideas were added. The chart to the left by no means represents a scientific attempt to weigh the relative probabilities of each scenario. Each listing does represent a scenario that, according to a broad array of experts, cannot be ruled out on the basis of what we presently know about the United States, the Soviet Union, and others who now have or may acquire weapons of mass destruction.

There are three types of OOOOPS events—outright technical malfunction; threats from smaller countries or terrorist groups, whether accidental or deliberate; and that old standby, human error. Experts generally see outright technical malfunctions by a single component or weapon as one of the lesser risks. Because of the secrecy surrounding accidents, however, that view is based on inherently arbitrary data. And a review of even the public accident record justifies some concern.

The Pentagon tracks (but seldom publishes data on) all serious mishaps involving nuclear weapons systems, breaking down such events into "Broken Arrows," for a relatively major accident, and "Bent Spears," an event that produces damage to a nuclear weapon, but no danger of launching, fire, nuclear detonation or contamination, or the threat of all-out war. From 1950 to 1980, according to Pentagon figures published by Richard Halloran in *The New York Times* in May 1981, there were 30 U.S. Broken Arrows, or a serious accident, on average, once per year. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute calculates that around the world there were at least 125 nuclear accidents—Broken Arrows and Bent Spears combined—between 1945 and 1976, or more than one every few months, including 22 publicly known Soviet accidents, eight British, and four French.

A House Intelligence Committee reported that on at least nine occasions U.S. submarines, some nuclear-armed, have collided with "hostile vessels" in Soviet waters. At least five of the collisions were with Soviet subs carrying nuclear arms.

Launches by Mistake

If all individual weapons work perfectly, what about the complex array of command and control systems that tells them what to do? Peter Clausen of the Union of Concerned Scientists doesn't think we're likely to see a single Soviet missile flying at the U.S., but he agrees with a report from the Marshall Institute that "there is a greater possibility you could see a whole field launched." This could happen, for instance, if a Soviet command center read an attack that wasn't there, and ordered a counter-strike, or if the wrong orders were somehow transmitted through the command system.

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Similarly, a malfunction in command and control systems could cause hundreds or thousands of weapons to be fired. "One doesn't want to overdo the set trigger analogy," John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution has cautioned, "but to a first approximation that is the way to think about the situation.... That's the only way [our command and control system] can operate, given the vulnerability of the entire mechanism." During any real or perceived crisis, as former Union of Concerned Scientists Executive Director Daniel Ford details in *The Button,* many of the controls on U.S. and Soviet forces are eased, and the authority to fire nuclear weapons is greatly decentralized.

Even without a faulty order to fire, the system could create conditions for an accident by producing a false reading of an attack by the Soviet Union or some other country. During one 18-month span from 1979 through 1980, NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) reported 3,703 "routine missile display conferences," low-level false alerts. Yet 147 warnings were of sufficient concern to prompt a wider "threat evaluation." And on at least five occasions, military officials were called to a preliminary state of alert. In October 1979, a radar intended to detect submarine-launched missiles picked up a low-orbit rocket body that generated a false launch and impact report. In November, the central NORAD computer system indicated a mass attack by incoming missiles as a result of "inadvertent introduction of simulated data." In March 1980, a Soviet submarine-launched missile test again set off a false warning of major attack. And twice in June 1980, the NORAD computer cried nuclear wolf due to a faulty chip. "Those [incidents]," wrote scientists of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in their 1982 *Nuclear Almanac,* "were sufficiently serious to come within minutes of launching a nuclear war." The particular outmoded computer that caused much of the trouble was ultimately replaced. Yet newer computers break down, too.

Unauthorized Launch

In addition to the threat of accidental launches, studies show ballistic missile technology, nuclear weapons technology, and chemical weapons capability spreading rapidly beyond the present handful of generally industrial nations. "U.S. Armed Forces and those of our allies will in the future be confronted by hostile military forces increasingly armed with ballistic missiles," as soon as "about 1990," reports the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS notes that there could be 33 nuclear powers by the end of the century. And as many as two dozen countries already have the capability to devastate a major population center using the "poor man's nuclear bomb," chemical weapons, according to biological warfare expert Joseph Douglass.

For those who find building a nuclear force too troublesome, stealing one, or taking over a nuclear facility, may be an option. In 1974, a crisis in Cyprus concentrated international minds wonderfully on this problem: Despite the testy relationship between Turkey and Greece, U.S. nuclear weapons were stored in both countries. "Only a U.S. custodial unit," Walter Pincus reported in *The New Republic,* "normally a handful of men with police dogs ... plus a complicated arming device, stood in the way of an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons." In 1984, nuclear weapons protesters aiming to demonstrate "an appalling lack of security of one of the most dangerous weapons in the world" penetrated a Pershing II missile plant in Florida for nearly an hour. From 1969 to 1975, U.S. nuclear facilities alone were the target of 14 bombings or attempted bombings, 22 incidents of arson or attempted arson, and 12 forced entries or security breaches.

Not every country is as stable as the United States. What might happen in the Soviet Union, for example, in the midst of a general political crisis brought on, say, by a coup attempt against Gorbachev and other reform elements in the Kremlin? In 1967, there were reports that a Chinese military commander rebelling against the Cultural Revolution had threatened to seize the nuclear base should the Maoists attempt to overthrow the local government.

"I can envision certain defensive deployments which could be in the interest of both our nation and the Soviet Union."

—Sam Nunn

Finally, besides technical error and threats from Third World countries, the weapons themselves will ultimately be fired by human beings who might override or circumvent the normal safety checks in the system. There are, for instance, no guarantees that individuals with drug, alcohol, or mental problems might not escape the notice of their superiors. A 1982 report to the House Appropriations Committee indicated that many of the U.S. military drug incidents and arrests have involved personnel dealing with nuclear weapons.

Joint Observation Centers

The first essential element of an OOOOPS protection policy should be, simply, to learn a lot more. In the short term, a substantial and comprehensive analysis—taking into account terrorist groups, nuclear and chemical deployment possibilities, and technical and human accidents—could be compiled using what the Defense Department and other agencies know but are reluctant to publicize. Published reports need not reveal classified secrets to be useful, and classified briefings for U.S. leaders would provide sufficient basis to insure public studies are sound.

In the longer term, the United States and the Soviet Union could expand their exchanges through such bodies as the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. A conception of the late Senator Henry Jackson, brought into being by legislation cosponsored by Nunn, the center has been in operation about a year and already has made some modest gains. For example, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are now exchanging ballistic missile launch information that may pre-

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vent a false-alert crisis from mushrooming. Perhaps the center could be given the task of reducing the possibility of an OOOOPS calamity, not just keeping U.S. and Soviet leaders calm if it does.

To give some examples, the center or some similar body could set up exchanges and joint observation centers—with the Soviets and other nuclear powers—on screening unstable nuclear personnel through the latest drug testing and psychological evaluation techniques. Eventually, a pact might be negotiated to end the practice of conducting multisystem, comprehensive nuclear war tests, as the Soviets did in 1982 and 1987—a dangerous practice during which the chances for a nuclear misfire rise greatly. The U.S. might agree to place permissive action links—an electronic safety catch—on its sea-based weapons.

In 1984, nuclear weapons protestors penetrated a Pershing II missile plant in Florida for nearly an hour.

The second element is to rethink arms proliferation policy. Between 20 and 50 countries have the capability today to build a deadly missile or bomb and aim it at any country in the world from a ship or plane, and in some cases even from their own territory. Among them are Brazil, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, South Africa, and India—not the most responsible club. Furthermore, the United States' ability to discover the early signs of a deployment of mass-destruction weapons is currently very limited. Much of the money spent in the last eight years has gone into expensive satellites and other technical devices that may one day be useful for counting Soviet missiles and the like. Yet gains in the human intelligence that would be critical to monitoring, say, a Libyan acquisition of chemical weapons stocks, have been marginal.

If such activity is discovered, moreover, the U.S. may have little time to react, and may be dealing with an adversary quite prepared to ignore the strictures and economic sanctions of the signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The U.S. may have to consider military action, such as President Kennedy's naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962 or Israel's strike against Iraq's nuclear power plant in 1981. Contemplating similar contingencies today is not the most pleasant task. But it is more pleasant than contemplating nuclear or chemical-biological weapons in the hands of a South Africa or Pakistan. Congress should weigh and pronounce itself on some of these risks in its debate over the tattered War Powers Act.

A sane proliferation policy for the post-proliferation age will have to address some distinctions that could be evaded when only a handful of countries had nuclear-development capabilities. For one, not all activities are the same. "While the rate of proliferation refers to the politically symbolic event of a first explosion," as Nye observes, "the degree of proliferation refers to the size, military quality, and deliverability of a country's nuclear arsenal." Furthermore, not all countries are the same. Norway's or Israel's building a bomb is not the same as Taiwan's or South Africa's building a bomb, and should not necessarily be treated the same. And a Taiwan or South Africa should not be treated the same as an Iran or Libya.

Rewriting the ABM Treaty

The third part of an OOOOPS policy should be an active defense against the outcomes the other policies seek to prevent. Testimony given this year by officials of the Lockheed and McDonnell Douglass Corporations suggests that a thin nationwide shield to block most kinds of land-based and submarine-based missiles could be built within the next president's term at a cost of approximately $10 billion. If supplemented by an upgraded U.S. air defense, this ALPS shield would cover bombers as well.

One problem is that even a modest shield might violate the ABM Treaty. For one thing, the treaty limits both sides to a single site, a requirement that strategic defense might have to transcend to offer coast-to-coast protection from submarine-launched or air-launched missiles. For another, as Senator Pete Wilson observed during the hearings on ALPS, the treaty bans any form of "nationwide" defense altogether.

Even if a "modest amendment" to the ABM treaty, as Nunn calls it, could be worked out, this combination of defenses would not provide leak-proof protection against all possible OOOOPS events. For example, an accidental launch of a whole field of Soviet missiles, which some experts consider one of the more likely human-technical accidents, might overwhelm the system if it is limited to the 100 interceptors required by the ABM treaty. A launch against Israel, Europe, and other allies would escape a ground-based U.S. defense altogether.

A more ambitious solution would be for the United States to propose a rewriting of the ABM treaty. A thin layer of smart-rock defenses—small, computerized, hit-to-kill missiles—could be deployed in space, which would offer global protection against most of the events listed in the OOOOPS chart. If deployed by the United States alone, it could still stop even one of our own stray missiles from reaching its target. If deployed by joint arrangement with the Soviets or an international body, it could serve as a multinational police force against calamity. As long as an insurance defense is in the interest of both countries—indeed, perhaps, of all countries—a sound American negotiating strategy should seek to awaken the Kremlin to that prospect for shared benefit. Moscow may come around, and the result would be a kind of active arms control, which seeks to promote joint U.S.-Soviet interests not merely by restricting bad systems, but by building good ones.

It is tempting, of course, to hope that none of these OOOOPS scenarios will unfold, even as one might have hoped that the Chernobyl reactor, the Soviet air defense system on the night of flight KAL-007, and the space shuttle Challenger had continued to function without a hitch. In those cases, failure to confront risks sooner cost the world dearly. In the case of a nuclear or chemical assault, the costs could be one city, or several, or a full-scale nuclear war. ☎

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

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Club Med with Books!

Cutting College Costs without Harming Education

Christopher Baldwin

The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for the benefit of the students, but for the interest, or more properly speaking, for the ease of the masters.

—Adam Smith

An old cover of the *Saturday Evening Post* features a Norman Rockwell painting called "Willie Gillis Goes to College." Just back from the Great War, Willie is sitting in the window bay of his dorm room reading a book and smoking a pipe. A colonial tower of a proverbial New England college, maybe Dartmouth or Williams, is seen from his window. A captured Nazi war flag and an honorable discharge notice hang on the wall. The date was October 5, 1946, and college cost less than $1,000 per year.

Over 40 years and two wars later, it's time for Willie Gillis to call his office—the financial aid office that is. Today's Willie Gillis fills out government loan forms every term. He works 20 hours a week at the cafeteria on a federally subsidized work/study program, and his parents have refinanced the mortgage on their home to pay for college. Despite all this, Willie will graduate nearly $20,000 poorer and $10,000 in debt.

For his efforts, Willie gets High Collegiate Gothic towers that loom over manicured greens, health services, faculty-student teas, public lectures, concerts, free birth control, keg parties, student clubs, and athletic facilities that most Third World Olympic teams only dream of. He gets—Club Med with books!

The problem with Club Med Ed is the Club Med price. College tuition has risen twice as fast as inflation since 1980. Between 1980 and 1987, private universities raised tuition by 47 percent. And it's only going up. The American Council on Education estimates that tuition hikes will outstrip inflation by 30 percent through 1990, and Senator Edward Kennedy predicts that attending a selective private college will cost $140,000 by 2005.

The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges explains that tuition hikes will be needed to compensate for professor salaries that lost 20 percent of their value during the inflation wave of the 1970s and to improve capital investments. "Colleges were neglecting their physical plants for years," says Harold Howe, a senior lecturer on education at Harvard University. "Many buildings on today's campuses are like bridges in New York City—what could have been fixed a few years back for a few million was ignored and now costs 10 times as much."

Officials at the Department of Education disagree. Secretary of Education William Bennett has brought public attention to exorbitant tuition increases, and the department is embattled with universities over who is responsible. According to one official, universities "are spending more and more each year, raising tuition with the knowledge the government will subsidize that increase, and then they run to the government and use us as their Wailing Wall."

Even after wading through the political verbiage of slick "more-money" reports by education lobbyists, it is clear that higher education is not strapped for funds—it's a $105 billion per year business that comprises 2.5 percent of the gross national product. Over the past seven years, federal student aid increased from $5.1 billion to over $9 billion, more than a 50 percent increase over inflation. State grant programs rose 88 percent, and alumni contributions soared.

Market forces, meanwhile, are encouraging tuition hikes. Applications are up at selective colleges with stratospheric tuition and fees. Presumably, students and parents think that if you want a "Cadillac" education, you've got to pay the "Cadillac" price.

But how long will students be able to pay these exorbitant prices? A recent poll by the Opinion Research Corporation found that 77 percent of Americans believe that college prices will soon be beyond the average family's means. Even rich families are being affected. An increasing number of upper-income students are attending public schools; the percentage of students from families earning between $50,000 and $100,000 has doubled at the University of Michigan since 1982. Higher education today is what medical care was in the '70s—an essential service too burdensome for the taxpayer and out of reach for many Americans. The solution is for higher education to cut costs. The good news is that it can be done without com-

Christopher Baldwin *is chairman of the* Dartmouth Review.

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

Ben Wildavsky

Today's student gets High Collegiate Gothic towers that loom over manicured greens, health services, concerts, and athletic facilities that most Third World Olympic teams only dream of.

promising the educational quality presently offered.

The first step to cutting costs is for colleges to reduce administrative budgets. Total spending on college administration rose from $4.3 billion in 1974-75 to $13.5 billion in 1985-86. Administrative spending per student after adjustment for inflation rose from $1,204 in 1974 to $1,506 in 1986, an increase of 25 percent. During this period, per student spending on instruction increased only 5 percent.

Administrative budgets have increased most rapidly in the past six years. Between 1982 and 1986, administrative spending per student in real terms rose 17 percent. Correspondingly, between 1975 and 1983, the ratio of instructional faculty on college staffs decreased to less than one in three; the ratio of nonteaching professionals increased to nearly one in four.

Because the number of full-time students rose less than 4 percent between 1975 and 1985, increased enrollment cannot be the sole explanation for the rising number of administrators. If colleges kept administrative costs in line with enrollment increases and spent as much money per student in real terms as in 1975, administrative costs would have risen about 5 percent, or about 20 percent less than they actually did between 1975 and 1985. This alone would have saved colleges billions of dollars.

Line-Item Veto

A second reform would be for colleges to cut spending on non-education-related services such as free health care, subsidized entertainment, and free athletic facilities. These services are what give colleges that Club Med aura and that Club Med price.

Service expenditures between 1974 and 1986 increased 27 percent after adjustment for inflation, with a 14 percent hike between 1982 and 1986 alone.

Under the present system, a student is charged for services that he may not use, which is the equivalent of charging a person for every item available at a cafeteria regardless of what he ate. Students should have a "line-item veto" over this part of their college bills. If colleges gave partial refunds for vetoed services, students could save money, and programs with little demand would still get funding. Lower- and middle-income students would benefit most from this reform because they would not be forced to borrow against their future earnings to pay for unneeded services.

Teacher Productivity

Because education is a labor-intensive industry, making faculty members more productive would create great savings. Getting more work per dollar paid to professors would be met with resistance, however, because the real value of the average faculty salary slipped from $35,205 in 1972 to $32,392 in 1986. It should be noted, though, that professors receive additional health, insurance, and retirement benefits that equal 25 to 30 percent of their salaries.

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Some may complain of low pay, but a report by Robert Boice, professor of psychology at California State University, Long Beach, shows that the average professor rarely spends more than 23 hours per week on teaching-related activities. Unsurprisingly, professors dismiss this hourly analysis of their work loads as irrelevant: "Academics are half way to being priests. Their whole lives are dedicated to their teaching, research, and students," says Harold Howe. "The recourse for promoting efficiency is very thin,"

Per student, administration spending rose by 25 percent, spending on instruction only 5 percent.

Howe adds. "Colleges can't monitor professors—there would be a hell of a lot of noise if they did that. The privilege of goofing off exists in higher education, but most don't do that. Most professors prepare for class and do research."

In theory, light teaching loads allow professors to conduct research. Over the past 20 years, colleges have reduced teaching loads from 10 courses per year to five or six per year, and have beefed up research grants to encourage scholarship. In addition, most professors have 15 weeks of vacation per year during the holidays and summer.

Bruce Carnes, Deputy Under Secretary of Education for Planning, Budget, and Evaluation, believes that many have abused the system. He charges that 59 percent of all college faculty have never written a book and 32 percent have not written a single article.

Different kinds of institutions will expect different mixes of research and teaching by their professors, so there should be no national rule. What is important is that colleges establish and enforce standards of quality and quantity for their own professors' research and teaching.

Year-Round Operation

A fourth reform that would slow tuition hikes would be for colleges to move to year-round operation. The current schedule gives students and college employees about 15 weeks of vacation a year. During these 15 weeks, more than $6 billion of land, buildings worth $79 billion, equipment valued at over $29 billion, and more than 700,000 instructional staff go unused.

Year-round operation would cut costs on many levels. First, billions of dollars of assets would not be wasted during the traditional summer break. Second, because students who study during a summer term would leave during the fall or winter semesters, colleges would be able to handle as many as one-third more students at little cost and spread fixed costs across more students.

Robin Hood Financing

Dramatic student savings would result if colleges found alternative funding for college-sponsored scholarships and loans. Most institutional aid now comes from so-called rich students, many of whom have borrowed money to pay for their education. These students pay several thousand dollars extra in tuition to finance the scholarships of poorer students. This money should come from other sources, such as endowments. Officials in the Education Department estimate that many private colleges could reduce tuition by 30 percent, some as much as by 50 percent, if this Robin Hood financing were abolished.

Smaller student savings could be achieved by reducing the number of scholarships. One college president who has done just this is William Hamm of Waldorf College, a two-year Lutheran college in Iowa. When Hamm took office, he inherited a school with declining enrollment, a deficit, and an endowment of only $750,000. During his first six weeks on the job, Hamm installed a computerized career assistance program for graduates and a new honors program, and he slashed tuition 30 percent by cutting institutional aid. Hamm explains that Waldorf cut tuition because, "When we raised tuition and gave money back to students as financial aid, we looked too expensive to prospective students. They just felt that they wouldn't be able to afford the debt . . . about 30 percent of the students come from families with incomes below the federal poverty line, and the bottom just fell out of our market."

The move has paid off. Waldorf's enrollment jumped almost 15 percent in one year, actually increasing the number of tuition dollars earned by the school. Money raised by this "supply-side" tuition system will go to a 10 percent raise in faculty salaries, and an ambitious $30 million endowment campaign has just been started.

While Hamm was forced to decrease tuition to keep Waldorf's doors open, colleges that have no trouble attracting applicants are unlikely to follow his lead. But should tuition increase as projected and public pressure build, colleges will need to cut costs and pass savings on to students. Trimming administrative budgets, giving students a "line-item veto" over service fees, increasing faculty productivity, instituting year-round operation, and financing institutional aid from sources other than tuition are five concrete ways for colleges to lower tuition bills without damaging the quality of education.

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THE DISINFORMATION VIRUS

How U.S. Scientists Invented AIDS and Other Russian Folk Tales

STEPHEN MILLER

In recent months, some Western observers have lauded the Soviet Union's new approach to foreign policy. For example, reviewing Mikhail Gorbachev's book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World,* George Kennan spoke of "far-reaching . . . changes of approach in foreign relations." No doubt, since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power there has been some "new thinking" in the Kremlin's approach to foreign policy. But the USSR under Gorbachev has shown no sign of giving up the dissemination of internationally propagated lies. In August 1987 Dmitri Simes, a Soviet expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "Outright disinformation [by the Soviet Union] continues to be perpetrated on a large scale."

Disinformation is typically fabricated by specialists in Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. Then the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee plants the fabrication wherever it can—mainly in pro-Soviet foreign newspapers, some of which have been set up with KGB subsidies. Once a story appears in a foreign journal, it is picked up by Soviet wire services and broadcast around the world. Most of the stories are planted to discredit the United States abroad and in the Soviet Union.

Germs of Untruth

During Gorbachev's first two years in office, the Soviet fabrication receiving the most play was that U.S. germ war researchers had created the AIDS virus. In October 1985, six months after Gorbachev was chosen as General Secretary, the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* alleged that the U.S. government had created the AIDS virus while conducting biological warfare research at Fort Detrick, Maryland. At first, the AIDS charge was repeated primarily in pro-Soviet journals, but a year later the AIDS disinformation made its way into the Western press. London's conservative mass-circulation *Sunday Express* carried an interview with Jacob Segal, the author (with the assistance of two other scientists) of a pamphlet arguing that U.S. germ warfare experts were probably responsible for AIDS. Segal and his colleagues were first reported to be French biologists, but it later turned out that they were retired researchers from Humboldt State University in East Germany with no particular expertise in AIDS research. Just why the *Express* chose to run such an interview is puzzling because Segal carried no authority in the scientific world, and in fact his arguments were refuted by articles in the London *Times* (October 31, 1986) and the *Sunday Telegraph* (November 9, 1986).

Even though Segal had no standing in the world scientific community, his charge was quickly picked up by newspapers throughout the world, and on October 31, 1986, *Pravda* printed a cartoon depicting a doctor being paid by an American military officer for producing the AIDS virus. At the feet of the doctor and the officer lie several corpses. The caption reads: "The AIDS virus, causing a disease for which there is no known cure, was created, according to some Western scientists, in the laboratories of the Pentagon."

It is highly unlikely that any Soviet officials believe the AIDS allegation because the charge has been rejected by leading Soviet virologists. On October 4, 1986, Dr. Viktor Zhdanov, the Director of the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology and the USSR's top AIDS expert, told a *Tass* correspondent: "Despite different points of view on the origin of AIDS, one thing is indubitable: an AIDS virus has not been obtained artificially." Moreover, on February 12, 1987, Gennadi Gerasimov, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, was careful not to blame AIDS on U.S. biological warfare experiments. He said there was no hard evidence from Soviet scientists that the disease had originated in this way. "As for the history of the disease," Gerasimov remarked, "maybe it can be regarded as the scourge of God against the doubtful morals of our world."

In April 1987, U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop told Soviet officials that if they didn't stop spreading this fabrication, the U.S. would refuse to participate in joint research on AIDS. In the summer of 1987, Soviet officials apparently decided to back off from the AIDS campaign; the frequency of stories in the world press decreased dramatically. Worried about the spread of AIDS in their country, Soviet health officials probably told those responsible

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for the AIDS campaign to stop spreading the allegation. On October 30, 1987, the official government newspaper, *Izvestia,* published a disavowal of the AIDS allegation by leading Soviet scientists. Nevertheless, on the same day, the Soviet daily *Sovetskaya Rossiya* published an article repeating the AIDS charge and defending the right of the Soviet press to "report different views."

Rather Absurd

When the Soviet press repeats the AIDS charge, it says that it is reporting the "different views" of many foreign scientists, but the only scientist who has continually accused the U.S. of creating AIDS is Jacob Segal. (On February 13 of this year, Radio Moscow's domestic service broadcast an interview with Segal, who maintained that it is "highly probable" that AIDS was created at Fort Detrick.) Even Segal admits (*Moscow News,* April 26, 1987) that "my wife and I . . . remain relatively alone on the point of the AIDS virus being a product of an abortive experiment carried out at a laboratory to develop biological warfare. . . . "

In 1987, the Soviet press began alleging that U.S. citizens were adopting Latin American children, murdering them, and using their body parts for organ transplants.

It is easy to dismiss the AIDS charge as so absurd that it is not worth taking seriously, but it has been successful insofar as media throughout the world have picked up the story. According to the U.S. Information Agency, which monitors disinformation campaigns around the world, the charge has appeared in more than 80 countries and in more than 30 languages. It has even appeared on the "CBS Evening News." On March 30, 1987, anchor Dan Rather reported that a Soviet "military publication" charged that the U.S. was responsible for creating AIDS. Although Rather noted that the Soviet article "offers no hard evidence," he said that the article "claims to be reporting the conclusions of unnamed scientists in the United States, Britain, and East Germany."

Shooting at the Dark

In recent months the AIDS charge has taken a back seat to two equally absurd allegations: that the United States is producing an "ethnic weapon" that kills blacks and brown-skinned people but not whites, and that the CIA was responsible for the Jonestown massacre of 1978 in order to prevent the approximately 1,000 members of that cult from emigrating to the Soviet Union.

In the past three years, the ethnic weapon charge has appeared in the press of at least seven countries, including India, Kuwait, Tunisia, Bulgaria, Ghana, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. It also has been carried repeatedly by Soviet wire services and international radio broadcasts. On January 9, 1988, *Tass* quoted a report in the *Ghanaian Times* that said U.S. chemical-warfare experts had become "frequent guests" in South Africa and were working with South Africans to develop 155mm chemical binary shells. According to *Tass,* "the [Ghanaian] newspaper emphasizes that the greatest danger to Africa is posed by U.S.-South African experiments with ethnic weapons which possess selectivity in killing only people with dark-colored skin." A more recent charge, first made by a Swedish journalist writing for a Swedish Communist Party journal and then picked up by a Soviet journal and a French magazine, is that the United States is also working on an ethnic weapon that kills only Asians.

When asked about the ethnic weapon, a leading Soviet journalist said that he believed the charge. In an interview in *Moscow Times* (June 4, 1987), Valentin Falin, chairman of the Novosti news agency, which many observers consider to be an arm of the KGB, said that "it is no secret that the United States has been working on various 'exotic' weapons, including the so-called ethnic ones. These are biological and chemical agents with selective action against people of different races, populating the same areas yet having different genetic susceptibility or vulnerability to these agents."

According to Falin, such facts are "widely known," yet the sole article Falin cited to support his claim comes to the opposite conclusion. A 1974 article on "Ethnic Weapons" by Dr. Richard Hammerschlag of the National Medical Center in Duarte, California, concludes: "So we have . . . no hard evidence that ethnic weapons are or ever have been under consideration by the Department of Defense." Dr. William S. Jordan, Jr., director of the Microbiology and Infectious Disease Office at the National Institutes of Health, calls the idea of an ethnic weapon "ridiculous" and "out of the question." A State Department spokesman said that the U.S. "categorically denies all these ridiculous allegations and regrets that the Soviet Union has chosen to repeat them."

CIA at Jonestown

The ethnic weapon campaign, which shows no sign of slackening, began in 1980; the Jonestown massacre charge was launched in January 1987, approximately two years after Gorbachev came to power. The campaign began with a 224-page book by two Soviet journalists who claimed they had researched the subject when they were based in the United States. The book, *Murder in Jonestown: Crime of the CIA,* was published in a press run of 100,000 copies by a publishing house connected with the Soviet Ministry of Justice. While attending the Moscow book fair in September 1987, Peter Osnos, a former Moscow correspondent for the *Washington Post* and currently a senior editor at Random House, was startled to find his picture featured in the book, which asserted that as the foreign editor of the *Post* at the time, Osnos was acting undercover for the CIA and was instrumental in the massacre.

While the AIDS charge mainly appeared in the foreign press, the Jonestown massacre charge, which contradicts the sworn testimony of eyewitnesses who escaped the mass

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suicide, has repeatedly appeared in the Soviet press. *Izvestia* ran a five-column article by one of the book's coauthors in January 30, 1987. The headline summarized the book's theme: "USA—918 Victims of Political Terror: They Were Killed For Their Intent to Gain Asylum in the USSR." The allegation appeared most recently in a book published in Moscow in February 1988: *CIA: State Terrorism of the USA*. The charge has also been repeated uncritically in papers in Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Laos, India, Bolivia, and Finland.

Latin American Baby Parts

In the spring of 1987 the Soviet press began another disinformation campaign: alleging that U.S. citizens were adopting Latin American children, murdering them, and using their body parts for organ transplants. Yet, according to a U.S. Information Agency report, "neither the [U.S.] government, private sector organizations, nor investigative journalists have been able to uncover any evidence of trafficking in 'baby parts.' " Moreover, all the alleged sources for these charges have either denied or repudiated the statements attributed to them.

The baby-parts story began early in 1987 with allegations that appeared in Honduran and Guatemalan newspapers. Then the Soviet-bloc disinformation apparatus picked up the story. On April 5, *Pravda* carried the original story without mentioning that subsequent press accounts had dismissed the allegations as false. *Pravda*'s Mexico City correspondent charged that thousands of Honduran children had been sent to the United States to be used as organ donors for children from rich families. According to *Pravda*, "eyes, kidneys, hearts—in short, everything that can be used for transplantation—are circulated." *Tass* replayed the story, which has subsequently appeared in pro-Soviet or Communist Party newspapers in India, France, Finland, Nicaragua, Morocco, and Cuba. The allegations have also appeared in non-Communist media in France, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, India, the Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Bangladesh, Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina.

Most recently, a Reuters news agency report in August repeated a Paraguayan judge's charges that the U.S. was trafficking in baby parts. The story, which was filed on the international news wire, was picked up by newspapers around the world, further lending credibility to these absurd allegations. The judge, Angel Campos, has since backed away from his original statements.

Bogus Memorandums

While lurid fabrications are one part of the Soviet Union's arsenal of disinformation, forgeries are another. Soviet forgeries increased in the 1970s and they have shown no sign of decreasing since Gorbachev came to power. According to U.S. officials, approximately 10 to 15 forgeries that seem to be of Soviet origin surface every year. A recent forgery, which appeared on August 1, 1987, in the Indian newspaper *Blitz* was an alleged letter from former CIA Director William Casey to Heritage Foundation President Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. The letter thanked The Heritage Foundation for a study that supposedly had been helpful to alleged CIA plans to undermine Indian Prime

***Pravda*, October 31, 1987: "The AIDS virus . . . was created, according to some Western scientists, in the laboratories of the Pentagon."**

Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The letter, which has been cited by *Tass*, *Pravda*, and other Soviet journals, led to a violent demonstration against the U.S. Information Service's office in Calcutta. Moreover, some members of the ruling Congress-I party pointed to it as evidence that outside forces are interested in destabilizing India.

Another recent forgery—a bogus memorandum from President Reagan to the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as to the director of the CIA—was designed to harm U.S. interests in Latin America. The memorandum, which was made available anonymously to officials in a Latin American country, urged the establishment of "Inter-American Permanent Peace Forces" in Latin America.

One other weapon in the USSR's disinformation arsenal deserves mention: blaming the United States for the assassination of prominent political figures. Soviet media have strongly suggested U.S. involvement in the deaths of Olaf Palme, Indira Gandhi—involvement even in the attempted assassination of the Pope.

Racist Frankenstein

While no Western analyst denies that the Soviet Union is engaged in disinformation, some observers argue that its impact is minimal and therefore not worthy of concern. Other observers, while acknowledging the difficulty of measuring disinformation's impact, point out that the Soviet Union obviously takes disinformation seriously. According to U.S. government officials, the Soviet Union

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spends over $4 billion a year on propaganda activities and employs approximately 15,000 people worldwide to work on all forms of disinformation, including setting up Soviet front organizations.

Perhaps Soviet officials fabricate the kind of disinformation I have described because certain aspects of Marxism-Leninism no longer hold much appeal. Attacking the United States for being a capitalist oppressor of workers no longer is very effective in the Third World, where Marxist-Leninist governments have bred poverty and even famine. It may be more effective to depict the U.S. as a racist Frankenstein, a place where evil scientists work on schemes to ensure white supremacy. The intent is to make the countries of the Third World think twice about having close relations with the United States—especially about letting American military personnel enter their country, for the latter may be either knowingly (by means of an ethnic weapon) or unknowingly (by means of soldiers carrying the AIDS virus) spreading death and disease.

It will always be difficult to assess the impact of disinformation, but we should not rush to dismiss its impact because of the crude nature of the charges. We should keep in mind that many people—including well-educated people—often attribute extraordinary powers to the CIA, and therefore are likely to believe stories that blame the CIA for any number of horrible events—from assassinations to plagues. Although we cannot say that disinformation has severely damaged the U.S.'s relations with foreign powers, we can say that it has increased the level of distrust in particular countries, especially where a good deal of distrust exists already. Second, disinformation may have some effect within the Soviet Union. A recent emigré told a colleague of mine that most of the people she knew in a Soviet Komsomol youth group believed that the U.S. created AIDS.

Soviet media have strongly suggested U.S. involvement in the deaths of Olaf Palme, Indira Gandhi—involvement even in the attempted assassination of the Pope.

The Wooing of Western Europe

While disinformation has had some impact in the Soviet Union and the Third World, it has not played a large role in the Soviet Union's wooing of Western Europe. To persuade Western Europe to be more accommodating, the Soviet Union relies heavily on Gorbachev's considerable skill in portraying himself as a dynamic and innovative Soviet leader who is sincerely interested in world peace. A recent USIA survey noted that in West Germany people "overwhelmingly credit Gorbachev for the recent progress [in arms control]." Moreover, Soviet propaganda harps on

***Red Star,* January 20, 1988: Bartender in the "Pentagon Bar" mixes "silent death" chemical weapons.**

a point that is true: Western Europe has a common heritage of suffering with the Soviet Union; both went through the terrible ordeal of World War II. Soviet officials, including Gorbachev, have often proclaimed that Western Europe understands the importance of peace better than the United States does because it has suffered so much from war. Soviet officials also claim that the USSR shares a common cultural heritage with Western Europe. "There is only one Europe," a Soviet official said last year in *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* "that of Leonardo and Michelangelo, Shakespeare and Moliere . . . Tolstoy and Dostoevsky." He didn't mention Marx or Engels.

Nevertheless, disinformation is not eschewed altogether. An article in *Izvestia* (June 19, 1987) accused a well-known American consulting company of computer-aided espionage against West European countries. The source for the article was an obscure Algerian weekly *Le parcours maghrebin,* an unlikely repository of the latest information on West European and American computer networks. In all likelihood, Soviet officials planted the story in this journal to provide *Izvestia* with an independent source for its allegations.

Disinformation, Please

In recent years, the United States has begun to track Soviet disinformation closely so that it can expose lies and forgeries as quickly as possible. Moreover, U.S. officials have objected strenuously to disinformation. Both Surgeon General Koop and USIA Director Charles Z. Wick have raised the issue with Soviet officials; in October 1987 George Shultz raised it with Gorbachev himself, who promised at the December 1987 summit that there would

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be "no more lying, no more disinformation."

There are several reasons why the Soviet Union continues to practice disinformation despite promises to the contrary. First, there is institutional inertia: So many governmental resources are currently devoted to disinformation that there would be a bureaucratic backlash if things changed quickly. It may be risky for Gorbachev to move quickly in this area, even if he wants to do so, since it could risk turning the KGB against him. But we cannot be certain that Gorbachev himself wants to stop disinformation. He may think that as long as the U.S. only objects to disinformation—that is, doesn't actually threaten policy changes—the benefits are worth the price of U.S. irritation. Occasional American complaints cost little compared with the benefit of abetting anti-Americanism—that is, creating a climate of opinion that may lead some Third World countries to declare their soil off-limits to American military personnel, or even to certain American civilians.

As Stanislav Levchenko, the Soviet defector who worked for the KGB, said in the winter issue of *Disinformation* (a quarterly published by the Institute for International Studies): in 1988 "another Soviet priority will be to discredit the American military presence abroad." The goal of Soviet disinformation, it would seem, is the quarantining of America. We shouldn't exaggerate the importance of this dark aim, but shouldn't the United States do more than occasionally register its objections to it—perhaps insisting that if the Soviet Union doesn't stop such crude lies, the U.S. will no longer continue cultural and scientific exchanges?

Moreover, if we do take a strong stand, we may give support to those Soviet citizens who find their country's disinformation crude and embarrassing. On July 20, 1988, for example, Valentin Pokrovsky, the president of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences said in *Sovetskaya Rossiya:* "I cannot refrain from mentioning the harm that has been inflicted upon all of us by the totally unfounded accusation of certain Soviet journalists concerning the alleged development and spreading of the [AIDS] infection by American researchers and state institutions. I state with full responsibility that not a single Soviet scientist, nor any medical or scientific organization [in the USSR] has ever shared this view." A strong U.S. stand may help the Pokrovskys of the Soviet Union. Even if it does not, a strong stand signals to the Soviet Union that there is a price to be paid for continuing to peddle outrageous lies. ☎

Occasional American complaints cost little compared with the benefit of creating a climate of opinion that may lead some Third World countries to declare their soil off-limits to the U.S.

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The Budget Cutters' Missing Link

Give Taxpayers an Incentive to Control Government Spending

Peter J. Ferrara

The key to cutting government spending is to adopt the strategy that worked so well with tax reform: Give all taxpayers an immediate, tangible benefit from the elimination of programs that benefit special interests.

The special interest tax deductions, credits, and exclusions eliminated in the 1986 tax bill would still be with us today if they had not been connected to a sharp reduction in marginal tax rates for everybody. The strong appeal of the general tax rate reductions overcame the power of the special interests lobbying for the special tax preferences benefiting only them.

Government spending programs will never be eliminated for the sake of an abstract principle like cutting the deficit. The key to overcoming the lockgrip of special interests is to offer voters a practical reason for eliminating unnecessary spending.

The answer is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax rates for every reduction in spending programs. A single bill could eliminate or cut back a large number of special interest spending programs, with the savings to be used to reduce taxes. The entire package, spending cuts along with tax cuts, would be put to a single up-or-down vote.

Grass-Roots Fiscalism

The possibilities for reducing federal spending through "spending reform" are almost endless, and the potential rewards are great. For individual income taxes, each percentage point in the 28 percent tax bracket down to 15 percent is currently worth about $6.5 billion in revenue a year. Each percentage point in the 15 percent bracket raises about $19 billion in a year. For corporate income taxes, each percentage point reduction in the top 34 percent rate raises about $3.5 billion per year.

With $57.5 billion in spending reductions, the top 28 percent rate for individuals could be reduced to 25 percent and the 15 percent rate could be reduced to 13 percent. With $107 billion in spending reductions, the 15 percent rate could be reduced to 12 percent, the 28 percent rate to 23 percent, and the 34 percent corporate rate to 29 percent. This would amount to a 20 percent cut in tax rates for most taxpayers, almost as large as the 23 percent cut in 1981. With $166 billion in spending reductions, the individual rates could be 11 percent and 19 percent, with the corporate rate at 25 percent.

Such a proposal could lead to a thorough reappraisal of the entire scope of the federal government. For example, many federal programs, such as the Economic Development Administration (EDA), Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG), Housing Development Action Grants (HoDAG), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), seek to subsidize economic development. These programs do not add to our total economy. At most they merely reshuffle resources to benefit the politically favored, diverting investment away from the most efficient uses of capital indicated by the market. Many of these programs have long records of favoritism, abuse, corruption, waste, and ineffectiveness.

The public would be far less tolerant of such wasteful and counterproductive spending if offered tax relief as the alternative. The tax relief itself would far more effectively stimulate economic development. Ordinarily, these federal programs would be too small to arouse active opposition from the average person, who would have little to gain from such activism. But combining the elimination of such programs with other major spending reductions and offering commensurate tax relief could make such activism well worthwhile, leading to strong grass-roots support for the overall package.

Other subsidies to business could be challenged as well. The Export-Import Bank (which subsidizes exports) and programs for development of exotic energy sources, such as methanol, provide funding for large corporations, who are unlikely to receive much sympathy when claiming funds otherwise immediately available for broad tax relief.

Subsidies for other relatively well-off groups could also be targeted. With immediate tax relief as the alternative, the public would likely have little patience for lavish pensions for federal bureaucrats retiring as early as age 55, and military pensions paying at even younger ages. Government guarantees making education loans available to all are likely to remain popular. But would the average worker be

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willing to forego tax relief to provide subsidized below-market interest on such loans to higher income families?

Impetus to Welfare Reform

With the savings returned in immediate tax cuts, public pressure to require able-bodied welfare recipients to work for their income like the rest of us, and to limit welfare assistance to those who are unable to support themselves, could become overwhelming. The public would also have far less patience with job training programs that fail to place workers in real jobs, except for the few that probably would have found suitable jobs anyway. Billions of dollars that go to professional welfare middlemen and bureaucrats to study and counsel welfare "clients," may also be seen as unnecessary or even counterproductive spending. With immediate tax relief as the alternative, could the federal government really get away with spending $8 billion per year on "social services"?

The prospect of tax relief could also revitalize privatization efforts. Do we really need to subsidize mostly business travelers through Amtrak and the Federal Aviation Administration? Do we really need to subsidize elite cultural tastes through public television and radio? Should the federal government be in the business of owning and operating utilities and subsidizing substantially lower utility rates for some geographic areas at the expense of the rest of the country? In an age of high tech communications, do we really need a subsidized post office? With lower tax rates dangled before the public as the quid pro quo, privatizing these and other federal programs might become politically feasible. For other programs, user fees could be charged to the beneficiaries. Why should the average worker provide subsidized coast guard services to private yachtsmen or subsidized airport services for users of private corporate jets?

Boost to Federalism

Such a program could reawaken public interest in shifting the responsibility for many current federally funded activities back to the states. The federal government currently spends more than $100 billion per year on grants to state and local governments. Besides the major welfare programs, these funds include billions for local sewage treatment plants and mass transit monuments. If the federal spending burden for such grants were reduced along with taxes, the average citizen would have much greater control through state and local governments over the extent and nature of such spending.

Public interest could be renewed as well in eliminating unnecessary federal agencies. Now that the energy crisis has been revealed as one of Jimmy Carter's delusions, do we need to maintain a bloated Energy Department bureaucracy in perpetuity? Do we need to spend $1 billion per year on the Interstate Commerce Commission so that bureaucrats can cartelize the nation's transportation network, raising cost to consumers?

We do need a strong national defense. But the promise of commensurate tax reductions may finally create sufficient public pressure to close the numerous outdated and useless military bases around the country. It might create enough pressure to eliminate outdated weapons production, which continues only to placate particular congressmen with production plants in their districts. And would the public allow continued foreign aid to governments that dissipate the funds on useless projects and spit in our faces to boot?

What About the Deficit?

While the entire "spending reform" package would be deficit neutral, using spending reductions to reduce tax rates would eliminate the opportunity to use such reductions to close the deficit. But the public doesn't seem to support cutting spending simply to reduce the deficit, and Congress still has not shown any serious willingness to do so.

As Milton Friedman has long argued, the total burden of government spending is the real issue, not the federal deficit. Reducing government spending over the long term may sometimes entail actually increasing the deficit in the short term, as tax relief or other increased spending may be necessary to buy off a political constituency and allow permanent changes to be made.

The key to overcoming the lockgrip of special interests is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax rates for every reduction in spending programs.

The interest expense resulting from the deficit does, of course, add to total government spending. So long as total spending reductions are at least 10 percent larger than otherwise, any added interest expense would be offset by the additional spending cuts.

Moreover, the political dynamic behind federal debt interest is quite different from other types of spending. Federal interest expenditures involve no special interest group that will lobby to keep expenditures increasing. Politically inert interest expense will have replaced politically active programmatic expenditures.

My calculations of the possible tax rate reductions were based on static analysis, as was the revenue loss from tax reform. In practice, the reduced tax rates should stimulate the economy, leading to increased revenue, as has occurred over and over again as tax rates have been reduced over the past 10 years. The improved economy may also lead to automatically reduced expenditures for unemployment insurance, welfare, and other programs. Ultimately, spending reform may prove to be a far more effective means of reducing the deficit than an unvarnished assault on spending offering no politically attractive counterweight. ☎

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JUST SAY YES

The People Who Recommended Marijuana and LSD

COMPILED BY RICHARD LOWRY

We can now say that marijuana does not lead to degeneration, does not affect the brain cells, is not habit-forming....

Dr. James Fox, Director of the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, U. S. Food and Drug Administration, 1966, as quoted in *Marijuana: The Facts, The Truth,* Will Ourseler, 1968

Drugs would commonly be used as a means of deepening self-awareness.

Tom Hayden, Democratic state legislator in California on life in an ideal community, as quoted in *Democracy Is in the Streets,* by James Miller, 1987

[LSD is a means of] enhancing values or expanding the self, a road to love and better relationships, a device for appreciation or a spur to creative endeavors, a means of insight and a door to religious experience.

Dr. Richard Blum and colleagues at Stanford, as quoted in *The Year of the Barricades,* by David Caute, 1988

Society should be able to accept both alcohol and marijuana.

James L. Goddard, chief of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, as quoted in *U.S. News and World Report,* October 30, 1967

Recent research has not yet proven that marijuana use significantly impairs driving ability or performance.

National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse (appointed by Congress), as quoted in *U.S. News and World Report,* April 3, 1972

Very little research has been given to the possibility that marijuana might *protect* some people from psychosis. Among users of the drug [marijuana] the proportion of people with neuroses or personality disorders is usually higher than in the general population; one might therefore expect the incidence of psychosis also to be higher in this group. The fact that it is not suggests that for some mentally disturbed people the escape provided by the drug may serve to prevent a psychotic breakdown.

There is a substantial body of evidence that moderate use of marijuana does not produce physical or mental deterioration.

Leslie Grinspoon, in *Scientific American,* December 1969

The three inevitable goals of the LSD session are to discover and make love with God, to discover and make love with yourself, and to discover and make love with woman.

...[T]he basic vision was common to all. We believed these wonderous plants and drugs could free man's consciousness and bring about a new conception of man, his psychology and philosophy.

Timothy Leary, former Harvard professor, as quoted in *The Year of the Barricades,* by David Caute, 1988

LSD and grass... will help us make a future world where it will be possible to live in peace.

Weatherpeople communiqué upon freeing Timothy Leary from prison, as quoted in *The Year of the Barricades,* by David Caute, 1988

[Marijuana is] a valuable pleasure-giving drug, probably much safer than alcohol but condemned by the power structure of our society.

Dr. Joel Fort, on staff of Federal Narcotics Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, and consultant on drug addiction to the World Health Organization, as quoted in *National Review,* January 30, 1968

Out of all these many studies (and others not reviewed here), a general pattern is beginning to emerge. When a research finding can be readily checked—either by repeating the experiment or by devising a better one—an allegation of adverse marijuana effects is relatively short-lived. No damage is found—and after a time the allegation is dropped (often to be replaced by allegations of some other kind of damage due to marijuana).

Consumer Reports, March 1975

We will probably have to recognize that the transformation of consciousness and personality, whether by yoga or LSD, is basically a religious problem entitled to the same constitutional protection as freedom of worship. Our difficulty in accepting this is the inability to see that LSD enthusiasts stand today where Quakers and Presbyterians stood in the 17th century, when they were regarded perverts and lunatics and public menaces. I am sure that there were

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those who became psychotic and even suicidal from having flouted authority so flagrantly as to become a Quaker.

Perhaps the most startling use of this chemical [LSD] (and others related to it) is that it can be an avenue to mystical experience—to that particular experience of consciousness in which the individual knows himself to be one with the entire universe, with being itself, with God, or with whatever the ultimate reality may be called.

Alan Watts, *The New Republic,* November 28, 1964

. . . [I]f we were to run marijuana through the course of procedures that the Food and Drug Administration requires of a standard drug we'd probably find it was one of the safest drugs on the market.

Dr. Robert Harris, chief of behavioral pharmacology at the Texas Research Institute of Mental Sciences in Houston, as quoted in *Newsweek,* September 7, 1970

Marijuana makes each person God. . . . Pot transforms environments. All the barriers we build to protect ourselves disappear. . . . All appointments and schedules, times and deadlines disappear. Man can do what he wants whenever he wants to do it. Marijuana is the street theater of the mind. Marijuana is destroying the schools. Education is conditioning. Pot deconditions. School makes us cynics. Pot makes us dreamers. Education polarizes our brains into subjects, categories, divisions, concepts. Pot scrambles up our brains and presents everything in a perfect mess. . . . Marijuana is a truth serum. . . . "Why die on Hamburger Hill?," asks the pot-smoking American soldier as he points his gun at the head of the captain who orders him to take a hill only the Viet Cong want.

Jerry Rubin, as quoted in *Chicago '68,* by David Farber, 1988

It would seem to me that *cannabis* and other hallucinogens provide a key to the creative process, and that a systematic study of these drugs would open the way to non-chemical methods of expanding consciousness.

William S. Burroughs, "Points of Distinction Between Sedative and Consciousness Expanding Drugs" in *The Marijuana Papers,* edited by David Solomon, 1969

. . . [I]f a male goes through four years of college on many campuses now, without the [marijuana] experience, this abstinence bespeaks a rigidity in his character structure and fear of his impulses that is hardly desirable.

Robert S. Liebert, Columbia University physician, as quoted in *The New Republic,* April 15, 1967

Marijuana is both pleasurable and harmless. Consciousness-expanding chemicals [LSD and related drugs], in reality, present no threat, but rather offer hope and encouragement to a democratically oriented social structure.

My first psychedelic experience was triggered by 400 milligrams of mescaline sulfate. It did indeed induce a flight, but instead of fleeing *from* reality, I flew more deeply *into* it. I had never before seen, touched, tasted, heard, smelled and *felt* so profound a personal unity and involvement with the concrete material world. My psychedelically accelerated mind did not merely grasp the symbolic import, the utter simplicity and truth of William Blake's ecstatic vision: for the first time in my life I literally *saw* "the world in a grain of sand." My exponentially heightened awareness saw *through* the static, one-dimensional, ego-constricted, false front which is the consciousness-*contracted* reality of the everyday world. This was no evasive flight *from,* but a deep probe *into* reality.

David Solomon, as quoted in *The New Republic,* April 15, 1967

Judging from the reported psychedelic experience of these subjects, who were not selected for their religious inclinations or outlook, organized religion might well investigate this chemical mode of reuniting the would-be believer to himself, his religious brother, and God.

Joseph J. Downing, program chief of the San Mateo Mental Health Services and clinical associate professor of psychiatry and preventive medicine at Stanford University School of Medicine, and William Wygant, Jr., chaplain to San Mateo County Juvenile Hall and San Mateo County General Hospital, "Psychedelic Experience and Religious Belief," in *The Utopiates,* edited by Richard Blum, 1964

We must discover, and discover very soon, new energy sources for overcoming our society's psychological inertia, better solvents for liquefying the sludgy stickiness of an anachronistic state of mind. On the verbal level an education in the nature and limitations, the uses and abuses of language; on the wordless level an education in mental silence and pure receptivity; and finally, through the use of harmless psychedelics [LSD and related drugs], a course of chemically triggered conversion experiences or ecstasies—these, I believe, will provide all the sources of mental energy, all the solvents of conceptual sludge, that an individual requires. With their aid, he should be able to adapt himself selectively to his culture, rejecting its evils, stupidities and irrelevances, gratefully accepting all its treasures of accumulated knowledge, of rationality, humanheartedness, and practical wisdom. If the number of such individuals is sufficiently great, if their quality is sufficiently high, they may be able to pass from discriminating acceptance of their culture to discriminating change and reform.

Aldous Huxley, "Culture and the Individual," in *LSD: The Consciousness-Expanding Drug,* edited by David Solomon, 1964

The ability of LSD to act as an educational implement, which is barely suggested in clinical writings, is attested to on the nation's campuses. Those familiar with college life are increasingly aware that untold numbers of students of high scholastic standing claim that LSD is one of the greatest aids to learning they have known.

LSD enhances all learning responses if the frame of reference is already in the mind, and it lowers the threshold at which "understanding" occurs. The student who takes LSD for a purposeful experience is likely to gain a broader awareness of the adult world and its problems, which heretofore he may have thought were of no concern to him. Consequently, his sense of responsibility deepens.

LSD in Action, by P. G. Stafford and B. H. Golightly, 1969

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The Buckley Doesn't Stop Here

William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives, *by John Judis (New York: Simon and Schuster, $22.95).*

Reviewed by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

In his classic 1931 biography, *The Duke,* Philip Guedalla disinters Wellington's advice to Lady Shelley on the education of her son: "There is nothing like never having an idle moment." Doubtless the subject of this biography would agree. It is hard even for an imaginative fellow, even for a hallucinating fellow, to envisage William F. Buckley, Jr., as ever suffering through an idle moment. He has during his long public life repeatedly notified us of his absolute dread of boredom. Those familiar with Bill know that the Iron Duke is surely his kind of guy, less the libertarian perhaps, more honored in history of course—but could the Duke at the height of his glory put on a more regal lunch? Could he leap from the table and fill the room with Bach played by himself on his own Challis harpsichord? Could he between dessert and coffee compose an 800-word column, lucid and informed? Readers of a psychoanalytical turn of mind, who have yet to be declared *non compos mentis,* will apply themselves to answering why there are men so abhorrent of idleness. For the rest of us, it is sufficient to note that a little idleness can be salutary, and that living the life of a whirlwind—even a heroic whirlwind—is curiously unsettling.

Let us not assume, however, that the Sepoy general, the hero of the Peninsular campaign and Waterloo, would be physically equal to Buckley's four decades of war: founding and editing *National Review,* running for mayor of New York, assisting in the founding of several essential conservative organizations, moderating a weekly television show, and producing spates of printed words, lectured words, debater's words. Buckley's books include treatises, anthologies, and novels. He even has a play in the works. He has delivered thousands of public addresses and participated brilliantly in a sufficient number of debates to make him the nation's foremost practitioner of this gentlemanly form of self-defense. In fact, since the early 1950s until the presidency of Ronald Reagan this private citizen was the Republic's preeminent conservative. As his dogged biographer, John Judis, pronounces early in this tome, "... it is impossible to understand American conservatism without understanding Bill Buckley's extraordinary life."

Yet, though Mr. Judis has put in an admirable effort, his compilation of facts and of affidavits from a wide range of sources fails to give any deeper insight into Buckley than that which we already have. Judis makes it clear that Buckley's beliefs spring from one source, his carefully considered, deeply informed, and ardently held Catholicism. From there everything follows, from his unyielding anti-Communism to his individualism. That still leaves many unanswered questions about Buckley. His relationship with the conservative movement that he was so instrumental in creating has always been elusive. Now he is wowing the hard core with the party line on some intensely sectarian issue, say, education vouchers or the peril of the immanatized eschaton, and again he is off suggesting moderate Republicans such as William Scranton and Nelson Rockefeller for the Nixon cabinet—and this after suggesting that Nixon select John Gardner as his 1968 running mate! Consider that at various times he has been fetched by high intellection, mere journalism, and promoting Red Wing peanut butter. His daily routine is so exhausting as to constitute mortification of the flesh, yet there are times when he is sybaritic to the utmost. Judis, a man of the left, has taken great pains to restrain his prejudices toward Buckley, but as a consequence he may have abstained from speculations that would have made his book livelier and Buckley more interesting. Judis has achieved what I would have thought an impossibility. He has made the life of William F. Buckley, Jr., tedious.

John Judis has achieved what I would have thought an impossibility. He has made the life of William F. Buckley, Jr., tedious.

Truth be known, Buckley is that rare public figure and rarer still conservative who over decades remains a sought-after figure. I have labored long in my laboratory to account for his durability. According to my examinations his gift is an intuitive capacity for perceiving some current in the *Zeitgeist* and latching on to it without impairing his principles. The *Zeitgeist* gusts through the years, bringing with it issues and tastes and heroes. For a while these issues

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

Drawing by Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*

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and tastes and heroes hold center stage, and then the *Zeitgeist* kicks up again, bringing with it change and new issues, tastes, and heroes. The props of one era influence later eras but rarely endure. A Gene McCarthy uttering the gibberish of the late 1960s launches another and another children's crusade—all in vain. The citizen's band radio sells in vast numbers only to be replaced by the car telephone. And when the *Zeitgeist* is against you not even New Coke has a chance.

Yet Buckley has endured. From the 1951 publication of *God and Man at Yale*, Buckley has been a star. His emphases have changed with the seasons but never his principles. Others have tried to endure but failed. Buckley endures effortlessly. When in the 1950s and 1960s the ideological debates were sharply defined and the audience wanted provocative debate, Buckley's dash and irreverence served him well. When intellectual celebrities were in season for their intellect rather than for their scandals, Buckley was there with James Baldwin, John Kenneth Galbraith, Norman Mailer, and Gore Vidal. These were the years of the brilliant dilettante on television and in popular magazines, and Buckley's curiosity and excitement over ideas gained him renown. During the trials of the Vietnam war and of Watergate his intuitive appreciation of the *Zeitgeist*'s flow kept him up to date and stalwart in the defense of right principles. And in the 1980s, as the retreating liberals blurred intellectual distinctions and tried to close off the debate by raising frivolity to a new level of importance amongst American sophisticates, Buckley adapted. For Judis to chide him for mellowing and participating in the soft *kultur* of the 1980s is disingenuous. When did the American of the left admire a conservative for his combativeness and devotion to serious thought? Judis laments that Buckley's celebrity barred him from writing books of deep political theory. Are such books really so dear to Judis's heart? Had Buckley devoted his life to Straussian exegesis would Judis have written a book about him?

Buckley has a knack for dramatizing issues and for turning his life into theater—a knack that is at the heart of politics—and conservatives had best master it if they are going to play a major role in the years after Ronald Reagan.

Buckley's gift for remaining a star is partially a product of his intuition for the *Zeitgeist*. But there is something else at play. Buckley has a knack for dramatizing issues and for turning his life into theater. Almost no other American conservative has been able to do this. Some probably think it phony. Yet it is a knack that is at the heart of politics, and conservatives had best master it if they are going to play a major role in the years after Ronald Reagan. Why does Buckley have this capacity and not other conservatives? The answer is that Buckley is literary. Most conservatives are from the commercial classes, or they are policy adepts. Few are literary. This has been a conservative defect since the movement's founding. The conservative movement was auspicated by economists, political theorists, activists, and highly principled businessmen. Occasionally one encounters a literary type such as John Dos Passos around the early conservatives. To find literary types active in politics one looks to the liberals. And there one also finds the capacity to create myths and to dramatize.

Buckley has brought to the conservatives verve and polemical genius. He weeded the fanatics out in the '50s and '60s. He made American conservatism intellectually presentable by the 1970s. But in the end his greatest contribution might stand as his capacity to dramatize himself and his ideas. Such a mind can at times be impractical and erratic; but in modern politics one needs this sort of genius. It makes the dull stuff of policy stirring. ☎

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LETTERS

Morton C. Blackwell, Patrick B. McGuigan, Charles C. Richards, Les Csorba, III, Victor R. Obillo, Michael L. Farber, Donna Krause, Peter Barglow, Douglas G. Glasgow and Betty Collier-Watson, Robert W. Kasten, Jr., Frederic P. Rich, W. H. Marshner

Back to the Trenches

Dear Sir:

All of what my admired friend Amy Moritz wrote in "The New Right, It's Time We Led: Conservatism's Parched Grass Roots" (Spring 1988) was interesting. Some of her criticism was useful. Some was potentially harmful. Some was invalid.

Miss Moritz specified issues on which the conservative movement "failed," yet it wasn't always the conservatives who came up short. By denying that Judge Bork was a strong conservative and implying he was oh-so-moderate, the administration made it impossible to fully rally our troops and guarantee his confirmation. The White House failed to lead.

Her criticism of the failure to turn donors and dollars into grass-roots activists and of the lack of vision in developing successful candidates for office is quite valid. That's why my Leadership Institute is expanding its programs, which now train hundreds of promising young conservative activists each year.

By using the wrong tactics, though—making idle threats, setting expectations too high, and putting too much emphasis on the media—conservatives have lost ground. Media hype may satisfy egos, but it's at best a phony substitute for infrastructure building.

Conservatives have been successful at fund-raising. But the Left has identified sources of strength on our side and then claims such activity is unethical, immoral, and ought to be illegal. A structured policing of "unethical" fund-raising in the conservative movement is a bad idea stemming from good motives.

Contributions should be between donors and recipients. We certainly don't need more statutory do-goodism menacing freedom. Let the free market decide where the donations go.

As I have said many times: Sound doctrine is sound policy. But it doesn't guarantee victory. Where we've taken the offensive, where we've framed the issues, conservatives have won. When we relax and let the Left set the agenda, we end up fighting on their terms and they inevitably win. Studying how to win isn't enough. The knowledge must be actively used.

Morton C. Blackwell
The Leadership Institute
Springfield, VA

Working the Press

Dear Sir:

Amy Moritz is absolutely on the mark when she asserts that conservatives cannot compensate for weakness with "frequent, blustering threats." I learned this lesson early in the many struggles for judicial confirmation with which I was involved from 1984-87 as legal affairs analyst at Coalitions for America. I also share her disdain for preprinted postcards as a means of communicating to policymakers. This technique has almost no effect any more, except when the volume is utterly crushing. Much more effective are sincere personal letters. Although this sort of letter campaign is a little harder to trigger and requires that our troops be more than donors, my experience has shown that movement activists are willing to write such letters to their senators and representatives. The Washington operation should provide the bottom-line talking points needed to make such letters effective, not preprinted cards.

I'm not sure I agree with Moritz's charge that the movement is inappropriately "obsessed" with the press. I think the problem is, rather, that too many conservatives feel that the press is so important to their success that conservative spokesmen feel compelled to comment on literally everything that happens. Not every story is "our story," nor is it possible or appropriate to get in on every single political or policy development in the nation's capital. The most effective way to purchase long-range authority with the press is to comment insightfully, accurately, and honestly on developments in which you or your organization have an actual interest and expertise. The working press is not so much biased against conservatives (although elements of it certainly are) as it is cynical about politicians and those in public life in general. The majority of reporters are looking for the "real thing," someone who actually understands the story they are pursuing. The sort of restraint I am counseling here may mean that weeks, even months, will pass without a given individual or organization appearing in news stories—but when that individual's or organization's

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area of expertise jumps to the news forefront, most reporters will treat them seriously.

Moritz asserts that the conservative movement has been losing mid-level talent "at just the time [such individuals become] experienced enough to be effective." Further, she believes that "loyalty to an individual conservative leader" is too significant a factor in advancement in conservative circles.

Commitment

But, the problem with the loss of talent is frequently with the individual. The kind of individuals attracted to politics and policy-making, quite naturally, tend to be hard chargers, not willing to accept the direction and guidance of others, even those substantially more seasoned than themselves. Effectiveness in politics requires a blending of genuine selflessness and aggressiveness. In 1980, we often underestimated the time and energy commitment required to succeed in government and policy-making. The attitude I frequently encountered was, "I'll put in my two or three years and then go make a lot of money." This attitude was and is utterly insufficient to the demands and rigors of governance and policy influence, which require lengthy—perhaps lifetime—commitments.

There are, no doubt, conservative leaders who demand total loyalty from employees, to the point that they do not invite or accept suggestions from the rank and file. However, the movement has far too many individuals who decide fairly quickly that they are smarter than their bosses. Effective deployment of political resources requires that leaders be confident that they control organizations with real resources that can be deployed in a timely and targeted way.

Battle for America's Soul

Too many conservative brethren still fail to recognize that the political struggle is but a subset of the larger battle for the soul of America—its economic ethos, its politics, its culture. Conservatives need to carry their message into all aspects of American society. There is frequently insufficient appreciation for the role conservatives need to play in the media, particularly print journalism, and in academia—not only as writers and scholars but as active members of professional associations. This is territory conservatives cede to liberals all too easily.

Contrary to Moritz, the Bork battle was not lost in the trenches of heartland America, but in the halls of power in Washington, D.C.

—Patrick B. McGuigan

As for the Bork confirmation battle, Moritz asserts conservatives were "out-mobilized at the grassroots level by the Left." I'm not sure that's true. The battle was not lost in the trenches of heartland America, but in the halls of power in Washington, D.C. Success in the Bork confirmation would have required full delivery from various elements in what one might fancy is the Reagan coalition: the White House, the Department of Justice, the Republican establishment, the Senate Republican leadership, sympathetic elements of the corporate establishment, and the full range of outside conservative groups.

Misplaced Loyalty

However, there never developed an effective means of communication between the inside—the White House legislative operation—and the outside—myself and the eclectic gathering of allies who supported Judge Bork. I knew the system was utterly inadequate from the beginning, yet—out of what I now know was a misplaced sense of loyalty to the president—I refrained from speaking out.

I fault myself and other leaders in the confirmation battle for not speaking out even in early August when colleagues of mine discovered that five weeks after Bork's nomination, the White House legislative operation apparently did not have a target list of key senators. I did not speak out when, before the confirmation hearings began, it had become clear that there were no Republican or White House plans to match the millions of dollars in advertising that were beginning to pour from the opposition campaign.

Throughout the long battle, leaders in the pro-Bork coalition tried to persuade insiders that a massive commitment of resources would be required for victory, but the standard response was that Judge Bork's brilliance alone would carry the day. This placed an untenable burden on the shoulders of the nominee. Judge Bork is the most profound constitutional scholar of our generation, but he needed an "in the trenches" legislative strategy not only from his conservative supporters, but also from the administration that nominated him.

When some of us finally spoke out—but, more significantly, when leading conservatives in the Senate began publicly to denounce the ineffectual White House strategy—as the hearings concluded, we began to see some movement. But it was too late. We allowed loyalty to a beloved president, and the persistent requests not to politicize the nomination, to silence us at a time when conservative and Republican donors needed to be made aware of the magnitude of commitment needed for victory in the Senate.

One lesson I draw from the Bork battle, which is consistent with Moritz's argument: "If you would have peace, prepare for war." While we can hope for the restoration of a civil and principled judicial confirmation process, supporters of the Constitution must prepare for every confirmation battle to be the legislative equivalent of a senatorial campaign, complete with high dollar media expenditures, vigorous negative advertising, and polemical theatrics.

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A second lesson comes from my friend Dan Casey of the American Conservative Union: "It's time to hang some scalps on the wall."

Throughout the Bork battle, conservatives did many things right. Even Joe Biden confessed that we won the cards, letters, and phone calls battle in 80 to 90 of the Senate offices. But the other side had a more credible political threat in the form of PACs and organized lobbies, whereas our message of support was somewhat unfocused.

The real strength of Moritz's essay is its recognition that conservatives insufficiently understand the process of power. To restore the dynamism, creativity, and clout of the late '70s and early '80s, conservatives need to do some soul-searching. Then, we need to act to correct the political weaknesses she identified.

Patrick B. McGuigan
Institute for Government & Politics
Free Congress Foundation
Washington, DC

Dear Sir:

Five stars for Amy Moritz! As a parched root myself, I have been seeking the water of conservative activism for a number of years, but the only response I get is five to ten mailings each week from "conservative organizations," or a postcard to mail, and the ever-present solicitation for funds. It is heartbreaking that more than 80 percent of the funds collected by these solicitations go to the fund-raisers. That might be a nice way to make a living without doing much physical work, but somehow the word "dishonest" keeps flashing across my mind. Unfortunately, the "big names" used by the fund-raisers to promote their solicitation also get tagged with the same label. This includes many of our elected and self-appointed "conservative leaders" who make their headquarters in Washington. Their names appear several times each week on a variety of fancy mail-outs and solicitations for funds.

What amazes me is the entry of a new organization into the field every three or four weeks, promoting some "new" conservative cause. After one or two mailings, enough for the fund-raisers to make their pot, the organization is never heard from again.

Actually, there are very few so-called conservative organizations worthy of financial support, and each grass-roots conservative should select two or three that demonstrate sustained effectiveness with a number of issues and limit his financial support to them. Perhaps the fragmentation of money and effort can be slowed or halted, especially if it is made clear to the contributors that the fund-raisers for most of these mail-intensive organizations are using most of the donated funds to pay themselves.

Charles C. Richards
St. Petersburg, FL

Conservative Complacency

Dear Sir:

Miss Moritz's article on the crisis in the conservative movement was thought-provoking. We need solutions to weed out ineffective and wasteful conservative groups. Most important, we need to ask: Will we return to the grass roots of America where the values and principles that conservatives advocate remain bubbling, yet untapped?

After the "crisis of confidence" of the '70s, when we saw the colossal failure of liberal ideas at home, and America damaged abroad by isolationism and the naive policy of detente, the American people were ready for change. They wanted to return to the reliable traditional values that enabled this nation to prosper. By articulating conservative ideas such as less government, stronger defense, and greater economic freedom, and by appealing to the grass roots, Ronald Reagan won two decisive electoral victories. No doubt, his warm personality and gentle wit helped, but his principles were what appealed to the vast majority of Americans. Conservatives flooded Washington, D.C., with their organizations and publications. Political commentators began writing about the "rise of the Right."

But with the rise of the Right came the rise of complacency as we got fat and happy with our new influence "inside the Beltway." Reagan voters became names on direct mail lists. We reassured them with the idea that sending a $50 check here and there meant being involved. Real, inexpendable activism was replaced by expendable resources. As a result, we began to lose battles we should have won.

Amy Moritz raises one such defeat, the Bork nomination. While I agree with her that it wasn't *just* the White House which caused Bork's defeat, I do think there's a more plausible answer. Judge Bork lost because of the way his positions were articulated by the White House strategists and conservative legal minds. How could we expect the Reagan voter to mobilize for a Supreme Court nominee who is advertised as being for "judicial restraint," and "original intent?" This philosophy of jurisprudence is all well and good, but it does not mobilize the electorate.

We lost the Bork battle because the appealing things the Judge stood for (*e.g.*, reversal of *Roe* v. *Wade*, and tougher anti-pornography decisions) were downplayed. Many of us who worked for Judge Bork's confirmation were told to "deemphasize" Bork's solid constitutional judicial position on abortion, while the Left was mobilizing because of it. And so we spent most of the time defending Bork and what he *wouldn't* do on the Court, instead of what he *might* do on the

Some of Moritz's criticism was useful. Some was potentially harmful. Some was invalid.

—Morton C. Blackwell

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Court. This may sound to some like "judicial activism," an anathema to conservatives. But how can we expect our people to be excited about somebody who doesn't intend to be active about some of the concerns we share?

Instead of avoiding confrontation, we should have been on the offensive. While we rightly condemned the politicization of the confirmation process, we were left standing on the sidelines while the Left slaughtered senators with their emotional smear campaign and threats to hold senators accountable for their votes on Bork's confirmation.

Five-Star System

All who are involved in promoting conservative ideas and principles can gain from Moritz's timely article, which has provoked discussion and caused many to reevaluate the purposes of our organizations, institutions, publications, and fund-raising tactics. I personally favor Paul Weyrich's proposed five-star system rating the most effective organizations, similar to the one used to evaluate hotels and restaurants. This would provide a new incentive—and healthy competitiveness—for conservative groups, compelling them to get back to organizing and educating the grass roots. Those who cannot survive a little outside scrutiny and accountability will be weeded out, and the integrity and effectiveness of our movement will be enhanced.

Les Csorba, III
Accuracy in Academia
Washington, DC

Manila Sees Red

Dear Sir:

I agree by and large with General Richard Stilwell's article on the insurgency in the Philippines ("Averting Disaster in the Philippines," Winter 1988). However, General Stilwell has overlooked some essential variables.

The local grievances that are now being exploited by the Communist Party of the Philippines are to a large extent products of the painful legacy left by the country's colonizers.

The parallels Stilwell draws between the Filipino insurgency and that of then South Vietnam are invalid because of the wide differences in the material influences on the two countries—foreign support, cultural values, geographic locations and configurations, degree of alienation of government forces, among others. Also, the National Democratic Front could be better organized than was its Saigon counterpart, possibly because of different emphases. Presently, the CPP stresses what it terms "insurrectional" warfare, with an emphasis on united front building; the VC concentrated on building its army.

It is also dangerous to rest on our laurels of the '50s, when the government successfully neutralized the Huks. The CPP is more sophisticated in its strategies and tactics than were the Huks. I assure General Stilwell, however, that the basics of the "Magsaysay" doctrine are well considered in our present counter-insurgency drive. But the government can only go as far as its resources permit.

As to the perceived inability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to fight the insurgents, General Stilwell blames the lack of training and inadequate or even dubiously managed support to the soldier. These are valid observations but I would like to emphasize that it is largely due to inadequate funds that there are such shortcomings. This, however, does not grossly reduce the capability of the soldier to combat insurgency; on-site training is now being conducted and resources are being pushed to the field.

General Stilwell inaccurately claims that there is no consensus within the government on how to combat the Communist threat. The government's program—Reconciliation, Security, and Development—is being implemented by the various government structures, including the Peace and Order Councils (POCs), which serve as forums for civilian government, military, and community leaders to resolve local problems.

The foremost priority of the government was political consolidation as the nation went through the normalization process. The next or even coequal priority of government was and is resource generation. These fundamental priorities necessarily affected other national priorities, including the insurgency threat. Nonetheless, as the new government took form and meaning with the reactivation of our democratic institutions, the insurgency problem was officially acknowledged by no less than the House of Representatives in the Congress of the Philippines as the top national priority and it continues to receive increased attention within and outside the government.

This government, from the top to its humblest levels, recognizes the nature and dynamics of the Communist insurgency. More important, this government, subject to limitations of resources, has initiated appropriate measures to contain, if not eliminate, the insurgency problem. It is just a matter of time before total focus can be directed toward the insurgents, unobstructed, I hope, by other national priorities.

Col. Victor R. Obillo
Philippine Army
Civil Relations Service
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City, Philippines

Refugee Rap Sessions

Dear Sir:

General Stilwell clearly recognizes the critical link between poverty and corruption and the success of Communist revolutionaries. As long as the peasants of any underdeveloped nation believe that there are critical social problems that the government is failing to address, they will be very receptive to Communist political agitation.

While General Stilwell did an excellent job in suggesting improvements in military training, intelligence training, and Civil Affairs operations, I believe he did not stress enough the critical role that Psychological Operations should play in the Philippine counterinsurgency effort. All Communist insurgencies place their primary emphasis on political rather than military warfare. With peasant support, the countryside is an ocean in which the Communist insurgency can freely swim. Without that political support, the rebels will be relegated to the uninhabited jun-

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gles and mountains, where they can do little harm.

In order to gain the support of the countryside, the government clearly must engage in a broad range of Civil Affairs operations. But that is not enough. Manila must begin an aggressive program of political education to show that despite its problems, a democratic-republican form of government combined with a capitalist economic system is the best way to go. Furthermore, Manila must show the peasantry what Communism truly is. Simply translating *The Killing Fields* into the various local Philippine dialects and showing that movie at a required *barangay* meeting would go far toward this end. The government could also enlist the support of the many Indochinese refugees now kept in Philippine refugee camps, who could lead discussions on the impact of Communism in Southeast Asia.

Such a program by itself would not win the war, but with very little cost, it would put a big crimp in the insurgency's style. Less than 13 years ago, Communism swept across Indochina. Since then, the amount of human suffering has been unspeakable. So far, the West has refused to engage in any activity to liberate that region, but at least we can profit from the experience and use it to help save the Philippines.

Michael L. Farber
Sacramento, CA

General Stilwell replies:

I am heartened that a senior and respected officer of the Philippine Army can "agree by and large" with the content of my recent article. He has, to be sure, some criticisms of detail. Except where those criticisms reflect misinterpretation of my words, I accept the judgment of an officer clearly better informed and more current than I am. What gives me pause is Colonel Obillo's rationale for relegating the insurgent threat to third or lower priority.

No one can deny that political consolidation is a *sine qua non* of nation-building or that economic development is of vital importance. The problem is that a steadily growing insurgency exacerbates the difficulties of both and prevents their achievement. To a considerable degree, the breakup of the broad and enthusiastic coalition that swept President Corazon Aquino into power two years ago resulted from differences over the priority assigned to counterinsurgency programs. Similarly, Communist-stimulated violence and unrest in rural and urban areas are disincentives for substantial domestic and foreign investment, the engines of economic growth and higher levels of employment.

Colonel Obillo asserts that the rank and file of the Philippine bureaucracy know precisely what has to be done to deal with the Communist insurgency, and, given time and resources, will implement the necessary programs. This old soldier is not assured. Time is a commodity not available to the Philippine nation in these hours of travail; nor can it wait for the stockpiling of resources as yet unprogrammed. With the enemy at the gate, it's a "come as you are" war. As for resources, the only indispensable ones are national resolve and the harnessing of all available means of the governmental and private sector in a sustained offensive against the CPP and its instrumentalities, the most formidable and time-sensitive threat to the survival of democracy in the Philippines.

Mr. Farber's comments are on the mark. Psychological Operations—by whatever name one wishes to call them—are integral to any viable counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, they were of fundamental importance to Magsaysay in the defeat of the Huk rebellion in the '50s.

However, as we know, psychological operations are supportive and exploitive of other programs; they cannot work in a vacuum. The Philippine Army is doing a reasonably good job of publicizing the evils of Communism. It is the other side of the coin that frustrates the psy-op community. How does one convince the peasantry that democracy is the better alternative in the absence of governmental programs that visibly and concretely address local needs and grievances?

Manila must show the peasantry what Communism truly is. Simply showing *The Killing Fields* at a required *barangay* meeting would go far toward this end.

—Michael L. Farber

Defending Day-Care

Dear Sir:

In "Brave New World" (Spring 1988) Karl Zinsmeister refers to day-care providers as "hired workers" and claims that we are detrimental to the welfare of young children.

In fact, quality day-care teaches children autonomy, self-discipline, and respect for the rights of others. Loving parents will find caring people for their children. Not the rigid, industrialized, standardized settings of which Mr. Zinsmeister speaks; but, rather, an enriching, caring, and flexible atmosphere where consistency in the day's events helps a child learn to trust and to feel she is in control of her life.

Mr. Zinsmeister also mentions that today's day-care use "marks a profound change in human history." Perhaps he is right, but it can be a wonderful change for the better. My grandmother had 13 children. She was consumed with bringing water to the house from the well, baking her own bread, preparing her own dough for noodles, cleaning, washing the family's clothes by hand, canning vegetables, preparing daily feasts for breakfast, lunch and dinner for her family. She had little to

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no time to provide for the social, emotional, intellectual, and physical welfare of each of her children. Child-care teachers do not iron clothes or make dinners while on duty. Their only job is to care for the little ones in their room, and to provide a program that will develop the "whole child."

It's time we stopped pointing fingers at child-care centers and the parents who need them. Instead, we should help these centers find and *keep* the kind of staff who will maximize the centers' experiences for our children. Most parents cannot afford to pay tuitions high enough to provide decent salaries for the people who care for their children. Teachers in elementary schools can make $30,000 for a 10-month year, with several vacation days during the school year, full medical benefits, and a good pension. But, because day-care teachers choose to work with preschool children they make poverty-level wages of less than $10,000 for a 12-month year, no medical benefits, and no retirement fund. Few can continue working in child-care. If our legislators subsidized child-care salaries, then we could stabilize the caregivers in our children's lives.

If our legislators subsidized child-care professionals' salaries, then we could stabilize the caregivers in our children's lives.

—Donna Krause

Some of our political leaders do not want the government to become responsible for subsidizing day-care salaries because of the "snowball" effect it could have. The truth is that investing in our children at the preschool age would save tremendously in the adolescent and adult years in social programs alone. Seems to me that would be the kind of ripple effect we all desire.

Donna Krause
Creative Learning and
Child Care Center, Inc.
Dundalk, MD

Scanty Evidence

Dear Sir:

I disagree strongly with Mr. Zinsmeister's conclusion that "day-care harms children." Only a thin thread of hard evidence suggests a deleterious effect, and that's only for low quality day-care. Haskins described heightened aggressivity in five- to six-year-olds in day-care merely as "a caution light." Jay Belsky and our Michael Reese research offer data that one-year-old infants in day-care are at risk for an altered quality of parental attachment, which does not translate into damage at later ages. Our "thinking" is correctly represented by the *Time* magazine quote that "the mother is the best caregiver for the very young child"; but thinking does not constitute evidence. The few follow-up studies of one-year-olds' secure or insecure attachment relationships have produced contradictory results. We are just beginning an adequately funded follow-up study of six and seven year olds who were given the strange situation test for attachment at age one.

Drs. Leach, Spock, White, and Salk give us their wise opinions that day-care is harmful, but their research expertise lies in other unrelated areas. Testimonials from equally eminent authorities on the other side are readily available. For instance, in October 1987, 16 national researchers (including Belsky) reached the following consensus: "When parents have choices about supplementary care for their infants and toddlers and have access to skilled, sensitive, and motivated caregivers, there is every reason to believe that both children and family can thrive." Deborah Fallows' and Linda Burton's colorful journalistic criticisms of day-care centers can easily be countered with equally eloquent statements of admiration by other popular writers.

In fact, Mr. Zinsmeister admits that "research on substitute parenting's effects on children is notoriously thin," but conveniently forgets this during the rest of his diatribe. I decry this article's intense politicization of the day-care issue, a technique used also by radical day-care proponents. No effort is made by either side to weigh evidence calmly, to recognize complexity, to present reasonable positions and data from the other side. Instead of a national debate that can educate readers and stimulate critical thinking, Mr. Zinsmeister cites a few of the "scarce" competent investigations, adds findings of weak studies, and mixes the product with the work of popular writers who express strong opinions unrelated to empirical research.

The creation of public policies guiding child day-care funding are far too important to tolerate controversy between the political Left and Right, using the deplorable tactic of debating the opponent's empty chair.

Peter Barglow, M.D.
Department of Psychiatry
Michael Reese Hospital
Chicago, IL

Editor's note: Please see Summer 1988 for other letters about Karl Zinsmeister's "Brave New World."

Urban League vs. Perkins

Dear Sir:

Joseph Perkins contends in "Boom Time for Black America," (Summer 1988) that black Americans have experienced tremendous growth and development over the last eight years. "Much of the credit," he says, "must go to Ronald Reagan, who initiated the policies that fostered the economic growth and job creation in the 1980s, and that produced the prosperity that most black Americans enjoy."

However, Perkins exaggerates black progress, and he introduces neither theory nor data to link what

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progress there has been to the economic policies and practices of the Reagan administration.

Perkins' conclusions and premises are important to black Americans, policymakers, and the general public. The prevailing sentiment is that the Reagan administration's policies have correlated with socioeconomic stagnation for both black Americans and the white middle class. If Perkins' repudiation of such claims can be substantiated, it implies a corrosion of reason among numerous black and liberal scholars whose inquiries have led them to the opposite conclusion.

Census data fail to document several of Perkins' supporting premises. First, the '80s have been far less kind to "average" Americans, black and white, than have the '70s. Median household income of all households, measured in *constant* dollars, was actually *less* in 1986 ($24,897) than in 1973 ($25,936). This shrinkage in median household income holds true across racial groups. White median household income decreased from $27,182 in 1973 to $26,175 in 1986. The parallel figures for black households are $16,001 and $15,080. If the time is narrowed to 1979, median income of black households decreased from $15,307 in 1979 to $15,080 in 1986. In contrast, white real median household income increased, but only by $104.

Second, there occurred a statistically *insignificant* redistribution of income from the white to the black community. In 1979, aggregate money income in the white community was 12.8 times the aggregate money income in the black community. In contrast, in 1985, this ratio had decreased such that the white community had 12.2 times the aggregate money income of the black community. The proportion of the population earning $35,000 and above (in constant 1986 dollars) did grow faster for blacks than for whites between 1980 and 1986. In 1980, 17.8 percent of blacks earned $35,000 and above. In 1986, this proportion had increased by 18.5 percent to 21.1 percent. Comparable proportions for whites were 37.9 percent in 1980 and 42.7 percent in 1986, producing a rate of increase of 12.6 percent. However, a similar trend prevailed in the period from 1975 to 1980. Such results do not support Perkins' implied notion that this trend was unique to the '80s and somehow a direct consequence of President Reagan's policies.

Perkins' argument regarding black Americans as disproportionate beneficiaries of the "explosive job growth" is similarly unfounded. Perkins argues that black Americans "gained 15 percent of the new jobs, even though they account for only 11 percent of the working-age population." But the critical variable for comparison is not new jobs versus the black proportion of the working-age population. Rather, one must examine the black proportion of *new* labor market entrants with the black share of *new* jobs gained. From 1980 to 1986 the civilian labor force grew by 10.9 million people, of whom 1.8 million were black. Thus, blacks constituted 16.5 percent of the new entrants but received only 15 percent of the new jobs. Black Americans gained *less than* proportionately from the new jobs created.

Similar errors mar Perkins' arguments regarding "steady growth in black college enrollment." Black college enrollment has grown, but not steadily. In 1975 black college enrollment peaked—32.5 percent of all black high school graduates were enrolled in college. By 1985, a number of factors had interacted to reduce this figure to 26.5 percent. In 1986, this figure had increased to 28.8 percent but still remained below the '70s high for black college enrollment.

Diminishing Returns

Perkins' claims regarding the entrepreneurial benefits that have accrued to black Americans because of the "current laissez-faire climate" are similarly inflated. First, the benefits of the last several years to business have been very much exaggerated. If an estimate of formation is inferred from the number of internal revenue returns, it appears that net business formation may have actually decreased during the '80s. In 1979, 16.2 million returns were filed. In 1984, only 16.1 million returns were filed. Additionally, corporate profits before taxes decreased from $257.2 billion in 1979 to $231.9 billion in 1986.

Using sales-per-employee figures, Perkins writes that the *Black Enterprise* 100 has grown faster than the *Fortune* 500. However, sales-per-employee ratios are a measure of worker productivity rather than a measure of financial performance. Perkins fails to document his thesis through the more traditional measures of financial performance.

Black businesses have progressed over recent years. The origins of such progress, however, clearly predate the Reagan years. From 1972 to 1982, for example, the number of black businesses increased by 43 percent relative to a 35 percent increase for white businesses.

Particularly surprising are Perkins' assertions regarding "billion dollar managers." A 1987 survey by Alicia Johnson of *Fortune* 1000 firms identified a mere four black senior executives next-in-line as chief executive officer. Other studies have found that blacks comprise fewer than 1 percent of senior executives. Within this 1 percent, black executives are disproportionately assigned to public relations posts and other positions that have less power.

While one can appreciate Perkins' efforts to bring greater balance to the dialogue regarding black Americans and the Reagan legacy, he does so with a loss of objectivity and accuracy. Much has happened during the Reagan years. In some instances the policies of the Reagan era are, indeed, causative. In other instances socioeconomic changes during the Reagan era were correlates of past policies and structural changes. Thus, the precise impact of Reagan's policies upon blacks is difficult to determine.

Douglas G. Glasgow
Betty Collier-Watson
National Urban League
Washington, DC

Dear Sir:

Joseph Perkins provides a great description of this Kennedyesque "rising tide" lifting the boats of all Americans. And the bare facts of black America's economic prosperity under Reagan pose a dilemma for

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the traditional leaders of the black community such as the NAACP: Should they remain in lockstep with the Democratic Party's entire agenda, or should they break ranks to support the GOP's proven, innovative approaches to minority growth, employment, and opportunity?

If black leaders truly believe that a strong, job-creating economy is essential to improving the condition of black Americans, then they should support the kinds of approaches that have stimulated our present economic boom. The NAACP ought to be a natural and forceful advocate of a 15 percent capital gains tax rate, payroll tax cuts, urban enterprise zones, urban homesteading and tenant management, a youth opportunity wage, tax incentives for education, and expansion of the earned income tax credit.

The NAACP's support for these pro-growth initiatives would give millions of black Americans the opportunity to climb the ladder of prosperity.

Senator Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
State of Wisconsin

Joseph Perkins responds:

I am pleased that Mr. Glasgow and Mrs. Collier-Watson "appreciate" my efforts to bring greater balance to the dialogue regarding black Americans and the Reagan legacy, and that they acknowledge that, in some instances of black progress, "the policies of the Reagan era are, indeed, causative."

I am also glad that they do not dispute my evidence that the black middle class has grown by nearly a third during the 1980s. Mr. Glasgow and Mrs. Collier-Watson acknowledge that the proportion of blacks earning $35,000 and above grew by 18.5 percent between 1980 and 1986—a rate of growth that was faster than that of whites. Nevertheless they argue that black incomes have not risen as fast in the 1980s as they did in the 1970s. Their analysis does not take into account the marked increase in the number of black families headed by unmarried women. If we control for this important variable, the 1980s compare favorably to the 1970s.

If Perkins is right, it implies a corrosion of reason among numerous black and liberal scholars who believe Reagan's policies have correlated with socioeconomic stagnation for both black Americans and the white middle class.

—Douglas G. Glasgow
Betty Collier-Watson

Mr. Glasgow and Mrs. Collier-Watson also cite an "insignificant redistribution" of income from the white to the black community. But nowhere in my article did I suggest that this was a measure of black progress. I did note that total money income for the black population has consistently increased over the decade. In 1987, for instance, the increase was 13 percent, to $238 billion. In 1988, the increase is projected at 8 percent, to $257 billion.

The writers agree with me that blacks have gained 15 percent of the new jobs created over the last five years, even though blacks account for only 11 percent of the working age population. To counter that blacks constituted 16.5 percent of new labor market entrants in no way refutes my evidence that proportionately more blacks are working today than ever before. Besides, the increase in black labor market entrants is itself a response to improving job market opportunities.

Mr. Glasgow and Mrs. Collier-Watson agree with me that black college enrollment has grown but argue that the growth has not been "steady." In my article, I noted that the Census Bureau reported that black college enrollment had increased by 4 percent between 1980 and 1985, to 1.05 million from 1.01 million, despite a decline in the number of college-aged blacks. Moreover, the decline in the percentage of black high school graduates enrolling in college has been arrested in recent years, rising to 28.8 percent in 1986 from 26.5 percent in 1985. On balance, these numbers add up to educational progress for blacks.

Mr. Glasgow and Mrs. Collier-Watson acknowledge the progress made by black businesses in the Reagan years. Since they object to my use of sales-per-employee figures to compare the growth of the *Black Enterprise* 100 firms with the *Fortune* 500, here's another measuring stick: in 1986, sales of the *Fortune* 500 actually decreased 5 percent, while those of the *BE* 100 companies grew by 11.2 percent.

Finally, the writers seem unimpressed with the achievements of black senior executives in *Fortune* 500 companies. They assert that their numbers are few, and that, more often than not, they are assigned to relatively powerless positions. I think this is an unfair slap at the four men I lauded in my article, all of whom manage billion-dollar divisions and supervise hundreds, or even thousands, of employees.

In short, Mr. Glasgow and Mrs. Collier-Watson grudgingly agree with me that blacks have made progress in employment, education, family income, and business during the Reagan years. We disagree on the extent of the progress. I wonder why scholars connected with the civil-rights establishment often go to tortured lengths to find a dark cloud behind every silver lining of black progress. Perhaps they are con-

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cerned that if they ever concede that blacks are making progress, their organizations will have to find another line of business.

Don't Antagonize Japan

Dear Sir:

"Crimes Against the Alliance: The Toshiba-Kongsberg Export Violations" (Spring 1988), by William Triplett, II, made me wonder if history is repeating itself in the Pacific.

Tripplett faults Japan for failing to discover the subterfuge of a small, obscure Japanese machine tool manufacturer and, after it was revealed, for dragging its heels to admit its fault. He also faults Toshiba Corporation, parent of the defecting machine tool company, which had nothing to do with the defection, (the machine tool company was controlled and operated entirely separately). The article also mentions unsubstantiated allegations that Toshiba Corporation illegally exported COCOM-controlled microelectronics assembly lines to the East Bloc, despite the fact that this has been repeatedly denied by Toshiba.

Triplett also trumpets the fact that, with almost unanimous approval of its members, Congress has enacted trade legislation that prohibits sales in the U.S. of Toshiba Corporation products for a period of time and appoints a monitor of future trade relations in Japan.

I have no doubt that the punitive measures adopted by Congress were inspired by a righteous sense of moral indignation. However, the real question is *not* whether the punitive action was justified.

Today, Japan's affairs are controlled by individuals friendly to the United States who believe that its destiny lies with the West. Their tenure in office, however, is by no means assured. There are dissident groups in the Japanese electorate (including its farmers) who are disenchanted with the United States.

Our ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, believes the single most important relationship in the future of the United States is the continuance of a warm relationship with Japan. Admiral Ronald Hayes, Commander-in-Chief of our Pacific forces, has demonstrated that, despite Gorbachev's "glasnost," the Soviets are making a play for supremacy in the Pacific. Few would deny that the most effective way for the Soviets to achieve their objective would be to replace the present Japanese government with one that actively invites trade with the Soviets.

The most effective way for the Soviets to gain supremacy in the Pacific would be to replace the present Japanese government with one that actively invites trade with the Soviets.

—Frederic P. Rich

Learning from History

To those who say it could not happen, let us not forget the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. At that time we had the same sense of righteous indignation over Japan's invasions of mainland China and its occupation of Indochina at the invitation of the Vichy French. At that time we were indifferent to the overtures of Prince Konoye when he controlled Japan's affairs as its prime minister. He had suggested a negotiation at the summit, looking to a withdrawal of Japan from China—a proposal that our then ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, believed to be of much importance. Because of our indifference, Prince Konoye was finally replaced by Tojo, General of the Japanese Army.

On November 26, 1941, the U.S. vented its displeasure at Japan's military inroads in China by issuing its ultimatum: cutting off Japan from its essential supply of oil. Japan's immediate reaction was to send its fleet to bomb Pearl Harbor.

The ensuing war in the Pacific maimed or killed millions. It also brought the advent of the atomic bomb. Today atomic secrets have somehow been obtained by the Soviets with the threat of the complete annihilation of mankind.

The trade bill mentioned above was vetoed on other entirely irrelevant grounds. In considering its provisions again, should we not take into account that finding ways to vent our spite is not always the most effective way of conducting our foreign relations?

Frederic P. Rich
Southold, NY

Cultural Pragmatism

Dear Sir:

Bill Lind and I welcome Philip Lawler's thoughtful review (Spring 1988) of our *Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National Agenda.* Mr. Lawler asks, "How does one go about setting an agenda for the transformation of culture?" He asks this under a proviso: given that one seeks "to restore an old, respected, and bountiful culture, not to overturn it and start anew." The given is important: it means that the task is neither to invent a culture out of thin air nor to resurrect one from the grave. The culture that is "old, respected, and bountiful" is one we still have, although its influence is diminishing.

We have not failed to face this fair question. If one seeks to restore an existing culture to strength, one should isolate the factors that are making it weak, robbing it of influence, and propose ways to counteract those factors. *Cultural Conservatism* has done exactly that. We have isolated some factors in the pop culture, some in the structures of institutions, some in the ideologies of the day, and a great many factors in public policy. We have found that many government policies produce dysfunctional cul-

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ture and/or advance the agendas of culturally radical cliques. We propose to stop and reverse these policies by giving conservatives in both parties an agenda on which they can attract broad support and govern creatively.

By Lawler's lights, however, this makes *Cultural Conservatism* "just another book about politics." He sees our indebtedness to Russell Kirk and so reminds us that, according to Kirk, culture flows out of the cult, the common worship of a society. So the strength of a culture is the strength of the shared beliefs that it communicates. Lawler concedes that these are not exclusively religious beliefs, since they include other "fundamental concepts about the nature of human life." Yet he continually complains that our agenda is missing the *unum necessarium:* a plan for "the resuscitation of faith."

It is ironic, then, that Lawler's complaint is not sustained by Russell Kirk. In his recent lecture, "The Culture Conservatives," given at The Heritage Foundation, Kirk applauded the fact that in our book "political action would be devised to emancipate, not direct, the practice of religion." He added: "The Cultural Conservatives do not fancy that their efforts can restore the cult. That, if it is to occur, lies beyond the scope of institutes. As George Washington put it concerning the Constitution, 'The event is in the hand of God.' Yet meanwhile practical measures may be undertaken to shore up our culture—indeed, to breathe fresh life into it."

Deregulating Religion

Kirk has understood us perfectly. Religion in America does not need to be breathed upon, as though it were a dying fire. Many conservative churches and denominations are growing by leaps and bounds. But religion needs to be released from excessive restrictions, which prevent churches and synagogues from making their full contribution to the well-being of our families, schools, communities, and less fortunate neighbors. We propose a series of measures to ease the restrictions.

On another front, Lawler accuses us of misunderstanding or under-utilizing "the natural law tradition." He accuses us of denying that there are "natural rights," for example, because we say, "Unless a nation's culture supports a right, it will have no real existence." But we were not addressing the natural-law issue. Rather, we were stressing a practical truth, evident to anyone who visits Cambodia these days, or Uganda. Lawler also suspects theoretical error to be lurking in the fact that we frequently use the term 'values' when speaking of moral matters, rather than "facts." But here Lawler misses the point that our book was written for a broad audience, most of whom would not be familiar with the exactitudes of conservative metaphysical objection to Hume and Weber. We chose to communicate, in other words, rather than to fight semantic wars of limited interest. For those who wish to know our own philosophical thinking on these matters, a forthcoming Cultural Conservative Policy Insight entitled, "Cultural Conservatism and Transcendent Norms" should set the record straight.

Perhaps most fundamentally, Lawler undervalues a point we made quite early in the book. We stated, "The agenda offered here is an agenda for governing." As Paul Weyrich has noted repeatedly, the conservative movement does a poor job of preparing itself to govern. Unless we reverse that—unless we prepare ourselves to govern—we will continue to lose the battle even when we win elections. The position Lawler seems to advocate, of waiting for a revival of the cult to restore the culture, abdicates the responsibility to govern and perpetuates the problem.

Still, no one can deny that a cultural agenda must contain many more private-sector initiatives than Bill Lind and I have been able to enumerate. It cannot be exclusively political. In the long run, it will not even be predominantly political—for a healthy culture counterbalances political (and economic) forces. Insofar as Lawler's intention was to remind us of this, his point is certainly well taken.

W. H. Marshner
Institute for Cultural Conservatism
Washington, DC

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WE DON'T JUST REPORT THE NEWS. WE *MAKE* NEWS.

On the Sandinistas:
Contra military commander Enrique Bermudez charged in POLICY REVIEW that "the Sandinistas have played the United States for a fool." *New York Times*

On Jeane Kirkpatrick:
In a POLICY REVIEW interview Jeane Kirkpatrick said: "The single most important change in my views in the last decade has been a much greater appreciation of market economics." *John Chamberlain, King Features Syndicate*

On Our Judeo-Christian Heritage:
In POLICY REVIEW Rabbi Joshua Haberman said that the bulwark we have against tyranny in this country is our firm belief in God and our firm belief in some standard of authority above government. *Pat Robertson, "Candidates '88 with Marvin Kalb"*

On the Evil Empire:
Picking up from President Reagan's phrase "evil empire," POLICY REVIEW's article, "Seventy Years of Evil," encapsulates some of the grimmer episodes of Soviet history. It is important reading. *Boston Globe*

On SDI:
Bob, you've talked about support for SDI, but you wrote in POLICY REVIEW that you would use it as a negotiating chip. *Representative Jack Kemp to Senator Bob Dole, NBC Presidential Debate*

On Republican Party Politics:
Jack Kemp elaborates the anti-establishment conservative case in POLICY REVIEW: "Despite its smaller size, only the activist wing can set the direction for the whole [Republican] party." The "establishment wing" is merely interested in "managing the status quo." *Sidney Blumenthal, Washington Post*

On Conservatism's Parched Grass Roots:
Amy Moritz wrote in POLICY REVIEW that the current state of the conservative movement is weak because in most cases leaders don't call on the millions of grass-roots activists except for financial contributions. *Washington Times*

On Media Bias:
ABC-TV reporter Rebecca Chase admitted that network producers, hell-bent on locating dire hunger, asked her "to scour the small towns of Mississippi to find hungry people . . . but I couldn't find any," she said in POLICY REVIEW. *Fred Barnes, Reader's Digest*

On the Family Farmer:
From "family farmer" Blake Hurst's article in POLICY REVIEW: "We don't really like accepting subsidies. But if we didn't enroll in government farm programs, our corn would be worth $1.80 a bushel; because we participate, we receive $3. Everybody has his price. Now you know ours." *Wall Street Journal*

On Crime and Punishment:
[In POLICY REVIEW Charles] Colson, former special counsel to President Nixon, makes a pretty good case for alternative sentencing, including restitution to victims of nonviolent crime. *William Raspberry, Washington Post*

On Angola:
Savimbi's strategy, as he outlines in POLICY REVIEW, is " . . . to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and the Soviets can no longer bear the burden." *Norman Podhoretz, Washington Post*

On Anti-Communism:
POLICY REVIEW . . . is the organ of the Heritage Foundation—the brain center of the most rabid reaction. *Pravda*

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

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policy REVIEW

For me, as for most young conservatives, the '60s were the decade not of John F. Kennedy but Barry M. Goldwater, not Students for a Democratic Society but Young Americans for Freedom, not Herbert Marcuse but Russell Kirk, not Norman Mailer but Ayn Rand, not a "meaningless" civil war in Vietnam but an important battle in the protracted conflict against Communism.

Lee Edwards
The Other Sixties:
A Flag-Waver's Memoir

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